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This thesis is focused on examining the lack of balance of interests between transnational 
corporations (TNCs) and host developing states. It also examines the aspirational 
differences between the parties vis-à-vis the investment practice(s) over the past few 
decades and reviews the perception of foreign direct investments (FDIs). The contribution 
of TNCs has been a heated topic of debates in international circles and policy-makers 
were unable to find solutions, not for the lack of attempts such as the UN draft codes of 
conduct on TNCs, the Havana Charter, MAIs and others, but due to gaps in aspirations 
between the parties, the negotiations were unsuccessful. There were also some successful 
attempts from the developing states, namely the UN Declaration on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the UN Charter on Economic Rights and Duties 
of States. This revealed the limits of law in regulating the conduct of TNCs in host 
developing states during the course of foreign investments. Emphasis is given to the 
capacity building and the system of protection of investments, namely by means of bi-
lateral investment treaties (BITs), as well as protecting the interests of both of the parties. 
International efforts to regulate foreign investments are gaining momentum. Research 
showed that changes are underway and the re-negotiations clause might be a way forward. 
It also makes an attempt in understanding the international investment law and increasing 
frustration with the existing mechanism for settlement of investment disputes, which 
arises from violations of BITs. It revealed that the role of law is of fundamental 
importance to offer protection to the investments and to ensure that both parties benefit 
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This research establishes the lack of balance of interests between transnational 
corporations (TNCs)1 and host developing states2 and makes an attempt at establishing 
such balance by exploring the concepts and principles that contribute to closing the gaps 
between aspirational differences of the parties. It also evaluates the role of law in the 
relationship between TNCs and host developing states. It explores the role of private 
foreign investment as a key component towards socio-economic development, especially 
of host developing states. It further examines the aspirational differences between the key 
actors and analyses how aspirations of developing states and their government may 
contribute to socio-economic development. It critically examines the limits of 
international and domestic law, while controlling the activities of TNCs by means of 
codes of conduct.3 A critical analysis of some of the bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
is conducted on case studies and examples. While examining the existing protection 
system for TNCs as well as host developing states this research explores the role of law 
in balancing their interests for common goal of achieving socio-economic development 
                                                          
1 In the literature terms such as global, international, multinational, supranational, transnational, world, in 
addition to firm, company, corporation and enterprise have been used to describe companies doing 
business across the borders of their home-state. According to Dunning, David Lilienthal was first to use 
the term “multinational corporation” while addressing Carnegie Institute of Technology as chief 
executive of Development Resources Corporation of New York in John Dunning, Explaining 
International Production (Unwin Hyman 1988) 134-136. This research maintains transnational 
corporations, following the UNCTAD definition. 
2 According to the UN ‘For analytical purposes, WESP classifies all countries of the world into one of three 
broad categories: developed economies, economies in transition and developing economies. The 
composition of these groupings … is intended to reflect basic economic country conditions. Several 
countries (in particular the economies in transition) have characteristics that could place them in more than 
one category; however, for purposes of analysis, the groupings have been made mutually exclusive. Within 
each broad category, some subgroups are defined based either on geographical location or on ad hoc criteria, 
such as the subgroup of “major developed economies”, which is based on the membership of the Group of 
Seven. Geographical regions for developing economies are as follows: ‘Africa, East Asia, South Asia, 
Western Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean’. See The United Nations, ‘Country Classification’ 
<http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_classification.pd
f> accessed 20 March 2016. Note also that ‘…an increasing number of developing countries subscribed to 
basic standards for investment protection and treatment (while rejecting them on the multilateral level), 
though typically not to positive rights of entry and establishment, which remained within the discretion of 
the host contracting party’. UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements, Key Issues, Volume I (New 
York and Geneva, United Nations 2004) 9. 
3 The challenge of the codes of condut is that they are voluntary in nature and as such not legally binding 
or enforceable. See Dinah Shelton (ed), Commitmment and Complience – The Role of Non-Binding 
Norms in the International Legal System (OUP 2008).   
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and consequently socio-economic independence and the implementation of the rule of 
law.  
This research does not exclude the international organisations and their role in 
international law and in governing the relationship between TNCs and host developing 
states. Extensive literature review revealed that over the past four decades’ researchers 
have conducted numerous studies in the area of TNCs in host developing states4 and 
private foreign investment, but these studies were not done in a consolidated manner to 
examine all three components in relation to each other and review the effect that they 
have on socio-economic development, for which big gaps and contradicting conclusions 
still exist. This research attempts to examine the correlation and makes conclusive 
evaluation of the impact that TNCs conduct have on the host developing states5 and the 
contribution of private foreign investment to socio-economic development process.  
In 1971, Vernon6 critically examined the “intrusive conduct” of the United States (US) 
transnational corporations (TNCs) as private foreign investors particularly in the 
developing world. More than four decades later, it is still worth examining whether 
investment practice(s) of transnational corporations (TNCs) have changed, and if so, in 
what way(s). Would it effectively be possible to change the perception of transnational 
corporations (TNCs) in regard to private foreign investments in the developing world, 
particularly in the natural resources sector,7 remains to be further explored. 
Aspirational differences between TNCs, those of host developing states and the United 
Nations (UN) created complex international environment. Policy-making geared to 
striking a balance between the interests of TNCs, those of host developing states and the 
                                                          
4 See UN Doc E/5209 (1972) requested the Secretary General to appoint a Group of Eminent Persons to 
study the role of transnational corporations in world society and the Group produced a report 
‘Multinational Corporations in World Development’; UN Doc ST/ECA/190 (1973); Juha Kuusi, The Host 
State and the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of Legal Relationships (Saxon House 1979); The 
United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, UN Doc E/C.10/1982/6 (1982). 
5 Activities of TNCs in developing states became the focus of international attention after the ITT scandal 
in Chile. 
6 Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at bay: Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (Longman 1971). 
7 See ‘Natural Resource Chapter’ 
<http://naturalresourcecharter.org/sites/default/files/Natural%20Resource%20Charter%20second%20editi
on%202014.pdf> accessed 20 June 2015. 
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UN is overdue.8 The differences and conflicts between host developing states and TNCs 
can only be overcome effectively through negotiations and under the UN auspices.9  
Stereotyping of the perception of bargaining position needs to be reviewed. Developing 
states do have bargaining position, and it is important to appreciate that, until an effective 
alternative source of natural resources has been found by the developed world, the latter 
is very dependent on the supply of national resources by many developing states. What is 
needed is to change the perception of developed states towards private foreign investment 
whereby both parties would derive benefits from such investments. Developing states 
should have benefited from foreign investments in the form of reinvestment of profits for 
the purposes of capacity building, such as infrastructure, education and health. The term 
“bargaining power” needs reviewing as it might not be appropriate and therefore 
“bargaining position” will be used for the future reference.10  
Transnational corporations (TNCs) were seen as a tool for maintaining peace and 
stability. This was the foundation of the interdependence theory developed by Keohane 
and Nye in the 1970s,11 where they described how states and non-states such as TNCs and 
International institutions such as the World Bank, the United Nations and the International 
Monetary Fund, work together in a complex interdependent environment. Wagner 
maintained that ‘the idea that asymmetrical interdependence is a source of power is 
nowadays common in writings on international political economy’ and by ‘using 
bargaining theory’ it ‘show that asymmetrical economic interdependence does not imply 
that one bargaining will be able to exercise political influence over another’.12 
Another example of bargaining position of developing states was expressed in the 
‘demands for a radical restructuring of the world trading and financial system, under the 
banner of the creation of a New International Economic Order’13 1974 and the Charter of 
                                                          
8 See Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and Policy (Addison-
Wesley 2000). 
9 See Robert L. Rothstein, Global bargaining (Princeton University Press 1979). 
10 The word “power” may suggest abuse and coercion and will be therefore replaced with the world 
“position” in reference to the bargaining.  
11 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 
(Little-Brown 1977). 
12 Harrison R. Wagner, Economic interdependence, bargaining power, and political influence (1988) 
42(3) MIT Press, International Organization 461-483. 
13 UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements, Key Issues, Volume I (New York and Geneva, United 
Nations 2004) 9.  
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Economic Rights and Duties of States 197414 that was initiated by developing states in 
which they expressed their aspirations and stressed, inter alia:  
 
[T]he urgency to establish generally accepted norms to govern international 
economic relations systematically and recognised that it is not feasible to 
establish a joint order and a stable order as long as a charter to protect the 
rights of all countries, and in particular the developing States, is not 
formulated.15  
 
It is important to note that many important resolutions were initiated by the developing 
states such as the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States 1970. These inter alia include principles for 
the states to ‘refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State’, to ‘settle their international 
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and 
justice are not endangered’ and ‘not to intervene in matters within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter’ among others. 16 
On the recommendation of the United Nations Group of Eminent Persons (GEP)17 in 1973 
the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations and the UN Centre on Transnational 
Corporations were founded. The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution that 
condemned the activities of TNCs in 1977.18 The issue of adopting appropriate policies 
by the developing world was highlighted by the UN Commission on Transnational 
Corporations (UNCTC) between the years 1982 – 1983 when a number of resolutions 
were adopted, urging TNCs to fully comply with them and as early as 1985 commissioned 
a panel.19 However owing to internal factors and political instability most of the 
                                                          
14 UNGA Res A/RES/29/3281. 
15 UNCTAD Resolution 45 (111) of 18 May 1972. 
16 UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) of Oct. 1970, Annex. 
17 Group of Eminent Persons produced reports ‘Multinational Corporations in World Development’ UN 
Doc. ST/ECA/190 (1973); The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and International 
Relations, UN Doc. E/5500/Rev.l, ST/ESA/6 (1974); For views of states on the report of the Group of 
Eminent Persons, see The Impact of Transnational Corporations on the Development Process and on 
International Relations, UN Doc E/5595 (1974).  
18 UNGA Res A/RES/32/73 of 9 December 1977. 
19 See the Report from the Commission on Transnational Corporations, in 1984 the US had 406 TNCs, the 
UK 364 and Germany 142 TNCs in South Africa. TNCs have employed 600,000 workers and 400,000 of 
them were black. In South Africa, the activities of TNCs were particularly relevant as they were believed 
to have been contributing to the existing apartheid system. In 1977 a Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
regarding TNCs and social policy was adopted by the International Labour Organization (ILO). 
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developing states seem to have failed to adopt and implement such policies; in other 
words, private foreign investment is still, in general, an issue which is predominantly 
controlled by private foreign investors. Developing states should take responsibility as 
they have not been able to develop sufficiently, namely their judiciaries’ decades after 
their independence. Main reason was the lack of confidence and therefore developing 
states did not contest and negotiate better terms, and as a result they have accepted the 
terms proposed by the West.20 However the practice is changing significantly in the recent 
years, namely in Latin America, which once again is leading the way towards a global 
treaty on foreign investments. 
On the other hand, profit-maximisers must protect the interests of their shareholders.21 
However this raises another issue, whether it is ethical to earn profits, without taking 
responsibility other than through delegated boards of directors (BODs),22 some of whom 
are also shareholders.23 According to Berle and Means shareholders were passive owners 
by only exercising the power of selling their shares in situation when they were not 
satisfied with the management or the performance of the corporation. Shareholders have 
                                                          
Unfortunately, the declaration was not binding but it did set the ground for the Codes of Conduct that 
followed. See also Dirk Willem te Velde, Foreign Direct Investment and Development, An historical 
perspective (Overseas Development Institute Jan. 2006 commissioned by UNCTAD).  
20 Chile has been the loudest voice of opposition from the host developing states, which started the 
discussions and put the issues of regulating activities of TNCs in host developing states on the map. 
21 See Sarah Bradley, ‘BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders: The New Fiduciary Duties of Fair Treatment, 
Statutory Compliance and Good Corporate Citizenship’ (2009–10) 41 OLR 325, 333, stated that ‘the 
stakeholder debate is nearly as old as the concept of a corporation itself’; See also Edwin Merrick Dodd 
Jr, ‘For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees’ (1932) 45 HLR 1145; Adolf A. Berle Jr, ‘For Whom 
Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note’ (1932) 45 HLR 1365; Stephen Bottomley, ‘Taking 
Corporations Seriously: Some Considerations for Corporate Regulation’ (1990) 19 FLR 203, 206-213; 
Davis A. Wishart, “Models and Theories of Directors’ Duties to Creditors’ (1991) 14 NZULR 323; 
Andrew Keay ‘Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the United Kingdom’s 
“Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach”’ (2007) 29 SLR 577, 582–88; Andrew Keay, (2008) 
‘Ascertaining the Corporate Objective: An Entity Maximisation and Sustainability Model’ 71 MLR 663; 
Paul Lyndon Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (8th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2008) 507. 
22 TNCs have become very powerful and in the light of their power, activities of TNCs have to be 
controlled preferably by the United Nations, as the legal and political entity of nations as a compliment to 
the control exercised by the host developing states and their domestic legal system and judiciary.  
23 See also Loukas Mistelis, ‘Regulatory Aspects: Globalization, Harmonization, Legal Transplants and 
Law Reform’ (2000) 34 Int’l Law 1055; See Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning 
liability for defective products; see Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights; see European Commission, White 
Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165, 2 April 2008; see 
Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on injunctions for 
the protection of consumers interests; Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights. 
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surrender the control and responsibility of the corporation to the management by stating 
that the shareholders ‘surrendered the right that the corporation should be operated in 
their sole interest’.24 One of the main objectives of transnational corporations (TNCs) is 
making profits for their shareholders and not the social good-doing. 25    
Should directors be allowed to hold shares in a company is another controversial question 
awaiting clarification. What is the role of corporate governance in dealing with this issue? 
Both of which are outside the scope of this research.26 Corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) was created as an attempt to address this issue.27 Owing to constraints of word 
limits, any discussion of the concept of Corporate Governance had to be omitted. Among 
the issues that it should address is also the question what should be the principal 
obligations of an investor in a foreign jurisdiction? An investment made by private foreign 
investor should be beneficial for the host developing state concerned; as it is equally 
important that a balance between the interests of both the parties must be struck. BITs 
concluded between developed and developing states have developed a pattern which 
confirms that the issue of finding appropriate balance, as stated above, must be accorded 
paramountcy, including the equal protection and benefit distribution of both the parties. 
Activities28 of TNCs29 across national borders have challenged the international legal 
system as non-state actors in spite of the fact that states are the main actors of international 
                                                          
24 Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (first published 
1932, 2nd edn, Transaction Publishers 1991).   
25 TNCs and other smaller businesses over the globe have been heavily criticised for their lack of 
responsibility to society, mainly due to the fact that they are profit maximisers. In other words, any 
commercial activity that is or could be damaging or destructive. The policy makers such as governments 
have therefore tried to encourage TNCs and other businesses to include CSR in exchange for either tax 
relief or some other kind of benefits. The concept of CSR can be traced back to the 1950s; see also Archie 
B. Carroll, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Evolution of a Definitional Construct’ (1999) 38(3) Business 
& Society, 268-295; see also Peter T. Muchlinski, ‘Corporate social responsibility’ in Peter T. 
Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Investment Law (OUP 2008) ch 17, 637.     
26 See for example Bradley R. Agle, Thomas Donaldson, Edward R. Freeman, Michael C. Jensen, Ronald 
K. Mitchell and Donna J. Wood, ‘Dialogue: Toward Superior Stakeholder Theory’ (2008) 18(2) Business 
Ethics Quarterly 153-190. 
27 See also Joseph Heath, ‘Business ethics without stakeholders’ (2006) 16(3) Business Ethics Quarterly 
533-557; Jose M. Moneva, Juana M. Rivera-Lirio, María Jesús Muñoz-Torres, ‘The corporate stakeholder 
commitment and social and financial performance’ (2007) 107(1) Industrial Management and Data 
Systems 84-102; Samuel F. Mansell, Capitalism, Corporations and the Social Contract, A Critique of 
Stakeholder Theory (CUP 2013).  
28 See also Donna J. Wood, Jeanne M. Logsdon, Patsy G. Lewellyn, and Kim Davenport, Global business 
citizenship: A Transformative framework for ethics and sustainable capitalism (M.E. Sharpe 2006); 
Amartya K. Sen, An economic inequality (OUP 1997).  
29 Effects of TNC activities can be measured by the means of FDI according to John Dunning, 
Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy (Addison-Wesley 1992); UNCTAD, World 
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law.30 Bennett maintained that ‘good corporate governance at home and abroad, 
promoting economic inclusiveness and community goodwill, are important elements of 
international security’ hence ‘This interweaving of roles calls for new partnership 
between business and government, in which sharing skills and expertise can be valuable 
in promoting regional and global stability’.31 Haque32 maintained that:  
 
Globalization is a process of integrating nations, societies, and peoples in the 
domains of economy, politics, culture, ideology and knowledge through the 
transnational networks of capital, production, exchange, technology, and 
information, owned and controlled unequally by dominant states, 
organizations, classes, and individuals 33  
 
He also added that TNCs are the key creators of globalisation and as such they shape the 
world economy, control global trade, finance, investment, information as well as 
technology.   
Most of the published works on transnational corporations (TNCs) have described them 
as "agents" of development34 and even highlighted the extent of dependence of developing 
states, in general. Unfortunately, many of these works have also failed to examine the 
issue of responsibility. The boundaries of responsibilities of TNCs are usually confined 
to contractual terms determined through negotiation process; thus issues such as "capacity 
building" or "ploughing back of profits" or Build Operate Transfer (BOT)35 or Build Own 
                                                          
Investment Report – Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of Development (United Nations, 
Geneva 1999). 
30 David J. Bederman, Globalization and International Law (Palgrave Macmillan 2008). 
31 Juliette Bennett, ‘Multinational Corporations, Social Responsibility and Conflict’ (2002) (55)2 Journal 
of International Affairs 393. 
32 Shamsul M. Haque, ‘The growing challenges of globalization to self-reliant development in developing 
nations’ in Gedeon M. Mudacumura and Shamsul M. Haque (eds), Handbook of development policy studies 
(Marcel Dekker 2004) 535– 550. 
33 Shamsul M. Haque, ‘The growing challenges of globalization to self-reliant development in eveloping 
nations’ in Gedeon M. Mudacumura and Shamsul M. Haque (eds), Handbook of development policy studies 
(Marcel Dekker 2004) 535– 550. 
34 When economic growth concept became equal to the economic development concept the dominant 
indicator became per capita income according to Ulrich Menzel, ‘40 Jahre Entwicklungsstrategie = 40 
Jahre Wachstumsstrategie’ 131-155 in D. Nohlen, F. Nuscheler (ed), Handbuch der Dritten Welt. 
Grundprobleme, Theorien und Strategien, Vol 1 (J.H.W. Dietz 1993); see also UNCTAD, World 
Investment Report 1992, Transnational Corporations as Engines of Growth 
<http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir1992_en.pdf> accessed on 20 December 2015. 
35 Private financing for public infrastructure has been widely spread worldwide, where the private 
investors are the operators. In a way BOT is a form of public-private partnership (PPP) providing public 
infrastructure and services. See also A.M. Algarni, D. Arditi, G. Polat, ‘Build-operate-transfer in the 
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Operate and Transfer (BOOT)36 have not received much attention. Bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) made an attempt to protect foreign investors interests by means of fair and 
equitable treatment(FET), full protection and security, most-favoured-nation (MFN) and 
national treatment,37 mainly due to widespread phenomenon of nationalisation and 
providing for investor-state arbitration.38 As Vernon pointed out in his work, the 
importance of the relationship between TNCs and states is crucial in understanding 
international business or in other words, how a business works across the state borders.39 
Salacuse maintained that ‘in the early twenty-first century’ there were examples of 
expropriation where ‘the investor’s assets was transferred to the state or state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) through a variety of legal means undertaken by the governments 
concerned’40 which called for higher protection of foreign investments. 
Vernon maintained that ‘To assess the economic consequences of foreign direct 
investment, one has to know something about the nature of the resource transfer 
involved’.41 Equally to assess the key elements of negotiations by means of bargaining 
position, the key definitions and concepts have to be explained. 
Bargaining position is the ability to achieve the desired outcomes through the negotiation 
process. However, the problem occurred with the newly born independent states in the 
decolonisation42 process that have not yet developed a proper strategy for their further 
                                                          
United States’ (2007) 133(10) ASCE Journal of Construction Management and Engineering 728-735. 
One of the first substantial BOT projects was the Suez Canal construction in 1854. 
36 BOOT is a form of concession agreement between public and private partnership.  
37 Ever evolving international law on the subject of protecting the investors and the investments interest 
has implemented the fair and equitable treatment standard that are primarily based on the obligations of 
host developing states to the investors and their investments. While the obligations of host developing 
states have been discussed the conduct of investor has not receive much attention to date, see Peter T. 
Muchlinski, ‘Caveat Investor?’ (2006) 55 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 527 in which he explored the relevance of 
the conduct of the investor under the fair and equitable treatment standards. See also UNCTAD, Fair and 
Equitable Treatment series on issues in international investment agreements (United Nations New York 
and Geneva 1999); Rudolf Dolzer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: A key standard in investment treaties’ 
(2005) 39 Int’L Law 87. 
38 See further Konstantin Katzarov, Bradley Anthony Wilfred (ed), The Theory of Nationalisation 
(Springer Netherlands 1964). 
39 Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at bay: Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (Longman 1971). 
40 Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (OUP 2015) 315. In two highly publicised 
expropriation cases, Yukos v Russian government and YPF v Argentine government. Both investors 
challenged these actions as illegal under the international law under investment treaties. Both arbitrations 
concluded in 2014. Argentina settled with US$5billion in bonds issued by Argentina. Russian government 
had to pay US$50 billion, ‘which was the highest amount of damages ever awarded in the history of 
international arbitration’.  
41 Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at bay: Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (Longman 1971) 151. 
42 The United Nations played crucial role in decolonisation process and process of self-determination of 
people leading to independence of peoples and formation of sovereign states. Decolonisation is based on 
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socio-economic development. Developing states had respect for the developed states, 
which in many cases were colonial powers and felt that they were in some way superior. 
Five decades after the decolonisation the situation does not seem to have changed 
significantly in terms of their socio-economic development. Improving negotiating 
techniques and understanding each other aspirations may be a way forward. Developing 
states have to take the position that they will only engage in collaboration and accept 
private foreign investment from TNCs when it will be beneficial for both parties, and 
when the large portion of the benefits will go to developing states and not only to TNCs. 
There should also be an agreed share of the profits reinvested back in the host developing 
states. One solution would be to have it equally split between the TNCs and host 
developing states based on performance and transfer of profits clause. Other option is also 
plough back a portion of their profits in the developing states capacity building or buy-
back. In any case re-negotiation clause, should be included in the future investment 
agreements. TNCs have to therefore review their expectations, as high profits are no 
longer sustainable as they do not contribute to the socio-economic development of the 
developing states nor do they contribute to the stability of global political economy.  
Focus should be put on what can be done in the course of the current climate of private 
foreign investments and in the future. The best way to start is by reviewing the perception 
of bargaining position. However, bargaining position alone is not sufficient. Knowledge 
and the know-how have to be recognised in addition to these resources. Frank pointed out 
that the relationship between TNCs and host developing states is hostile and at the same 
time shares some mutual interests.43 It is not possible that TNCs will take over the role of 
the government in international peacekeeping, however in collaboration with the 
governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and civil societies TNCs can 
offer their know-how, business skills and financial capacity to contribute to the global 
socio-economic stability.44  
                                                          
the ‘equal rights and self-determination of peoples’, more specifically chapters XI, XII and XIII. After 
1960 the General Assembly released Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples, known as Declaration on decolonisation. Another document is resolution of General 
Assembly 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960.  
43 Isaiah Frank, Foreign Enterprise in Developing Countnries (Johns Hopkins University Press 1980) 25. 
44 See statement of G.A. Wagner, President, Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Senior Managing 
Director of Royal Dutch Shell Group of Companies in Summary of Hearings before the Group of 
Eminent Persons to Study the Impact of Multinational Corporation on Development and on Industrial 
Relations (United Nations, Geneva, 5 November 1973). 
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Governments45 should however, impose rules and regulations on TNCs. Notwithstanding 
that the governments often stand behind TNCs and their activities that effectively support 
profit-maximisation. TNCs have only one concern and that is to make profit for their 
shareholders on which their business performance is based. Friedman46 maintained that 
‘the sole purpose of a firm is to make money for its shareholders’47 and contempt the 
businessman’s “social conscience” and their concern about the ‘social responsibilities of 
business in a free-enterprise system’ and seriously consider ‘its responsibilities for 
providing employment, eliminating discrimination, avoiding pollution’. Friedman called 
these businessman ‘unwitting puppets of the intellectual forces that have been 
undermining the basis of a free society these past decades’.48 
There is a lack of restrictions and legislation especially on environmental issues, because 
they were not given the needed attention.49 The issue of environmental rights is however 
still in their early stages and call for new regulations to protect the environment. To that 
end a number of agreements were formulated, like the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, however some of the developed states did not ratify 
environmental agreements, such as the US that has signed the Kyoto Protocol50 on 12 
November in 1998, but has not yet ratified it.  
Distribution of ownership and control is another complex matter awaiting further 
clarification. In some cases, when TNCs did not have the option of ownership they 
                                                          
45 From the 1970s the ability of governments to maintain control has been deteriorating according to 
Kevin Phillips, American theocracy: The peril and politics of radical religion, oil, and borrowed money 
in the 21st century (Viking 2006).  
46 Milton Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits’ The New York Times 
Magazine, (New York, 13 September 1970) 
<http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html> accessed 
on 26 March 2015. 
47 Steve Denning, ‘The Origin of “The World’s Dumbest Idea”: Milton Friedman’ Forbes Magazine 
(New York, 26 June 2013). <http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/06/26/the-origin-of-the-
worlds-dumbest-idea-milton-friedman/> accessed 26 March 2015.  
48 Milton Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits’ The New York Times 
(New York 13 September 1970) <http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-
soc-resp-business.html> accessed 26 March 2015. 
49 See Franklin R. Root, 'Environmental risks and the bargaining power of multinational corporations' 
(1988) 3(1) The International Trade Journal 115; Franz Perrez, ‘Cooperative sovereignty: From 
Independence to Interdependence in the structure of international environmental law (Kluwer Law 
International 2000). 
50 The Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was 
adopted at the third session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 3) in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 
1997. In accordance with Article 24, it was open for signature from 16 March 1998 to 15 March 1999 at 
United Nations Headquarters, New York. By that date the Protocol had received 84 signatures 
<http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php> accessed 26 March 2015. 
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insisted on having the control. Neither ownership nor control guarantees profits, on its 
stand-alone basis. The challenging part therefore is finding a balance between not only 
the bargaining position during the negotiation process, but also the ability to form joint-
ventures (JVs) and share the ownership, share the control as well as the benefits and 
profits. The only problem with the international joint-ventures (IJVs) that has been 
identified by case studies over the years, is the fact that they come to an end for variety 
of reasons.51 The high rate of failure of the JVs was owing to poor management, because 
the decision-makers did not meet their expectations. In the UK for example, in 2006 the 
Companies Act was passed that instructed the shareholders to work closely with the 
management. Hence the role of management and key stakeholders should be reviewed 
and geared towards employees’ participation in the management as well as employees as 
shareholders. 
Some of the developing states (Angola, China, and Indonesia) have started implementing 
revised foreign investments legislation and by doing so they have managed to improve 
their bargaining position.52 Developing states are starting to implement indigenization 
policies, and are regulating as well as promoting foreign investments. Several developing 
states have undergone severe reforms, such as Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Indonesia, South 
Africa and Venezuela and they continue to attract foreign investment. Some developing 
states are still in this process and others have not yet managed to start the reforms, mostly 
owing to the government instability.53 
Developing states are trying to take control through their jurisdictions, but lack access to 
the global markets. Passing new laws is necessary for developing states, however 
developing states are in a difficult position because by implementing new policies they 
are trying to assume control and attract foreign investments, while trying to maintain 
national sovereignty intact, all at the same time. Miozzo et al.54 argued that it may still be 
worthwhile for host countries governments to continue to set policies to attract foreign 
                                                          
51 See Joel Bleeke and David Ernst, ‘The Way to Win in Cross-Border Alliances’ (1991) 69(6) HBR. 
52 See Sue Liu, ‘Inside China: FDI changes in the pipeline’ (2015) 34(5) International Financial Law 
Review; Katherine Jo, ‘FDI changes draw praise, spark confusion’ (2014) China Law & Practice; Angola 
Country Report (The PRS Group, Inc 2014); Angola Power Report (2015) Q2 BMI’s Industry Report & 
Forecasts Series; Indonesia Business Forecasts Report (Business Monitor International Ltd. 2014);  
53 Robert J. Barro, Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Economic growth (MIT Press 1995); Paul R. Krugman, Maurice 
Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and Policy (Addison-Wesley 2000). 
54 Marcela Miozzo , Mo Yamin & Pervez N. Ghauri, 'Strategy and structure of service multinationals and 
their impact on linkages with local firms' (2012) 32:7 The Service Industries Journal 1171-91. 
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investments and ensuring collaboration with local firms simultaneously.55 That brings 
balancing the interests of TNCs and host developing states back to the forefront, together 
with the role of law in this relationship, which is the core subject of this research. 
To sum up, balancing the interests seems to be more complex than it initially looks. 
Synchronizing the reforms to be able to both, attract and control private foreign 
investments56 at the same time, only adds to the complexity of balancing the interests 
between TNCs and host developing states. Governments have a challenging decision to 
make, when it comes to investment reforms. There is no doubt that the chain is only as 
strong as its weakest link(s), which is why it is all about finding the right balance. 
However, there could be no such “right balance” without the order, and the order has to 
have the ability to exercise its authority. The order can therefore only be established, 
effectively by means of the law and the rule of law. Hence the role of law is of crucial 
importance. This type of order, in social or everyday life, could be enforced by simply 
following the common etiquette and customs. However, the origin of which has to be 
formed and written and effectively communicated to the wider global community and 
civil society. The existence of institutions to control the process of maintaining the order 
is essential for the rule of law. Without these institutions, the rule of law has no ground. 
Any such actions of ignoring or disregarding these two concepts, can result in sanctions, 
which again call for trained forces, to ensure its implementation and compliance. 
Arguably, the categories of morality, etiquette and social sanctions can be subject of 
legislative restrictions, customs or even ideology57 however there must be a uniform and 
unconditional applicable rule of law. 
Plato reflected on the origins and the practical use of ethics in his Euthyphro dialogue and 
argued for the existence of independent standards.58 Socrates on the other hand believed 
                                                          
55 Marcela Miozzo , Mo Yamin & Pervez N. Ghauri, 'Strategy and structure of service multinationals and 
their impact on linkages with local firms' (2012) 32:7 The Service Industries Journal 1171-91. 
56 The subject matter of admission of investment and the right of establishment implies that each state has 
the ‘…sovereign right to regulate the entry of foreign direct investment (FDI). This right is based on the 
state’s control of its territory, which carries the attendant right to exclude aliens from that territory. That 
right is absolute and can only be restricted by international agreement’. Ignacio Gómez-Palacio and Peter 
T. Muchlinski, ‘Admission and establishment’ in Peter T. Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph 
Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP 2008) ch 7, 228.  
57 See also Elman R. Service, Origins of the State and Civilization, The Process of Cultural Evolution 
(W.W. Norton & Company 1975). 
58 Plato, Euthyphro (Translated by Cathal Woods and Ryan Pack, Creative Commons, 2007) 
<http://myweb.facstaff.wwu.edu/nmarkos/Zola/Plato.pdf> accessed 29 March 2015. 
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that definition of justice has to be reformulated thought his audience methods of inquiry. 
Human nature as undisputed fact, which for unknown reason seems to only steer an 
individual towards just behaviour only due to the fear they will not be able to get away 
with the unjust behaviour and they will have to bare the punishment.59 The issue still 
remains to be clarified on why one should act justly, while an unjust behaviour could be 
more profitable, however unfortunately that is a subject for another research.  
Within the authority of historical, legal, socio-economic context, which has been 
established throughout this research the bigger objective has emerged on the ground that 
international institutions have been built with the focus on reaching and maintaining 
international peace, security and stability. Therefore, the role of namely one such 
institution, primarily the UN is closely examined in relationships to TNCs and host 
developing states.  
There can be many concepts relating to the topic of this research, however the most 
essential concepts have been identified and further developed in an attempt to ensure that 
knowledge of the main concepts will be helpful in appreciating the reasons for writing 









                                                          
59 See also Socrates and Plato, Politeia (The Republic written around 380 BC). 
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The reasons for developing this research 
 
Until the 1970s the issue of balancing the interests between TNCs and host developing 
states did not receive much attention from academic writers other than Vernon,60 Hymer,61 
Kindleberger,62 Dunning63 and to some extent Friedman.64  
In the 1960s and the 1970s developing states have indicated their aspirations. The 
evidence can be found in certain UN resolutions namely the Permanent Sovereignty over 
National Resources65 1962, Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order66 1974, and Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States67 in the 
same year. Despite the numerous efforts of developing states in this regard, they do not 
seem to have been met with success. The reasons were colonisation of the mind that left 
physiological consequences resulting in the lack of confidence as well as lack of 
consistency and government stability to develop reliable judiciaries, education, health and 
infrastructure systems. An attempt to review and analyse the reason for this has been 
explained in the following chapters of this research. 
There have been a number of conflicts between TNCs and host developing states68 as well 
as concerns over the impact of private foreign investments, while TNCs have: 
 
                                                          
60 Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at bay: Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (London, 1971); 
Raymond Vernon, The Economic Environment in International Business (Prentice Hall 1972); Raymond 
Vernon, Economic and Political Consequences of Multinational Enterprise: An Anthology (Harvard 
University Press 1972).  
61 Stephen H. Hymer, Hugo Radice, The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven Development 
(Penguin books 1975); Stephen H. Hymer, The International Operations of National Firms: A Study of 
Direct Foreign Investment (MIT Press 1976); Stephen H. Hymer, Robert B. Cohen, Nadine Felton and 
Morely Nkosi, The Multinational Corporation: A Radical Approach (CUP 1979). 
62 Paul Goldberg and Charles Kindleberger proposed a general agreement in international investment 
based on the GATT in 1970; Paul Goldberg and Charles Kindleberger, ‘Towards a GATT for Investment: 
A Proposal for Supervision of the International Corporation’ (1970) (2) Law and policy in International 
Business, 295 – 325.  
63 John H. Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy (Addison-Wesley 1993). 
64 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (University Chicago Press 1962); Milton Friedman, Money 
and Economic Development (The Horowitz Lectures of 1972); Milton Friedman, Why government is the 
problem (Praeger Publishers Inc 1973); Milton Friedman, On Economics: Selected Papers (University of 
Chicago Press Journals 2010). 
65 UNGA Res 1803 (XVII), 17 UN GAOR Supp. (No.17) 15, UN Doc A/5217 (1962). 
66 UNGA Res/S-6/3201 (1974). 
67 UNGA Res/29/3281 (1974). 
68 See further Thomas N. Gladwin and Ingo Walters, Multinationals Under Fire: Lessons in the 
Management of Conflict (John Wiley & Sons 1980). 
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[E]xpand their global reach, integrate national economies, rearrange the 
international division of labour, consume environmental resources, 
manufacture homogenized products for a world market, and deliver goods 
and services across increasingly irrelevant national borders, they irrevocably 
and fundamentally transform the society in which we live.69 
 
However, at the same time host developing states did not manage to achieve capacity 






In reviewing the past events that led to the current situation the conclusions will be drawn 
based on the historical research method. This research is based on primary sources of 
information, such as the UN Charter and other legal documents, constitutions, protocols, 
conventions, treaties, namely the relevant materials (Codes of Conduct and other reports) 
developed by the United Nations (UN), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and World Trade Organisation (WTO) in addition to referring to 
those of the relevant documents developed by various states, and regional bodies, namely 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Bank 
(WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), North America Free Trade Association 
(NAFTA) and various agreements such as International Investment Agreements (IIAs), 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). The bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) concluded between developed and developing states will form 
a very important source of information for developing the themes of this research. 
Descriptive method will be used to establish norms in like circumstances. Correlation 
method will be used in examining the relationships between the concepts that have been 
developed and their interdependent relationship structure. Comperative method will play 
an important role in comparing the past and the present events. Decisions rendered from 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and International 
                                                          
69 Eric Kolodner, Transnational corporations: impediments or catalysts of social development? 
(UNRISD, occasional paper no.5 World Summit for Social Development, Geneva 1994) 1. 
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Court of Justice (ICJ) will also be closely examined based on the case study method and 
examples that set precedence as well as awards and decisions of tribunals. Domestic 
legislation applicable to transnational corporations (TNCs) activities or inapplicability of 
such legislation, particularly when identifiable customary rules of international law 
and/or standards of international law70 are available. Decisions rendered by the English 
courts or by any other reliable judiciary and the relevant awards rendered by ICSID 
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes)71 and various ad hoc Arbitral 
Tribunals have been examined with a view to determining whether the decision of courts 
and tribunals, in particular, have formed part of the customary rules of international law. 
Evaluation methods will be used to describe the complex issues of civil society in 
developing socio-economic and political context. Opinions of authors expressed through 
their published works in the form of books and journals have been referred to as secondary 
sources of information, where necessary as they are divided in two main categories, 
supporters of TNCs and critics. Empirical studies have also been carried out in respect to 
the issues, where relevant. Method of analysis will be used throughout the thesis to review 
the ideas and principles in understanding how they affect each other. Comparative method 
will be used in researching and identifying common elements between different states 
and their systems, primarily in the context of balancing the interests between developed 
and developing states. Hypothetico-deductive method will be used in developing 






Based on this brief outline of ideas the following hypotheses are laid. 
1. How may it be possible to develop a technique whereby interests of both parties 
may be balanced? 
                                                          
70 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th edn, Routledge 1997). 
71 See also Investor - State disputes on Energy Charter 1994 <http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=7> 
accessed 20 May 2015. 
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2. A false notion of bargaining power72 has hindered the process of implementing 
the concept of balancing the interests. 
3. The aspirational differences between the parties are currently unreachable and 
some progress on this issue can be made, if only true bargaining position concept 






This research has been developed by relying on mainly two sources of information, a) 
Primary and b) Secondary sources of information. Whereas primary sources of 
information will include the UN Charter, Constitutions, Conventions, Treaties, reports 
published by the UN agencies, UNCTAD, e.g. OECD bodies, World Bank, IMF, 
NAFTA, WTO and other inter-governmental bodies73, non-governmental bodies, BITs, 
IIAs, FTAs, governmental reports, decisions of ICSID, ICJ and other tribunals and case 
studies. Published academic works in forms of books and scientific articles have been 
referred to as secondary sources of information. 
This research has predominantly been developed on the basis of primary sources of 
information; the secondary sources of information (books and articles) have been 
developed under two distinct categories: promoters of transnational corporations (TNCs) 
and their activities and their "critics". Transnational corporations (TNCs) should not be 
undermined in developed states.74 While TNCs ‘can foster social development in 
developing countries by transferring management skills as well as research and 
                                                          
72 To reiterate further on footnote 10, power suggests dominant position of one party over the other and as 
such cannot facilitate equal negotiations. Therefore the shift in terminology is crucial in achieving 
balanced negotiaitons, where the interests of both parties will be equally represented. One cannot deny the 
existance of power on both sides, it only suggests that neither party abuses its power and resorts to their 
bargaining positions instead. 
73 Such as: World Trade Organisation (WTO), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UN Global Compact with 
Business, European Union (EU), International Labour Organisation (ILO), World Bank (WB), 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA), International Finance Corporation (IFC). 
74 See Tagi Sagafi-Nejad and John H. Dunning, The UN and Transnational Corporations, From Code of 
Conduct to Global Compact (Indiana University Press 2008); Louis Emmerji, Richard Jolly, Thomas G. 
Weiss, Ahead of the curve? UN Ideas and Global Challenges (Indiana University Press 2001). 
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development (R&D) capacities, in practice their record in this filed is mixed’ furthermore 
‘governments in developing countries have historically criticised TNCs for not employing 
enough nationals in management positions and, therefore transferring only minimal 
management skills’.75 
A different kind of behaviour of TNCs in developing states has also prompted many 
authors to critically assess their contributions to the socio-economic development process 
in those states. As regards the first category of authors - the promoters, it has become 
evident that in developing their ideas they seem to have failed to appreciate the adverse 
socio-economic consequence of colonisation on the former colonies and the 
psychological impact of it on their minds and attitudes (colonisation of minds) - under 
this category would come namely, Dunning76, Robock, and Simmonds77, and even 
Kotler78, whereas under the second category the following authors may be included: 
                                                          
75 Eric Kolodner, Transnational corporations: impediments or catalysts of social development? 
(UNRISD, occasional paper no.5 World Summit for Social Development, Geneva 1994) 13. 
76 John H. Dunning, ‘Explaining the international direct investment position of countries: towards a 
dynamic and development approach’ (1981) 117 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 30-64; John H. Dunning, 
‘Explaining outward direct investment of developing countries: in support of the eclectic theory of 
international production’ in Kumar, K. and McLeod, M. (eds), Multinationals from Developing Countries 
(Lexington Press 1981) 1–22; John Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy 
(Addison Wesley 1992); John H. Dunning, Multinational enterprises and the global economy (Addison-
Wesley 1993); John H. Dunning, Making Globalization Good (Macmillan 2003); John H. Dunning, New 
Challenges for International Business Research; Back to the Future (Edward Elgar 2010); John H. 
Dunning and S. Lundan, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy (2nd edn, Edward Elgar 
2008). 
77 Stefan H. Robock, Kenneth Simmonds, ‘International Business: How Big is It-The Missing 
Measurement’ (1970) 19(2) Columbia Journal of World Business 62; Stefan H. Robock, Kenneth 
Simmonds, J. Zwick, International Business and Multinational Enterprises (Richard D Irwin 1977). 
78 Philip Kotler, Gary Armstrong, Lloyd Harris, Nigel F. Piercy, Principles of Marketing (6th edn, 
Pearson 2013); Philip Kotler, Hermawan Kartajaya, Iwan Setiawan, Marketing 3.0 (Wiley 2010); Philip 




Hymer79, Muchlinski80, Stiglitz81, Vernon82 and Perlmutter.83 There already exist a large 
number of secondary sources of information, but there is no need to go into details of 
these works, as each of these, generally speaking, come under one of these two categories. 
The number of works emphasising the need for a "balanced view" are very few, other 
than that by Kuusi84 and Stiglitz85, the Codes of Conduct or the various reports published 
by various international, inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations.86
                                                          
79 Stephen H. Hymer and Hugo Radice, The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven 
Development (Penguin books 1975); Stephen H. Hymer, The International Operations of National Firms: 
A Study of Direct Foreign Investment (MIT Press 1976); Stephen H. Hymer, Robert B. Cohen, Nadine 
Felton and Morely Nkosi, The Multinational Corporation: A Radical Approach (CUP 1979). 
80 Peter T. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (2nd edn, OUP 2008); Peter T. 
Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Investment Law (OUP 2008); Peter T. Muchlinski,  'Trends in International Investment Agreements: 
Balancing Investor Rights and the Right to Regulate: the Issue of National Security' in Karl P. Sauvant 
(ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2008-9 (OUP 2009) 35-78; Peter T. 
Muchlinski, 'Trends in International Investment Agreements: Calls for Reforms of Model Bilateral 
Investment Treaties in Norway, South Africa and the United States' in Karl P. Sauvant (ed), Yearbook on 
International Investment Law and Policy 2009-10 (New York, OUP 2010) 41-85; Peter T. Muchlinski, 
'Corporations in International Law' in Wolfrum, Rudiger, (ed), Max Planck Encyclopaedia of 
International Law (Oxford: OUP 2010); Peter T. Muchlinski, ‘Multinational Enterprises as Actors in 
International Law: Creating “Soft Law” Obligations and “Hard Law” Rights' in Math 
Noortmann, and Cedric Ryngaert (eds), Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law: From Law 
Taking to Law Making? (Ashgate Publishing 2010) 9-39; Peter T. Muchlinski,  'Holistic Approaches to 
Development and International Investment Law: The Role of International Investment 
Agreements' in Julio Faundez and Celine Tan (eds), International Law, Economic Globalization and 
Developing Countries (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 2010) 180-204; Peter T. Muchlinski,  'Regulating 
Multinationals: Foreign Investment, Development and the Balance of Corporate and Home Country 
Rights and Responsibilities in a Globalising World' in Jose Alvarez and Karl P. Sauvant (eds), The 
Evolving International Investment Regime: Expectations, Realities, Options (New York, OUP 2011) 30-
59; Non-State Actors in International Law, Politics and Governance Series (Routledge 2005-2016). 
81 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (Penguin Books 2002); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Making 
Globalization work (Penguin Books 2007); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Freefall, Free Markets and the Sinking of 
the Global Economy (Penguin Books 2010); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality (Penguin Books 
2012). 
82 Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at bay: Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (Longman 1971), 
Raymond Vernon, Storm over the Multinationals, The Real Issues (HUP 1977); Raymond Vernon, Louis 
T. Wells Jr., Subramanian Rangan, The manager in the international economy (Prentice Hall 1995). 
83 Howard V. Perlmutter, ‘The Tortuous Evolution of the Multinational Corporation’ (1969) Jan – Feb 
Columbia Journal of World Business 9–18; Howard V. Perlmutter, ‘Perplexing Routes to M.N.E. 
Legitimacy: Codes of Conduct for Technology Transfer’ (1976) 11 Stan. J. Int’l Stud. 169. 
84 Juha Kuusi, The host state and the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of Legal Relationships 
(Saxon House 1979). 
85 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Regulating multinational corporations: Towards principles of cross-border legal 
framework in a globalized world balancing rights with responsibilities (Grotius lecture 2007). 
86 Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/1982/6 annex 
(1982); UN Doc. E/5570/Add.1 ESCOR Res. 1913, 57 ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1A) 31, the UN Commission 
on TNCs, the role of the commission is ‘[c]onducting inquires on the activities of transnational 
corporations, making studies, preparing reports and organizing panels for facilitating discussions among 
relevant groups’; In 1975 the Commission gave top priority to the formation of a Code to be observed in 
dealing with transnational corporations (TNCs) and produced a Report of the First Session, UN Doc. 
E/C.10/6 para 9, at 2 (1975) where it highlighted areas of concerns and issues to be considered in Code 
negotiations ‘Issues Involved in the Formulation of a Code of Conduct’, UN Doc. E/C.10/17 (1976); 
Report of the Second Session, UN Doc. E/C/ 10/16 annex 1-4 (1976); Intergovernmental Working Group 
                                                          
on a Code of Conduct was established in 1977 by the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations in 
accordance with paragraph 1(d) of E.S.C. Res. 1913. See also Transnational Corporations in World 
Development, UN Doc. ST/CTC/46 para. 345, at 110 (1983) known as the Third Survey with an in depth 
study on aspects of TNC activity and impact in world society. 
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In this chapter an attempt has been made to explain some of the basic concepts as they 
are fundamentally important for the understanding of the issues with which this research 
is concerned. In developing this research, it is felt that misconceptions surrounding the 
activities of TNCs have impacted on the minds of many and it is important to bear in 
mind that in the final analysis TNCs are profit maximisers and the main objective of host 
developing states is to become economically independent. A way forward would be to 
sensibly negotiate a bargain between themselves and transnational corporations (TNCs).1 
Based on this premise some of the concepts will be defined, which are important for this 
research.  
Some essential concepts have been identified for understanding and appreciating the 
reasons for writing this research. In this chapter an attempt is made to examine some such 
concepts. It is also believed that these concepts are often enmeshed with popular 
misconceptions. These concepts will be examined in their appropriate perspective.  
One such concept is globalisation2 and the question of its benefits3 to the developing 
states4, while TNCs have been making substantial profits.5 The perception ‘that 
                                                          
1 See Fred Charles Ilké, How nations negotiate (Harper and Row 1964). 
2 It is recommended to replace globalisation with internationalisation as the concept of globalisation tends 
to be misleading and therefore internationalisation would be a more appropriate word to be used for 
future references. However literature refers to the phenomenon as globalisation with mixed conclusions. 
3 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (Penguin Books 2002); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Making 
Globalization work (Penguin Books 2007); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Freefall, Free Markets and the Sinking of 
the Global Economy (Penguin Books 2010); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality (Penguin Books 
2012). 
4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Trends in International Trade, A Report by a Panel of Experts 
(GATT, 1958). 




globalization creates poverty6 and inequality’7 is however yet to be examined8 as there is 
no evidence to support raise of the living standards in host developing states.9  
‘[T]he basic asymmetry between multinational enterprises and national governments may 
be tolerable up to a point, but beyond that point there is a need to re-establish balance’.10 
Vernon suggested ‘accountability to some body, charged with weighing the activities of 
the multinational enterprise against a set of social yardsticks that are multinational in 
scope’.11 
Another such concept is transnationality, as defined by Dunning.12 The most widely 
recognised definition is that ‘A multinational or transnational13 enterprise is an enterprise 
that engages in foreign direct investment (FDI) and owns or controls value-adding 
activities in more than one country’,14 ‘owns (in whole or in part), controls and manages 
income generating assets in more than one country’.15  
 
                                                          
6 Based on the World Bank definition of extreme poverty in 2008 there was 1,28 billion people living on 
less than US$1.25 a day; 739 people were without adequate daily food intake; more than 100 million 
children under age of five remain malnourished. See World Bank, World Development Indicators 2012, 
2-3. 
7 World Economic Forum, Global Risks 2013, 10 has identified severe income disparity as the global risk 
that is most likely to manifest itself over the next decade.  
8 Juliette Bennett, ‘Multinational Corporations, Social Responsibility and Conflict’ (2002) 55(2) Journal 
of International Affairs 393. 
9 The UN General Assembly adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development on September 25, 
2015. It includes 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to tackle poverty, inequality, injustice, and 
climate change by 2030. For the first time involvement of business in joint development with 
governments, civil society and UN agencies. Businesses are asked to help at the negotiating table by 
launching a Private Sector Advisory Group (PSAG) to help enhance UN-private sector engagement 
<www.sdgfund.org> accessed 25 February 2016. See also Peter Van den Bossche and Werner Zdouc, 
The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization (3edn CUP 2013) < 
http://www.book2look.com/vbook.aspx?id=9781107694293> accessed 20 December 2015. 
10 Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at bay: Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (Longman 1971) 271. 
11 Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at bay: Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (Longman 1971) 271. 
12 John H. Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy (Addison-Wesley 1993) 3. 
13 There is a controversial element in the meaning of the transnational and multinational. The former 
being the better suited to fit for the purposes of explaining the essence of its nature, which is operating 
across the national borders and hence inter-national as in “inter” between or among nations. Multinational 
on the other hand is not the best word to use to describe such enterprise, because it suggests involvement 
of multiple nations in the basic enterprise as founding nations, such as international institutions like the 
Leagues of Nations or the United Nations, where multinational can truly apply. Ergo multinational should 
only be applied when the enterprise in its essence is composed and owned by multiple nations, which is 
not the case for the enterprise as a corporation conducting business across national borders. However, the 
terminology has been misused for so long it is extremely difficult to reverse back to the clearer definition. 
See Cynthia Day Wallace, Legal Control of the Multinational Enterprise (2nd edn, Springer 1983) 10-13.  
14 John H. Dunning, Multinational enterprises and the Global Economy (Addison-Wesley 1993) 3-4.  
15 Neil Hood, Stephen Young, The Economics of the Multinational Enterprise (Longman 1979) 3. 
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The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) defined TNCs 
as: 
 
[I]ncorporated or unincorporated enterprises comprising parent enterprises 
and their foreign affiliates. A parent enterprise is defined as an enterprise that 
controls assets of other entities in countries other than its home country, usual 
by owing a certain equity capital stake. An equity stake of 10% or more of 
the ordinary shares or voting power for an incorporated enterprise, or its 
equivalent for an unincorporated enterprise, is normally considered as an 
threshold for the control of assets.16  
 
Lilienthal defined TNCs as ‘corporations…which have their home in one country but 
which operate and live under the laws and customs of other countries as well’.17 In this 
research the term “transnational” is used rather than “multinational”.18 However Aharoni 
maintained that ‘there was no general agreement on the definition of multinational 
corporations’.19 The UN Transnational Corporations in World Development series 
defined them as transnational corporations.20 The same applies to the neo-classical theory 
as well as according to the UN, development of a country is based on their Gross National 
Product (GNP), Gross Domestic Product (GDP), per capita income and growth.21  
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) definition of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) states that: 
 
FDI is defined as an investment involving a long-term relationship and 
reflecting a lasting interest and control of a resident entity in one economy 
(foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise resident in an 
economy other than that of the foreign direct investor (FDI enterprise or 
affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate).22  
                                                          
16 UN Commission on Transnational Corporations, Transnational Corporations in World Development: A 
Re-Examination (1978 UN Sales No. E.78.II.A.5.) Annex I, 158-159; The United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2002b) 291. 
17 David K. Fieldhouse, ‘The multinational: a critique of a concept’ in Alice Teichova et al (eds) 
Multinational Enterprise in Historical Perspective (CUP 1986) 9-10. 
18 This research maintains that all business activities that go across their national borders, should be called 
transnational, while Multinational implies involvement of multiple nationalities it does not however put 
an emphais on conducting business acros national borders. See also Christopher A. Bartlett and Sumantra 
Ghoshal, Managing across borders. The Transnational Solutions (Harvard Business School Press 1989). 
19 See Yair Aharoni, 'On the Definition of a Multinational Corporation' (1971) 2 Nov-Dec Quarterly 
Review of Economics and Business 27-37. 
20 See The United Nations, World Investment Reports, UN/WIR/1991-2016. 
21 See Gerald M. Meier and James E. Rauch, Leading Issues in Economic Development (7th edn, OUP 
2000). 
22 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2002) 291. 
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In 1962 on the initiative of Chile the UN adopted Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources23 that imposed some conditions on the foreign investors. The 
Resolution stated that:    
 
The exploration, development and disposition of such resources, as well as 
the import of the foreign capital required for these purposes, should be in 
conformity with the rules and conditions which the peoples and nations freely 
consider to be necessary or desirable with regard to the authorization, 
restriction or prohibition of such activities24 … [T]he profits derived must be 
shared in the proportion freely agreed upon, in each case, between the 
investors and the recipient State,...25 
 
The Resolution clearly supports the fair distribution of profits between the foreign 
investors and host developing states. However, the concrete terms and conditions of such 
profit distribution have to be agreed during the negotiation process in order to become a 
part of contract binding agreement. 
Since 1980 many academics have been researching the impacts of private foreign 
investment on developing states, namely Kumar and Mcleod,26 Lall,27 Lecraw,28 Oman,29 
Wells30 and Goldstein.31 First report in the series of the World Investment Reports was 
done in 1991 and until the present day the views are still split between critics and 
supporters of TNCs as private foreign investors, namely on the impact of private foreign 
investments on socio-economic development of host developing states.32 
                                                          
23 UNGA Res A/1803/XVII of 14 December 1962, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources; 
UNGA Res A/523/VI of 12 January 1952; UNGA Res A/626(VII) of 21 December 1952; UNGA Res 
A/1314(XIII) of 12 December 1958; UNGA Res A/1515(XV) of 15 December 1960. 
24 UNGA Res A/1803/XVII of 14 December 1962, Permanent sovereignty over natural resources I (2). 
25 UNGA Res A/1803/XVII of 14 Dec 1962, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources I (3). 
26 Krishna Kumar and M.G. Mcleod (eds), Multinationals from Developing Countries (Lexington Books 
1981). 
27 Sanjaya Lall, The New Multinationals: The Spread of Third World Enterprises (Wiley Chichester 
1983). 
28 Donald J. Lecraw, ‘Internationalisation of Firms from LDCs: Evidence from the ASEAN Region’ in K. 
Kumar and M.G. McLeod (eds), Multinationals from Developing Countries (Heath 1981). 
29 Charles Oman (ed), New Forms of Overseas Investment by Developing Countries: The Case of India 
Korea and Brazil (OECD development centre Paris 1986).   
30 Louis T. Wells Jr., Third World Multinationals: The Rise of Foreign Direct Investment from 
Developing Countries (MIT Press 1983). 
31 Andrea Goldstein, ‘Emerging Multinationals’ in the Global Economy: Data Trends, Policy Issues, and 
Research Questions (OECD Development Centre Paris 2005). 
32 See UN World Investment Report series from 1991 
<http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/WIR-Series.aspx> accessed 20 
February 2016. The UNCTAD have made an attempt to explain the relationship between TNCs and FDIs 
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This research attempts to bring clarity on the role of law, while investigating the interests 
and aspirations of TNCs, the UN and host developing states. These arguments are made 
using the balance of interests as a basic parameter and by drawing on the extensive 
empirical literature that assesses the determinants and consequences of the role of law 
concerning activities of TNCs in host developing states. Based on the review of the 
published literature, bilateral investment treaties (BITs), international institutions and 
organisations, contribution by various authors, decisions of ICSID, ICJ, international 




1.2 Bargaining Position 
 
Misconception of bargaining power derives from the strategy33 of achieving goals as a 
stronger power and it originates from the military34 history.35 Hence bargaining power in 
terms of force is a misleading concept and has been therefore replaced with bargaining 
position. Freedman added that ‘This balance requires not only finding out how to achieve 
desired ends but also adjusting ends so that realistic ways can be found to meet them by 
available means’.36 
To reiterate that the term “bargaining power” might not be the most appropriate term and 
has been therefore replaced with “bargaining position” rather than power. Developing 
states have bargaining position, and it is important that they recognise it in spite of being 
exposed to the “colonisation of the mind”37 and ideology of westernisation.  
                                                          
in terms of development. The reports cover a wide area relating to the activities and role of TNCs 
effectively in the relationship with the UN. 
33 Lawrence Freedman, Strategy, A history (Oxford University Press 2013) IX. 
34 See Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy, Military Strategy: Theory and 
Application (US Army War College 1989) 3-8. 
35 Sun Tzu, The Art of war (written in cca. 512 BC, Classic Books International 2009). 
36 Lawrence Freedman, Strategy, A history (OUP 2013) XI. 
37 Marcelo Dascal in his paper 'Colonizing and decolonizing minds' (Tel Aviv University 2008) defined the 
colonisation of the mind with the following characteristics (a) the intervention of an external source – the 
‘colonizer’ – in the mental sphere of a subject or group of subjects – the ‘colonized’; (b) this intervention 
affects central aspects of the mind’s structure, mode of operation, and contents; (c) its effects are long-
lasting and not easily removable; (d) there is a marked asymmetry of power between the parties involved; 
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The perception of bargaining position has to change towards striking a balanced 
relationship between transnational corporations (TNCs) and host developing states, 
notwithstanding that TNCs act as superior party. TNCs have to start recognising the 
bargaining position of host developing states. At the same time developing states have to 
start using their bargaining position and be more confident when negotiating investment 
agreements with TNCs.  
Bargaining theory states that parties in a negotiation possess power over each other, 
which can be used to affect the course of the negotiation process.38 Kobrin among others 
supported the idea that power usually derives from possession of attributes, which one 
party aspires and the other possess.39 Inkpen and Beamish stressed that bargaining power 
depends therefore on the availability of resources.40  
The main interaction between the TNCs and the host developing states predominantly 
takes place during the negotiation process, where the benefits are distributed between the 
negotiating parties. According to Kobrin ‘the actual distribution of benefits depends on 
agreed terms relative to the bargaining position of the host country and TNCs’.41 Moran 
argued that the bargaining model between host developing states and TNCs interactions 
consist of economic nationalism in terms of rational self-interest.42 The UN report 
reviewed key issues on the bargaining between TNCs and host developing states and their 
bargaining position to take the major share of the investment project’s benefits.43 
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38 Keith D. Brouthers, Gary J. Bamossy, 'The Role of Key Stakeholders in the International Joint Venture 
Negotiations: Case Studies from Eastern Europe' (1997) 28(2) Journal of International Business Studies 
285-308. 
39 Stephen J. Kobrin, 'Testing the bargaining hypothesis in the manufacturing sector in developing 
countries' (1987) 41(4) International Organization 609-638. 
40 Andrew C. Inkpen, and Paul W. Beamish, 'Knowledge, bargaining power, and the instability of 
international joint ventures' (1997) 22(1) Academy of Management Review 177-202. 
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in Theodore H. Moran (ed), Multinational corporations: The political economy of Foreign Direct 
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Reuber,44 Lecraw45 and Kobrin46 suggested that the attraction of the domestic market 
increases the host government’s bargaining position across a broader range of states. 
Bargaining position as the ability to negotiate, where “bargain” accounts for ‘discussion 
between two parties of the terms on which one is to give or do something to or for the 
other’ as well as ‘agreement between two parties setting how much each gives and takes, 
or what each performs and receives in a transaction between them’.47 
As mentioned before developing states do have bargaining position but often fail to 
recognise it for two primary reasons. One is the historical position of submissiveness and 
the second is psychological.  
TNCs often fail to acknowledge that developing states have bargaining position. Grosse 
and Behrman48 maintained that numerous theories on international business ‘fail to focus 
on the distinguishing characteristics of business operating among different nations’49 
where the fundamental element is the relationship between the firms and the 
governments. It is a two-way process. On one side the firm identifies the host developing 
state where they would like to conduct their business and the government of the host 
developing state on the other side regulate and makes policies on admission of private 
foreign investments. Hence, Grosse and Behrman suggested that the ‘theory can be built 
on existing bargaining power’.50   
Foreign investors and beneficiaries as well as the relationship  between  host  developing  
states  and  TNCs  can  be analysed in terms  of bargaining  position.51 In the past few 
decades the issues of bargaining position was based on the concept ‘that the stronger or 
mightier has a prerogative to dominate the weak’.52 While states bargaining position was 
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45 Donald J. Lecraw, ‘Bargaining Power, Ownership, and Profitability of Transnational Corporations in 
Developing Countries’ (1984) 15(1) Journal of International Business Studies 27–43.  
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primarily based on the military, economic and technological strength, the TNCs 
bargaining position is based mainly on their capital contribution. It wasn’t until the newly 
born independent states became aware of their sovereignty, which consequently made 
them aware of their bargaining position. Chatterjee asked ‘whether possession of such 
power should necessarily give a stronger state the prerogative to dominate the other party 
in negotiating any matter’.53  
The UN Centre on Transnational Corporations made a note in their study claiming that 
developing states can use their bargaining position in order to acquire new technology: 
 
[D]eveloping countries have generally shown pragmatism and flexibility, 
recognising that the world technology market is imperfect, that it is difficult 
to determine the reasonableness of the price for technology and that in the 
final analysis, the price is the outcome of the crude bargaining power of the 
technology supplier and the recipient.54  
 
 
The Report added that: 
 
[T]he purpose of regulation has been, first, to strengthen the bargaining 
position of the national recipient entities; secondly, to reduce the overall level 
of technology payments; and thirdly, to take an integrated view of foreign 
participation for evaluating the implications instead of looking only at foreign 
equity investment.55  
 
Government of host developing states were keen on achieving socio-economic 
independence and: 
  
To a certain extent, governments have also been motivated by the need to 
minimise unjustified transfer through transaction between parent companies 
and affiliated enterprises.56  
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Better negotiating skills do not consequently reflect stronger bargaining position. 
However, this does not mean that the negotiation skills are interchangeable with the 
bargaining position nor does it mean that they are the same. Bargaining position by 
definition is something that is determined outside, given the opportunity under certain 
circumstances.57 Bargaining position therefore also depends on the environment in which 
the negotiations are taking place.  
Ilké defined negotiations without the interference of bargaining power and has focused 
primarily on the negotiation process as an exchange of proposals and maintained that: 
 
Negotiations is a process in which explicit proposals are put forward 
ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the 
realisation of a common interest where conflicting interest are present. It is 
the confrontation of explicit proposals that distinguishes negotiation from 
tacit bargaining and other forms of conflict behaviour.58 
 
Phatak and Habib model59 explained the environment context of international business 
negotiations,60 in outer circle and includes legal and political pluralism, currency 
fluctuations and foreign exchange, foreign government controls and bureaucracy, 
instability and change, ideological and cultural difference, and the influence of external 
stakeholders. The immediate context in inner circle includes “relative bargaining power” 
of negotiations and nature of dependence, immediate stakeholders, desired outcome of 
negotiations, relationship between negotiators before and during the negotiations and 
levels of conflict underlying potential negotiations.  
 
The findings suggest that transitional governments as key stakeholders 
intervene at different stages of the negotiation process, have both direct and 
indirect influences on the process, and that they can change the balance 
of power in the negotiations, sometimes to the detriment of their own state-
owned enterprise.61 
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Alternative options might give TNCs better bargaining position. Kobrin argued that when 
conflict and compatibility coexist, a range of mutually acceptable agreements are 
possible.62 ‘The weakest bargaining position for the host country occurs when the 
investor’s opportunity foregone is the difference in positive net profits between 
alternative investment’.63 According to Schelling64 bargaining power is the ability to 
influence the outcome of a negotiation. The main interest of TNCs is making profit,65 and 
in this quest the executives work towards protecting their profit making interest and that 
is by acquiring control in respect to the bargaining position during the negotiation process.  
It is important to distinguish between bargaining position on one hand, and negotiating 
skills on the other.66 Brouthers and Bamossy argued that a key stakeholder may be able 
to shift the balance of bargaining position during a joint negotiation, and thus change the 
outcome of the negotiation process.67 Kindleberger and Vernon have accepted the 
bargaining model between TNCs and host developing states.68 Bargaining power alone is 
not sufficient, as knowledge, skills and experience can have much greater influence on 
utilisation of the bargaining position in the negotiation process.69  
The key stakeholder can influence the bargaining position of both the domestic and 
foreign firm by providing government controlled resources such as access to natural 
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resources, providing required license approvals, or providing currency conversion and 
repatriation of profits.70 
Bargaining position has an important influence on the industry structure, which depends 
also on the number of TNCs that could negotiate a joint venture with the State-Owned-
Enterprises (SOEs).71 Lecraw72 argued that when a key stakeholder take actions and try to 
restrict the number of potential foreign partners the result will be seen as a decrease in 
the domestic firm's bargaining power, however the key stakeholder has the ability to force 
a domestic firm to form an IJV, despite the desires of the firm's managers.73 These so-
called "forced" IJVs then create all kinds of different and intentional negotiation problems 
for TNCs, which do not necessarily happen in cases where IJVs are formed with consent.74 
This only reiterates the importance of negotiating the conditions and structure of 
ownership and profit sharing, which should become part of the legally binding terms of 
the investment agreement. 
Brouthers and Bamossy suggested that ‘ultimately, the key stakeholder can alter the 
outcome of the negotiation process by shifting the bargaining power of the MNE and 
state-owned-enterprises (SOE) participants’ and claim that ‘in the government's role as 
key stakeholder, it does impact bargaining power at different stages of the negotiation 
process, and that the impact is sometimes detrimental to the SOE’.75 Host developing 
states should better negotiate the terms and conditions of investment agreements, which 
should contain capacity building clause, re-negotiation clause, succession clause, 
performance clause and transfer of profits in addition to the protection of foreign 
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investment and set of standards of treatment.76 Kindleberger supported the idea that as the 
interests of host states and foreign investors are likely to diverge, the two parties become 
antagonists and governments seek to re-negotiate the initial concession agreement when 
the initial advantages of TNCs decline,77 for which re-negotiation clause must be included 




1.3 Ownership and Control 
 
How much does ownership really matter is the question that remains to be answered. As 
Madhok maintained that ‘there is still no consensus on the issue’ of which control is 
preferred dominant, minority’, or ‘equal, as measured by the extent of equity ownership, 
have all been linked to performance (howsoever defined) but with no consistent results’.78  
Berle and Means suggested treating shareholders as investors who have no necessary 
claims to control as ‘the owners of passive property’, because they have surrender ‘control 
and responsibility over the active property’ as well as ‘the right that the corporation should 
be operated in their sole interest’ and added that ‘Neither the claims of ownership nor the 
those of control can stand against the paramount interests of the community’.79 
Demsetz80 argued that ‘ownership tends to be an individual affairs’ and that the most 
notable “exception” is the publically held corporation. “Owners” of which tend to form 
the so called joint-stock-companies because the economies of scale only exist in the 
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operating of these enterprises and not in the provision of the capital.81 The reason for the 
stock owners and therefore the owners of the corporation do not (cannot) participate in 
the decision making process is again directly related to the economies of scale. Through 
“delegated authority” ‘a small management group becomes the de facto owners’.82 
However the partnership law commits the shareholders, in the case the corporation has 
debts, to meet the debts ‘up to the limits of his financial ability’.83 In the limited liability 
corporations ‘Shareholders are essentially lenders of equity capital and not owners, 
although they do participate in such infrequent decisions as those involving mergers’.84 
Ownership was separated from the control and the shareholders no longer had any control 
over the management decisions. The separation of ownership and control is not a new 
phenomenon as it dates back to 1776 when Adam Smith wrote about joint stock 
companies and stated that:  
 
[B]eing the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it 
cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch 
over their own…85  
  
Smith did not believe in this separation as he feared that the managers would be 
inefficient, because they would lack the incentives to operate as owner-managers would. 
Jensen and Meckling characterised the separation of ownership and control as an agency 
problem, a conflict between management and stockholders.86  
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Behrman stated at the summary of hearings before the Group of Eminent Persons that the 
main issue in the relationship between TNCs and governments was the issue of control 
not ownership.87 
On the complete opposite side of an argument are the foundations of the Bullock Report 
1977.88 The Report was a product of in depth research of new phenomenon that involved 
substantial numbers of people being employed by TNCs and the topic of ownership and 
control gained momentum. The European Commission drafted the fifth directive on the 
company law coinciding with the draft statute for the European company, which included 
provision on worker directors on company boards.89 At the same time union policy was 
translated into government action which led to the formation of the Bullock Committee.90 
Mjoen and Tallman91 and Yan and Gray92 claimed that control is significantly shaped by 
the bargaining power. Tallman and Shenkar93 claimed that international joint venture 
(IJV) may be created under the influence of a key stakeholder, in order to control crucial 
resources. Peng and Heath94 suggested that ‘the government controls the ownership of the 
State-Owned Enterprise’s (SOE’s)’, as well as ‘state's resources and distribution 
channels’.95 
Steensma and Lyles,96 on the other hand, argued that shared control creates mutual respect 
and a sense of fairness that promotes trust and reduces conflict between joint venture 
parents. Yang and Grey97 however found evidence for both of the opposing points of 
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views. Apart from the ownership, overall bargaining power and shareholder agreement 
and inside and outside control could also depend on the management.98 That would make 
management more important than ownership.99   
‘The relationship between TNCs and host developing countries can be viewed as a 
bargaining relationship in which each party has certain resources the other needs and 
certain goals it wants to achieve’.100 There are limited evidences101 that TNCs have 
developed the infrastructure in the developing states or have contributed to the capacity 
building.102 The UNCTAD report ‘stress the risk of FDI endangering local capabilities 
and extracting natural resources without adequately compensating poor countries’ 
however ‘in the past three decades has been that governments have become more 
favourable towards FDI’.103 Lall maintained that governments of host states are 
liberalising foreign investment policies when they identify foreign investments beneficial 
to the socio-economic development.104 
Host developing states can increase its bargaining position by using their right to change 
legislation, laws, improve political stability, and change economic policies that will create 
more favourable investment environment. Root argued that in most circumstances 
compromise is required.105 Furthermore, a host government can also withhold licences or 
approvals that are crucial for the operations of TNCs. A host government can exercise its 
right to restrict market access. Miozzo et al. research results showed that there is a 
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preference to global sourcing and maintaining relations with multinational suppliers, 
rather than the local ones.106 In any case TNCs ‘must make some key trade-offs’.107  
Developing states will not face problems attracting private foreign investments with 
balanced liberalised markets, which happened in the case of China. Latin America on the 
other hand had the support of international organisations,108 but did not manage to reach 
similar economic growth, nor reduce poverty, namely due to the poor management.109 
 
The UN resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1962 in Article 
I(6) stressed that: 
 
International co-operation for the economic development of developing 
countries, whether in the form of public or private capital investment, 
exchange of goods and services, technical assistance, or exchange of 
scientific information, shall be such as to further their independent national 
development and shall be based upon respect for their sovereignty over their 
natural wealth and resources.110  
 
TNCs as investors therefore cannot have ownership over natural resources of a sovereign 
state, only control to a limited extend that can be beneficial to the socio-economic 
development of developing state. In any case there is a need to close the gap between 
aspirational differences between ownership and control among TNCs and sovereign 
states. Furthermore ‘owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with 
the rules in force in the state taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and 
in accordance with international law’.111 
Fagre and Wells Jr.112 maintained in their study that the equity ownership would eliminate 
the control and economic benefits that the economists would consider to be priority 
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between TNCs and host developing states as a measure of the bargaining position. From 
the economic point of view ‘taxes and other financial provisions can assure the 
government economic benefits that are unrelated to the degree of ownership’.113 Stopford 
and Wells114 argued that when TNCs decide on the objective, their need for resources or 
their need for control, they try to negotiate it with the host country’s government.115 
Studies of restrictive host governments suggests that ownership policies do not have any 
across-the-board effect on ownership structure and actually their effect depends on the 
characteristics of the industry, the subsidiary, and especially, the host developing state 
which led Gomes-Casseres to suggest that the bargaining power is the essential ingredient 
for the negotiation process.116  
There is also the right to appoint board members or others with the function and 
responsibility to control the relationships and operations that according to Fagre and 
Wells Jr.117 does not depend on the ownership. Motivation behind the control is primarily 
based on political interests, which makes the host governments unstable and on occasion 
unreliable in the eyes of the TNCs, because ‘Politically unstable countries tend to receive 
relatively small amounts of FDI’.118 ‘The main exception to this rule are countries rich in 
natural resources which have managed to attract considerable amounts of FDI despite 
often unstable environments’.119 Ownership element therefore is more important to the 
TNCs and less to the governments of host developing states. This is also the reason that 
TNCs are reluctant to coexist in the joint ventures. However, Vernon ‘found that TNCs 
were sometimes prepared to accept – even to welcome local joint ventures, provided the 
bargaining position of the local partner was sharply limited’.120 Studies have shown that 
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mainly small firms in an industry tend to favour joint-ventures (JVs) as they are more 
pressed to expend, especially to the foreign markets than the leading firms.121 
The question that awaits clarification is if the ownership gives to either party also the 
control? When speaking about ownership and profit distribution it is worth mentioning 
that the full ownership does not necessarily bring the highest profits, because it has been 
proven in some cases that the reduced equity share could actually bring bigger profits to 
TNCs. Lecraw122 suggested that the control of critical operational variable by the TNCs 
is directly related to success. As mentioned earlier the countries have the ability to 
determine and define the restrictions on the equity ownership in various sectors of their 
economy. The same applies to the host developing states. Some countries might decide 
not to pose restrictions on the equity ownership held by the TNCs when other countries 
might have severe restrictions or even prohibit it in many industry sectors.123 There exists 
a third option to initially allow the equity share under the condition that the ownership 
share is reduced or eliminated over time.  
Vernon identified the following four factors as being crucial to determining the level of 
equity ownership of TNCs in their subsidiaries: 
 
1. The desired ownership level of the TNC 
2. The bargaining power of the TNC 
3. The desired level of local equity participation of the host country 
4. The bargaining power of the host government (including the bargaining power of 
locally-owned firms in the host country).124 
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Vernon considered both, TNCs as well as host states’ bargaining position as well as the 
desired level of ownership to have equal value when determining the level of equity 
ownership. This would suggest that TNCs do not automatically have the upper hand. 
Fagre and Wells Jr. maintained that ‘governments are hesitant to trade ownership for other 
kinds of benefits in an agreement’.125 Nonetheless Dymsza126 stressed that the idea of 
shared control as well as shared profits could be favourably considered by both parties.127 
In his later study he stated that in JVs, developed states’ contribution may fade over time 
and therefore the managerial responsibilities are likely to be given to the host developing 
state.  
Gomes-Casseres argued that ‘government ownership restrictions deter firm entry’.128 
Smith129 noted that small domestic market of developing state makes the origin of the 
foreign investor relevant especially when the products are produced for export. Venu 
maintained that TNCs influence the payment of balance of the host states and therefore 
possess a threat to their sovereignty.130 TNCs are ‘linking the assets and activities of 
different national jurisdictions with an intimacy that seems to threaten the concept of 
nation as an integral unit’.131 The question is if ‘the multinational enterprise undermining 
the capacity of nations to work for the welfare of their people?’ or is ‘the multinational 
enterprise being used by a dominant power (read “United States”) as a means of 
penetrating and controlling the economies of other countries?’132 Therefore Vernon was 
suspicious of foreign investment, which could be seen as a way of economic dominance 
of TNCs over host developing states by means of foreign investment.  
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TNCs would without a doubt like to have ownership when they are engaging in big 
projects that require high investments over long period of time. At the same time the host 
developing states are the rightful owners of natural resources and the foreign investment 
is due on their territory which will potentially have a huge impact on their economy. Fagre 
and Wells Jr.133 claimed that the bargaining position between TNCs and host developing 
states is influenced by the resources brought by the foreign investor and by the number 
of firms offering similar resources. 
As mentioned earlier, TNCs have the benefits of resources, high technology, product 
differentiation and most importantly the access to the foreign markets. The question how 
foreign investment effects socio-economic development has been addressed on many 
occasions. The UNCTAD report 1999 has identified the following areas: 1. Employment 
and incomes, 2. Capital formation, market access, 3. Structure of markets, 4. Technology 
and skills, 5. Fiscal revenues, and 6. Political cultural and social issues.134  
Berman argued that ‘regional economics has long been recognised as one of the most 
challenging and difficult areas of economic development’.135 Possibly because, the local 
economy is not only dependant on the national economy, but also on the fiscal, and 
economic policies of their trading partners. The most relevant question that arises is how 
both parties in the process of private foreign investment can benefit equally. Is such 
equality even possible and how could it be achieved?  
Gomes-Casseres136 suggested that TNCs can select the kind of ownership structure that 
they would like to implement for their subsidiaries, which he supported by two different 
approaches. One approach suggested that TNCs choose the kind of structure that enables 
them to reduce transaction costs, while conducting business in foreign states. Second 
approach is completely opposite to the first one and even suggested that it has nothing to 
do with minimising the transaction cost and that it is in fact not up to the TNCs to select 
the form of ownership. This suggests that negotiations process is of fundamental 
importance because ownership structure is actually agreed upon during the course of 
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negotiations between TNCs and host country’s governments whose outcomes depend on 
the bargaining position of both the parties.137 However based on the transactional costs 
TNCs have to choose between ‘the costs of using the market’ and ‘internal channels for 
transferring organizational capabilities’ which is crucial for separating internal and 
market channels and transferring their capabilities.138 Miozzo et al. claimed that there 
were only a few cases, when TNCs actually helped local firms to upgrade their 
capabilities, such as for example, introducing quality control procedures and product 
offers.139 
As mentioned earlier, entry restrictions might not be the only challenge for TNCs as the 
ownership structure has to be negotiated between TNCs and host states’ governments. 
Both parties involved have the trade-off options, which are again agreed upon during the 
negotiation process. Bargaining position in this situation could enable ‘one party to skew 
the outcome of negotiations in the direction of the ownership structure it prefers’.140 This 
is why bargaining position takes paramountcy in the negotiation process, where interests 




1.4 Sovereignty in relation to TNCs 
 
It has been highlighted by many authors that the relationship between TNCs and host 
developing states can be analysed in terms of the bargaining position.141 International 
relations are however conducted between sovereign states, which are also the actors of 
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bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Sovereignty is the fundamental principle of 
international law. In terms of sovereignty there is no difference between developed and 
developing state.142 Sovereignty also gives a state the right to grant trading privileges to 
the contracting parties under BITs, which are predominantly concluded between 
developing and developed states. While sovereign state can impose restrictions on foreign 
investors and result to taking of foreign assets, international law requires compensation 
payment.143 Sovereignty can also give a state the ground for higher bargaining position 
vis-à-vis TNCs. State practise on protection of corporations under the nationality 
principle still varies, because states can give nationality to corporations, however the 
emphasis is not placed on the place of incorporations but rather on the seat of TNCs 
management. It is state’s discretion to extend the nationality principle to protect its 
nationals or corporations across their national borders. In the recent years the practice of 
concluding treaties has become well spread.   
‘The state is a type of legal person recognized by international law’ however ‘the 
possession of legal personality is not in itself a sufficient mark of statehood’.144 Painter 
and Jeffrey have identified the following five distinctive features of a modern state: 
 
(1) are ordered by precise boundaries with administrative control across the 
whole; 
(2) occupy large territories with control given to organized institutions; 
(3) have to have a capital and be based somewhere with symbols that embody 
state power; 
(4) allow for state organizations to monitor, govern and control its population 
through police surveillance, electronic surveillance and record keeping by 
the “state”; 
(5) monitoring has increased over time. 145 
 
As the state is required to govern its citizens and control their territory it would extend 
that a state is also required to control all foreign activities on their sovereign territory. 
Bodin’s idea was based on the need for a system with clear and undoubted source of 
authority that leads to absolute sovereignty by saying ‘Majestas est summa in cives ac 
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aubditos legibusque solute potestas’.146 He was convinced that is it the lack of strong 
government that creates turmoil and as a result of this conflict State is born. According 
to Bodin stability is not attainable in contrary to the belief of the social contract school. 
Bodin’s definition of sovereignty ‘la puissance absolue et perpétuelle d'une 
République’.147 The most important aspect of sovereignty is that there is no time 
limitation (perpetual principle), because only in such condition sovereignty is possible. 
That means that anyone or anything not timeless is less than sovereign.  
Oppenheimer as “market socialist” opposed the idea of “social contract” as founding 
reason for a state and its guarantee of security, safety and prosperity. According to 
Oppenheimer the formation of a state as ‘social institution’ is based on domination of one 
group of people over another group. Moreover, a state is ‘a social institution, forced by a 
victorious group of men on a defeated group, with the sole purpose of regulating the 
domino of the victorious group over the vanquished, and securing itself against revolt 
from within and attacks from abroad’.148 Oppenhaimer made an important distinction 
between the “economic means” and “political means”.149 This could also be understood 
as ways of acquiring wealth by coercion or by conducting peaceful trade.   
Early states150 have already had the element of development and have included the 
interaction with other states. Wright argued that crucial concept for understanding ’the 
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emergence of states – the development of internally specialized governance – as a key to 
understanding the rise of civilizations’.151 
Childe in his concept of “urban revolution” stated that ‘there seemed a glaring conflict on 
economic interests’ between the ruling classes and those ‘excluded from the spiritual 
benefits of civilization’152 and as a result ‘guarantee them security in a new social 
organization’.153 This indicates the importance of security as an important element as early 
as 5000 years ago.  
Marxian154 understanding of a state as a product of society during one of the stages of its 
development is based on the repressive force, whose only interest is to protect the 
economic interests of the ruling or dominant class, who is also the class that controls the 
state. Engels added that the state enables the economically dominant class to become the 
politically dominant.155  
Bodin156 defined sovereignty as an absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth and 
as such had believed that the power of the state had to be embodied in the prince or other 
appointed leader. Furthermore, the most important condition of sovereignty is that it has 
to be single, unlimited and absolute. Many scholars agree that theories of Bodin, Grotius 
and even Blackstone failed to include the dimension of political power. More recent 
theories however lack in providing tangible reasons of why should any citizen be at the 
mercy of this co called “sovereign leader” when at the same time all citizens ought to be 
equal in their rights and responsibilities. There is a big gap in research regarding the 
people in power and their accountability and the shortcomings of law to bind them to the 
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rules and regulations that apply to all other citizens, however it is unfortunately outside 
the scope of this research.157  
Habermas maintained that ‘the source of all legitimacy lies in the democratic law-making 
process, and this in turn calls on the principle of popular sovereignty’.158 Austin however 
had a different view on sovereignty. According to Austin sovereignty is unique and 
therefore cannot be shared among two or anybody else for that matter, because as soon 
as it is no longer unique it is ergo no longer sovereign. Branch159 for example argued that 
the nation state is actually a by-product of the 15th century map-making technology 
improvement.   
There might be a justified concern that state sovereignty is in danger. One of such 
examples is the UN treaty to formulate International Criminal Court (ICC)160 that will 
have the power to judge and consequently punish or imprison anyone, anywhere in the 
world for war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.  
Ferreira-Snyman161 stated that the idea of absolute sovereignty is an outdated concept, 
especially due to the trend of interdependence and co-operation, internationalisation and 
universalisation of human rights. Perrez argued that ’International law is based on the 
principle of sovereignty’ and that ‘sovereignty is the most important if not the only 
structural principle of international law that shapes the content of nearly all rules of 
international law’, and added that sovereignty is the ‘cornerstone of international law’.162  
Oppenheim noted that there is ‘no conception, the meaning of which is more controversial 
than that of sovereignty’ and that it ‘had never had a meaning which was universally 
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agreed upon’. 163 Ferreira-Snyman stated that ‘Sovereignty is the most extensive form of 
jurisdiction under international law. In general terms, it denotes full and unchallengeable 
power over a piece of territory and all the persons from time to time therein’.164  
Dicey provided the following explanation on the legal and political sovereignty stating 
that:  
 
[W]hereas as a “merely legal conception”, sovereignty is “the power of law-
making unrestricted by any legal limit”, by contrast ‘that body is “politically” 
sovereign or supreme in a state the will of which is ultimately obeyed by the 
citizens of the state.165  
 
Power without restriction is on this view the key idea. Power of one kind, normative 
power or “authority” is conferred by law. This may be a power of law-making in a certain 
territory conferred by a certain constitutional order that is effectively observed in that 
territory. MacCormick maintained that:  
 
Sovereign power is that which is enjoyed, legally, by the holder of a 
constitutional power to make law, as long as the constitution places no 
restrictions on the exercise of that power… If the constitution then confers 
such a power but contains no limits upon the power (other than the discretion 
and judgment of those who exercise the power) we may say that sovereignty 
is vested in the holder of the law-making power. 166  
 
Sovereignty is therefore defined by the territory and not by a higher power of authority.167 
Although it is not possible to formulate an all-inclusive definition of sovereignty, two 
major points of view with regard to the concept of sovereignty can continuously be 
identified. The first view is that sovereignty means absolute power above the law and that 
absolute sovereignty constitutes one of the most powerful and inviolable principles in 
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international law.168 The second view is that it is of utmost significance that states – as the 
most important subjects of international law – do not claim that they are above the law or 
that international law does not bind them.169 It is necessary to distinguish between the 
internal and the external sovereignty of a state. Internal sovereignty is considered the 
ability of a state to exercise its authority within its national borders and freely regulate 
internal affairs. Internal sovereignty gives the state the rights and attributes that are 
limited to its territory. External sovereignty on the other hand is a form of legal 
independence from any foreign powers and ability of state to protect itself from outside 
interference. 
According to Perrez170 external sovereignty broadly includes international independence, 
the right to international self-help and the authority to participate in international society. 
The idea of external sovereignty eventually led to the development of modern 
international law. In the external relations of states, sovereignty was regarded as legal 
independence from all foreign powers, in particular that of the Pope and the Emperor of 
the Holy Roman Empire. Perrez171 maintained that in general sovereignty is seen as 
independence and supreme authority of a state. 
Arendt claimed that authority ‘is commonly mistaken for some form of power or 
violence’ however ‘authority precludes the use of external means of coercion’ and ‘is 
incompatible with persuasion’.172 The principle of national sovereignty gives states ‘the 
right to make laws that are supposedly in its national interests’.173 ‘Suddenly, it seems, the 
sovereign states are feeling naked. Concepts such as national sovereignty and national 
economic strength appear curiously drained of meaning’.174  
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TNCs play a crucial role in the international business and trade. Smith175 recognised that 
jurisdictional reach is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an effective control 
system and added that developing states are in a difficult position as they are 
implementing policies that at the same time are trying to control and attract foreign 
investments however not at the expense of sovereignty. 
Bain176 examined three entry conditions in terms of the market structure; blocked entry, 
restricted entry and free entry. As an example Xerox entry was blocked in Japan due to a 
basic patent issue.177 Smith recognised that ‘entry is restricted when post entry profit 
expectations become insufficient to motivate entry before a competitive solution is 
reached’. 178  
Venu179 reviewed the areas of conflict between TNCs and host developing states. There 
have been reported cases that TNCs have interfered with policies of host state and hence 
endangering the sovereignty of the host state for which Venu180 maintained that many 
have been exaggerated, due to bad reputation of TNCs. Venu181 supported the idea that 
public awareness is an important tool, saying that ‘the impact of such events is great 
enough for the host society to regard it as an overall threat’.182 These kinds of threats 
brought hostile emotions demonstrated in a form of nationalism. Nationalism183 is a 
complex subject and it has to be seen through the historical context. However, it cannot 
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be ignored as it is important for understanding the evolution of international investment 
law as a focal point in the relationship between TNCs and host developing states.  
Kissinger pointed out that there has never been a truly global “world order” in existence. 
The Treaty of Westphalia was based ‘on a system of independent states refraining from 
interference in each other’s domestic affairs and checking each other’s ambitions through 
a general equilibrium of power’.184 States were given sovereign power over their entire 
territory. As a result, a new system of international order of states was established. The 
new system was based on recognising multiplicity and uniqueness of each of the state, 
whose objective was to maintain their sovereignty and not try to unify or standardise their 
political order, religions believes or structure.  
Robock and Simmonds maintained that ‘Nation-states have developed a variety of ways 
to achieve national goals and protect national interests as far as international business 
transactions are concerned’.185 Smith argued that ‘a national government has undisputed 
jurisdiction over the granting and regulation of industrial property, over conduct that 
occurs within its territory, and over the corporations that it charters’.186 The United 
Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) have been providing technical 
assistance to the developing countries that would like to attract foreign investments, 
according to Venu.187 The UN has the resources to provide support to the host developing 
states especially during the negotiation process with TNCs in order for the developing 
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1.5 Conclusions  
 
For many years TNCs have been involved in development mainly through foreign 
investments in host developing states. While TNCs are profit maximisers, host 
developing states would like to achieve socio-economic independence. The main 
interaction between TNCs and host developing states takes place during the negotiation 
process when bargaining position is of significant importance in order to agree on the 
terms and conditions of the investment agreement. However, the concept of bargaining 
position seems to be remote from any legal basis because it is a power oriented concept. 
If bargaining position is remote from any legal basis then it will be limitless, coercive and 
indeed it can be used by force. This has unfortunately become the basis for using 
bargaining position. The non-legal dimensions to bargaining position can be tamed by 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and codes of conduct for TNCs. If a contractual 
arrangement is made solemnly on bargaining position, the fundamental principles of the 
law of contract will not form the basis of that contract. Unfortunately, this principle has 
been the basis for negotiating investment agreements between TNCs and host developing 
states for many years. During the colonial period foreign investor companies took the 
control of natural resources although they could not take over the ownership, but the 
colonial masters in practice subordinated the concept of ownership and expressed their 
strength through their power to control exploration and exploitation of natural resources 
in host developing states. 
This practice aided the objectives of profit maximisation by TNCs without allowing in 
most cases much benefits to be derived by host developing states, in other words their 
legitimate base for control over the natural resources was taken away from the host 
developing states. From the 1980s a new trend seems to have emerged in certain states to 
reverse the traditional bargaining of TNCs engaged in exploring and exploiting natural 
resources in host developing states. One such example is Indonesia, which ‘does not 
restrict the transfers of funds to or from foreign states, but incoming investment capital 
requires approval’.188  
                                                          
188 Deloitte, Taxation and Investment in Indonesia, Reach, relevance and reliability (Deloitte Touche 
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71 
 
The impact of foreign investment on host developing states has been on the agenda of 
many academics, including the UN and the views are split between the critics and the 
supporters. 
After having discussed some of the most important concepts relating to the core of this 
research it may be maintained that during the colonial period the question of the colonies 
using their bargaining position in controlling the conduct of TNCs did arise. The 
corporate entities in the colonies were under the total control of the parent companies, 
which had a psychological impact that resulted in lost confidence. This can be seen in 
host developing states behaviour during the colonisation period approximately between 
the years 1945 to 1962. In this research it has been pointed out that the newly born 
independent states were able to express their aspirations at the UN level when the UN 
general assembly resolution entitled Permanent Sovereignty over the Natural Resources 
1962 was adopted. Although initially it received opposition from most of the developed 
states it eventually became part of the customary international law.   
It is believed that the extent of frustration led the newly born independent states to regain 
back control over their natural resources through nationalisation or “taking” of assets of 
foreign companies. This impacted the nature of international relations between host 
developing states and TNCs but from a neutral standpoint and based on the principle of 
fairness of contracts it is maintained that the balance of interests between the two parties 
was essential and therefore has received the needed attention in the subsequent chapters 
of this research. 
The objective of investors is clear; they are mainly interested in the return on the 
investment (ROI). On the other hand, the host developing states if in position with 
multiple investments offers they are in a position to choose the best private foreign 
investor, however it is often the case that the host states are not in a position to choose 
their foreign investors. This means that the developing states do not have many options 
but to try to negotiate the best possible agreement that they can. Considering the benefits 
that derive out of the foreign investment. The alternative is the loss of investment 
altogether, which practically means that host developing states have no alternative. 
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Gomes-Casseres189 noted that TNCs have only two options to consider when their 
interests are in conflict with the host state governments, they can insist and negotiate a 
compromise or decline to invest and pull out.  
From the above the conclusion is that the bargaining position is dependent on the 
alternatives that are available to the foreign investors as well as to the host developing 
states. Host developing state has better bargaining position when there is no alternative 
investment for TNC. That means that the investor can settle with lower ROI whereas the 
host developing state cannot really settle with no foreign investment.  
Arguably the alternative options are actually the one that define the bargaining position 
of both parties. Bacharach and Lawler190 advocated that the availability of alternatives 
influence the bargaining position of both parties. Fisher and Ury191 stated that the party 
with more alternatives is more powerful due to the fact that it could walk away from the 
negotiations and exercise its “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” (BATNA). 
Root192 maintained that TNCs bargain their technology, access to the world markets, 
management skills, capital and other proprietary assets with host developing states, which 
bargain their natural resources, labour and country specific assets. Yan and Gray193 
stressed that TNCs normally contribute technology, management expertise and global 
support to the relationship. Inkpen and Beamish194 recognised that host states contribute 
some local knowledge of local market, culture and environment conditions to the 
partnership. Vernon and Hymer195 argued that the industries in which the US based TNCs 
operate are oligopolistic.196 However the main topic of negotiations between TNCs and 
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host developing states is the scarcity of the natural resources that the host developing 
states have and TNCs wish to exploit. TNCs can therefore offer resources that the host 
developing states do not have, such as capital, advanced technology, distribution network 
and skills.197 
Nevertheless, Root also added that the moment that TNCs enter into the joint-ventures 
(JVs) with the host developing states it immediately loses its bargaining position. The 
bargaining position shifts to the host developing state, because host developing state is 
controlling the prices, taxation, requirement, restrictions and even legislation. Root 
argued that ‘the venture becomes hostage to host-government behaviour’.198 Svejnar and 
Smith stressed that ‘less developed countries have sought to increase their bargaining 
power in relation to the TNCs’.199 Gomes-Casseres supported the hypothesis ‘that 
attractive domestic markets increase the relative power of host government’ but tries to 
find the answer to ‘the basic question of when and why TNCs form joint ventures 
abroad’.200 Gomes-Casseres implemented two important developments, ‘a new 
conception of the role of ownership in international business’ and ‘a better understanding 
of the process of negotiation between TNCs and host country governments’.201  
According to Brown the structure of cooperation and conflict called polyarchy has come 
to life in states ‘subnational groups, and transnational special interests and communities 
would have to be resolved primarily on the basis of ad hoc bargaining in a shifting context 
of power relationships’.202 There is limited evidence that the involvement of TNCs in 
development of host developing states had made significant contribution in terms of 
socio-economic development or capacity building. Equally the effect of foreign 
investment on socio-economic development in host developing states is yet to be 
explored. Negotiations are important also because the host developing states should 
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negotiate ownership structure and profit distribution with TNCs before their entry in order 
not to compromise their sovereignty.  
Sovereignty is the fundamental principle of international law, which also gives a state the 
right to grant trading privileges to the contracting parties under BITs. While sovereign 
states can impose restrictions on foreign investors in cases of taking of foreign assets 
compensation has to be paid under international law.203 Sovereignty can also give a state 
the ground for higher bargaining position vis-à-vis TNCs. It is however state’s discretion 
to protect its nationals and its corporations across their national borders, which have 
become well spread in the past four decades and will be closely examined in the following 
chapters of this research.   
To sum up, bargaining position takes centre stage while stability of global economy 
depends on the relationship between TNCs and host developing states.      
 
                                                          
203 UNGA Res. No.1803 of 1962 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. 
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Chapter 2: Aspirational Differences between Host Developing 





The gap between aspirations of the UN, host developing states and TNCs are still quite 
large. Sauvant maintained that ‘it should have been possible to bridge the different 
starting positions of developed and developing countries’.1 The solution for closing these 
gaps has not yet been finalised. Aspirations are the key elements for formulating ideas 
and contributing to the socio-economic development. TNCs have grown significantly 
over the years in their number as well as in their size. Some TNCs profits are bigger than 
most developing countries GDP. Based on the significance of TNCs it is expected that 
more attention would be paid to the aspirations of host developing states. This does not 
seem to be the case at present or at least there is no evidence that would suggest otherwise. 
An attempt has been made to examine these aspirations more closely from the perspective 
of each party individually and in relation to each other. Based on the research findings 
some solutions have been recommended to bridge the aspiration gaps that have been 
identified. 
The main issue with aspirations of TNCs is the focus on profit maximisation, which is 
not sustainable and should be reviewed in parallel with the aspirations of host developing 
states. At the same time the role and aspirations of the UN should be reviewed and 
redefined based on the previous experience of failed and successful initiatives and efforts 
such as Havana Charter 1948, Abs-Schawcross draft Convention on Investments Abroad 
1959, UN Convention on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1962, New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) 1974, UN Draft Code of Conduct for TNCs 1974 
and Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 1974. NIEO Resolution did manage 
to establish the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations (CTC) 1974 to regulate 
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76 
 
activities of TNCs.2  However their attempt to adopt the UN draft Code of Conduct for 
TNCs were not successful. 
Wells Sheffer argued that in order for economic development to be sustainable foreign 
investment alone is not sufficient, as it requires also the protection of human rights, 
especially by TNCs.3 The UN Special Representative John Ruggie on Business and 
Human Rights, proposed a framework to the UN Human Rights Council in June 2008 in 
which he claimed that foreign investment and TNCs constitute powerful forces capable 
of generating economic growth, reducing poverty, and increasing demand for the rule of 
law.4  
The UN and TNCs have its own ideas for socio-economic development as do the host 
developing states. The gap in aspirations between the three parties is quite extensive. The 
recommendation is therefore to narrow down the aspirational differences between TNCs, 
host developing states and the United Nations (UN). The biggest issue with host 
developing states is that their aspirations are fundamentally based on the wrong 
assumptions by following the models of other developed states, notwithstanding the fact 
that the model of developed states cannot be replicated nor implemented in the host 
developing states. Another problem that developing states have is the lack of confidence 
and ability to develop their own model and this is exacerbated by their inability to 
implement such improvements. Achieving socio-economic development as a result and 
predominantly socio-economic independence is therefore at risk. Furthermore, 
developing states failed to take into account their natural resources, their capacity and 
ability not only to develop but also to implement in practice the required rules and 
regulations. Berliner et al. maintained that building state capacity, especially in the 
developing world ‘has been linked to human rights improvements, economic 
development, and the enforcement of property rights’.5 Therefore, capacity building is the 
most crucial element that the host developing states should aspire towards in order to 
become socio-economically independent. Socio-economic development should be 
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focused on modernisation and capacity building. The same applies to the legal aspects 
and the ancillary laws and legislation. It has to be set and based on the capacity of the 
host developing states and especially the ability of its enforcement. Elliott and Freeman 
argued that ‘the problem of low standards often stems from a lack of capacity to enforce 
labor codes’.6 Dias maintained that one cannot discuss legal order if legislature, judiciary 
and executive do not exist.7 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the sole institution 
to make up for the fact that there is no system of courts in the international law as it states 
in the Statute of the International Court of Justice ‘The ICJ can only decide cases referred 
to but cannot enforce the compliance with their decisions’.8 Moreover there is no 
international institution to establish, clarify or determine consequence for parties breaking 
the rules,9 notwithstanding the UN Charter10 and other UN Resolutions, mainly Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1962 and Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States 1974. 
The reality of aspirations between different parties is that they have to meet at some point 
in order to create environment for mutual socio-economic development. Different 
directions are to be considered while examining these aspirations. Host developing states 
have expressed their aspirations in the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
1962 and Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 1974.11 Clear need for the 
codes of conduct for TNCs was expressed but not executed.12 In the US, the Congress, 
after a number of congressional hearings and legal actions against corporations, adopted 
the Sullivan Principles as law13 that should prevent bribing foreign officials in order to 
gain economic advantage. After the economic crisis, the US adopted Dodd-Frank Wall 
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Street Reform and Consumer Protection14 Act 201015 in order to address the issues of 
governance and regulation of the financial sector. Following the US, the EU also adopted 
numerous directives to improve oversight of the financial sector.16 According to the UN:  
 
[C]odes of conduct have become increasingly significant for international 
investment, since they typically focus on the operations of large multinational 
corporations which, through their foreign investment and global value chains, 
can influence the social and environmental practices of businesses 
worldwide.17 
 
The UN Draft Code of conduct on transnational corporations 1990 and the OECD 
Guidelines for multinational enterprises 1976 are discussed more in depth in chapter 3. 
OECD Guidelines are very clear and specific on the responsibility and the role of TNCs 
in host developing states. Furthermore, TNCs cannot be blamed for the latter, because as 
profit maximisers they are accountable to their shareholders and as such not accountable 
for socio-economic development of host developing states. Moreover, when there is no 
signed binding contract in existence, hence TNCs have no contractual obligations to fulfil. 
Therefore, it is the host developing states that should negotiate such binding provisions 




2.2  Aspirations of Host Developing States 
 
Meier and Rauch maintained that ‘there is no universally accepted definition of “less 
developed country (LDC)” or “developing country”’.18 Standard measuring methodology 
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is based on the US dollar and gross domestic product (GDP). The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) argued that in order ‘to put themselves on a path of convergence with the 
advanced economies, developing countries must align their policies with the forces of 
globalization’.19 The ILO maintained that ‘rather than eliminating or attenuating 
differences and inequalities, the integration of national economies into a global system 
has on the contrary made those differences and inequalities more apparent and, in many 
ways, more unacceptable’.20 Emmerji et al. maintained that ‘Growth was always promised 
as one of the results of structural adjustment, but it has often failed to materialize’.21 
However, it seems as the aspirations of developing states are restricted as they feel they 
are without a voice due to their big debt from borrowing and dependency on the financial 
aid that they have been receiving over the years.  
The root cause of the aspirations of host developing states is based on the quest to achieve 
socio-economic development towards socio-economic independence, while protecting 
their natural resources and sovereignty. The objective of the aspirations is to achieve such 
socio-economic development while being also independent and not dependant on 
resources or finances from the foreign investors. Permutter maintained that ‘The history 
of the relationship between transnational corporations (TNCs) and nation-state during the 
past half century and more may be characterized as a “tortuous evolution”’.22 
Since the decolonisation process and creation of many newly independent states their 
aspirations have reflected that: 
 
In the mid-1970s, with the adoption of UN Resolutions calling for the 
establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), with its 
emphasis on sovereign rights to regulate and control foreign investors and 
their investments, and on the recognition of permanent national sovereignty 
over natural wealth and resources.23 
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Inequalities in the current global trading system have hurt developing states heavily.24 
According to Hill there were three waves of globalisation.25 First wave it is assumed to 
have begun in the 1870s and ended with the beginning of the First World War.26 Maddison 
maintained that in this period there were massive global migrations of the world 
population, especially from Europe to the United States (US).27 After the Second World 
War the period was labelled as “reverse globalisation” due to stagnation on development 
and significant fall back to where the first wave had started.28 It was not until the 1950s 
to the 1980s that the economic prosperity has started again as the Second wave of 
globalisation. The most important in this wave was the integration between developed 
states of Europe, North America and Japan via trade agreement such as GATT, NAFTA, 
OPEC, and others that have tried to facilitate international trade and promote global 
foreign investments.29 The third wave of globalisation also known as mega-globalisation 
hosted innovations in communications technology and by opening international trade, 
which according to Stiglitz30 was due to being forced and based on their own choice. 
Developing states were trying to attract foreign investment as ‘most developing countries 
came to embrace the idea that foreign investment was a necessity for economic 
development’31 during their economic turmoil in the 1990s.32  
 
 
The UNCTAD Resolution 45(III) 1972: 
 
Stressed the urgency to establish generally accepted norms to govern 
international economic relations systematically and recognised that it is not 
feasible to establish a joint order and a stable order as long as a charter to 
protect the rights of all countries, and in particular the developing States, is 
not formulated.33 
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The UN recognised the importance to protect developing states as early as 1972 as well 
as the need to govern international trade. Shaw maintained that ‘The role of the state in 
the modern world is a complex one’ and added that ‘each state is sovereign and equal’.34 
Keane35 maintained that the role of states is in decline, while at the same time TNCs are 
becoming more powerful in the global civil society. Hence it should be the responsibility 
of the governments and international organisations to take the responsibility of setting 
rules that would manage, control and implement standards of internationalisation in terms 
of interaction between host developing states and TNCs as well as the United Nations and 
other important international institutions, namely ICCt (International Criminal Court), 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank 
(WB), and World Trade Organisation (WTO). It should be borne in mind that, while the 
TNCs are not dependent on civil society by election but by executives, the government 
of the host developing states on the other hand are elected by the civil society. Therefore, 
the civil society has enormous power, which it might not even be aware of, to elect the 
government that will govern the state. Governments should therefore become more 
accountable for the decisions that they are making while in power, and should be able to 
regulate the activities on their sovereign territory and make sure agreements are made in 
the interest of the state and not only of the TNCs. Government also have the power to 
regulate the legislation on all levels. As mentioned in the first chapter the importance of 
negotiations plays a crucial role in making decisions on regulations and legal framework 
as well as binding terms and conditions. Governments not only have the power to change 
the laws, but also the power to negotiate international agreements with other states and 
with TNCs as well as to enforce compliance with the agreed or negotiated terms and 
conditions and change regulations at any given time.  
International law requires compensation payment by the newly formed and independent 
states to TNCs as foreign investors, which assets has been taken in the process of taking. 
Therefore, compensation payment has been heated topic of numerous international 
debates due to the fact that TNCs have been exploiting natural resources of host 
developing states, making substantial profits along the way and the host developing states 
are still required to pay compensation. Countries such as the UK have argued in the early 
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19th century that foreigners should be entitled to the same treatment as nationals, namely 
during the large-scale expropriation process.36 The right of foreign investors to 
compensation payment on the grounds of national treatment was challenged, namely by 
newly independent and communist states, such as the Soviet Union, where during the 
large-scale nationalisation at the beginning of the 20th century no such right was granted 
to their nationals and therefore could not have been extended to foreigners. Southern 
states nationalised former colonial enterprises after becoming independent and did not 
think compensation payment was due on the ground that the colonial masters had been 
exploiting their natural resources for many years. Latin American states on the other hand 
claimed that compensation payment could not be justified because enormous profits have 
been made on their expense by the expropriated TNCs. Wortley and White believed that 
no compensation should be paid.37 However, in reality the majority of developing states 
have in fact paid compensation, based on signed BITs and customary international law, 
however even in the absence of BITs the compensation payment still applies under 
international law. The main disagreement was on the type of compensation to be paid, 
such as prompt, adequate and effective38 or just and appropriate.39 When the states became 
independent in the process of decolonisation, the newly born sovereign states gained back 
the control over their natural resources from under the control of the former colonial 
masters that until recently had economic dominance. In such situations one can suggest 
that by paying compensation it only encourages unfair continuous profit-maximisation. 
Developing states should therefore steer their aspirations towards benefit-maximisation 
which includes capacity building. While TNCs are only interested in profit-maximisation 
and not recognising their responsibility for capacity building and socio-economic 
development of developing state in which they operate, notwithstanding their corporate 
social responsibility.40 It is without a doubt that these two aspirations should be revisited 
under contractual terms in which developing states would have the majority of ownership 
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and consequently control for making decision on their sovereign territory and most 
importantly regain the control over their natural resources.  
During the initial period of decolonisation, the newly born independent states did not have 
any voice to control the operational matters of foreign companies working in their own 
jurisdiction. As stated earlier that they have developed the sense of submissiveness to the 
colonial master which hindered their creativity particularly in the first few decades after 
their independence. As far as TNCs are concerned they did not encounter opposition from 
the host developing states in negotiating investment agreements and host developing 
states failed to assert their rights vis-à-vis TNCs. This has been clearly demonstrated 
through BITs, which are extremely one sided and predominantly protect the interests of 
private foreign investors. TNCs should appreciate that circumstances have changed and 
that the developed world instead of creating confrontation should try to resolve them 
through balanced negotiation processes. 
Sagafi-Nejad maintained that ‘Host countries were either colonial dependants or were too 
feeble (and corrupt) to exercise much control over the activities of foreign firms’.41 While 
the UNCTAD ‘recommended that developing countries should, with the assistance of 
developed countries and the UN adopt suitable means to supply all the necessary 
information about investment conditions, regulations, and opportunities to prospective 
foreign investors’.42 The UNCTAD also suggested to the foreign investors that:  
 
[F]oreign private investment, based upon respect for the sovereignty of the 
host country, should co-operate with local initiative and capital, rely as far as 
possible on existing resources in developing countries, and should work 
within framework and objectives of the development plans with a view to 
supplying domestic markets and, in particular, expanding exports.43 
 
Unfortunately, as Haymar pointed out the foreign investors were blinded by making the 
highest return on their investment to be able to pay attention on the UNCTAD suggestions 
or take them into consideration. At the same time developing states, namely the newly 
                                                          
41 Tagi Sagafi-Nejad and John Dunning, The UN and Transnational Corporations, From Code of Conduct 
to Global Compact (Indiana University Press, 2008) 24. 
42 Tagi Sagafi-Nejad and John Dunning, The UN and Transnational Corporations, From Code of Conduct 
to Global Compact (Indiana University Press, 2008) 26. 
43 UNCTAD, Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, vol. 1, Final Act 
and Report (New York: UN 1964) 49-50. 
84 
 
formed ones started to become aware of their sovereignty and the power to control the 
activities on their territory. As a result, cases of nationalisation44 and expropriation were 
becoming more and more frequent. This environment negatively affected foreign 
investments, TNCs and host developing states. Instead of working together on common 
objectives of socio-economic development the relationships turned into turmoil.45 As the 
UN recognised as early as in 1950s that international trade and finance would be crucial 
for the socio-economic development in developing states. However, the: 
 
[S]pecial vulnerability of developing countries to economic fluctuations 
arising outside their borders; instability and long-run decline in commodity 
prices, which formed the main exports of many developing countries; and 
fluctuations in flows of international capital, private and public.46  
 
These were issues identified that could stand in the way of achieving socio-economic 
development in developing states. Furthermore, the necessary actions required to be taken 
by the developing states were proposed in Measures for International Economic Stability 
1951.47 
Developing states aspired towards the UNCTAD to ‘become a forum through which they 
could improve their bargaining position more effectively than in other multilateral 
economic institutions in which the West was dominant’.48 OECD maintained that states 
have liberalised their private foreign investment regimes in order to attract private foreign 
investment.49 It is interesting to note, that it was actually Chileans, who were responsible 
for putting the activities of TNCs on the agenda of the UN, following the nationalisation 
of private foreign investments, namely copper mines, hotels, manufacturing, 
telecommunications, ITT affair50 and political scandals of Allende government.51 These 
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events laid the foundation for the UN to study the effects of TNCs on socio-economic 
development. De Seynes maintained that:  
 
The decision of 1973 to create a focal point within the United Nations system 
for transnational corporations must be viewed as a landmark in the 
development of institutions needed for a New International Economic 
Order.52 
 
While Root maintained that:  
 
[T]he attempt by the International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT) 
to get the U.S. government to exert economic pressure on the Allende 
government of Chile reinforced allegations throughout Latin America that the 
U.S. multinational enterprises pose a threat to national economic 
independence.53 
 
Developing states did demonstrate their strength, which reflected in the UN resolution 
the New International Economic Order 197454 that was based on equality, sovereign 
rights, interdependence, common interests and co-operation among all states. Developing 
states however unfortunately failed to materialise on their aspirations by translating them 
into laws and ‘without petroleum to export were obliged to set aside changes in the 
international economic system and give priority to implementing structural adjustment 
programs’.55 At the same time industrialised developed states were strongly against 
redistribution of wealth and income with developing states. ‘Growth was always 
promised as one of the results of structural adjustment, but it has often failed to 
materialize’.56 
The main aspirations of host developing states manifested in the UN Resolutions such as 
the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1962, New International Economic 
Order 1974, and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 1974, however it 
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seems that in spite of the efforts they failed to materialise their aspirations, mainly due to 
the strong opposition from the developed states. It is also important to bear in mind the 
fact that there are fundamental differences between developing states as not all 





2.3  Aspirations of TNCs 
 
‘TNCs have an increasingly profound impact on the world we inhabit and therefore 
deserve serious attention’.58 Over the years the responsibilities of foreign investors 
became a major topic of debates, which had significantly affected the development of 
international investment law. As from the very beginning of investment law the main 
focus of promotion and protection of private foreign investment has not changed. 
Muchlinski argued that international social responsibility ‘obligations may be seen as the 
quid pro quo for the protection of investors and investments under international 
investment protection agreements and international economic rules’.59 The term corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) has been modified over the years of its inception and the 
UNCTAD associates ‘the term with the “social contract” between a corporation and its 
host society’.60 However ‘The scope of corporate social responsibility is conceptually 
quite unbound at the present time’.61 
The new topic of discussions is ‘what is the nature and extent of those obligations and 
how can they made accountable for any non-compliance’, because ‘if the regulatory 
regime can be arranged in such a way as to harness market forces and provide an 
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economic incentive to MNCs to meet their obligations, they will engage in effective self-
regulation because it is in their interests to do so’.62 
Transnational corporations (TNCs) have become the most important actors in the global 
political economy arena, mainly due to the extent of their operations across the national 
borders of their home state’s headquarters. The decision making process that takes place 
within such a corporation is purely based on making or maximising profits with no regard 
to the national interests or the interests of host developing states in which their operations 
are taking place, because their accountability is to their shareholders.  
Research conducted by INSEAD (Institut Européen d’Administration des Affaires) 
explores in depth the question, if TNCs should be concerned with the global common 
good.63 Since 1776, when Adam Smith64 in his work the Wealth of Nations set a theory 
of an invisible hand that guides the individual interest into a common good. However, the 
UN Development Programme and World Bank reports have shown that the biggest one 
hundred economies in the world are in fact transnational corporations (TNCs). As an 
example, the Shell corporation accounted for $268,9 billion in sales65 in 2003, while Niger 
GDP of only $2,7 billion. In the same year General Motors sales accounted for $185,5 
billion and GDP of Botswana was $7,4 billion. Microsoft corporation accounted for $32,2 
billion in sales, while GDP of Guatemala was $24,4 billion. Johnson & Johnson turnover 
in 2003 was $41,9 billion and GDP of Kazakhstan was $24,7 billion.66 Mason67 
maintained that one can consider corporations to be the central institutions of our time in 
terms of their importance and relevance to shaping everyday life.  
The phenomenon of global activities, have contributed to the fact that transnational 
corporations (TNCs) have gained not only economic but also social power. The fact that 
they operate in various countries gives them the opportunity to bypass national laws and 
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regulations, and access international arbitration directly as the precedence for exhausting 
local remedies has not been set. TNCs enjoy the privilege of extraterritoriality. The 
supporters of TNCs claim that they create jobs and hire workers and contribute towards 
employment and technology transfer. The critics of TNCs claim they undermine national 
sovereignty in developing states, cause environmental degradation, destroy labour units, 
circumvent national and international law, support repressive regimes and do not 
contribute to technology transfer.68 An example that technology transfer is possible to be 
obtained, exploited and adapted, without the private foreign investment can be seen in 
China, Hong Kong, North Korea, Singapore, South Korea, former Soviet Union, and 
Thailand. Moreover, TNCs supply developing states with the second-hand technology or 
even out-dated one as they feel very protective of their corporate secrets. TNCs have 
legitimate fear that technology could be copied and as a result TNCs would end up in 
competition and would lose their monopoly position, which would endanger their profit 
maximisation. Another reason for using second-hand technology is also cost 
minimisation. Technology transfer is put under question also because examples of only 
using the second-hand technology by the TNCs in the developing states have been 
numerous.69 
In his research Velasquez maintained that there is no moral obligation for transnational 
corporations (TNCs) to aspire towards a global common good, especially when it 
interferes with profit maximisation. Velasquez concluded that:  
 
In the absence of an international enforcement agency, multinational 
corporations operating in a competitive international environment cannot be 
said to have a moral obligations to contribute to the international common 
good, provided that interactions are non-repetitive and provided effective 
signals of agent reliability are not possible.70 
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Friedman71 stated that the social responsibility of corporations is to make profit by 
following the law. The paradox here is that while the legal system was founded on the 
grounds of being meant for the public good TNCs are dependent on efficient legal system, 
which does not seem to work in favour of the public good. Furthermore, the legal 
protection and rights gave TNCs ownership, security, right and the power to execute their 
activities and make enormous profits on the way. Without the ownership and security 
granted to TNCs by the legal system, the latter would not have been able to operate. At 
this point the role of law becomes open to interpretations, namely in the investment 
agreements made between TNCs and host developing states as well as when deciding on 
the investor-state dispute settlement be it following the international law or signed BITs.  
The Judiciary Act 1789 that gave federal courts original jurisdiction stated that ‘The 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States’.72 The Act 
thereby allowed individuals and groups to sue TNCs for international law violations 
outside the USA. However, in 2004 the Supreme Court has restrained use of this Act to 
the applicability of international law violations. Furthermore, in 2013 in Kiobel v Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co.73 which further limited the scope of claims under the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS) by assuming that suits based only on tortious conduct overseas do not stand 
on solid ground stating that ‘touch and concern the territory of the United States…with 
sufficient force’.74 Such law would be worth to consider making universally applicable 
by becoming a part of customary international law. 
TNCs motive for investing in the host developing states is clear, access to natural 
resources, cost reduction and profit maximisation. Given the fact that there are a number 
of developing states, TNCs could currently choose in which of them they are interested 
in investing. Developing states can improve their bargaining position by high quality 
infrastructure, skilled labour force and skilled negotiators. However it is very difficult to 
find any tangible proof that private foreign investment has in any way contributed to the 
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infrastructure development in the host developing states.75 The UNCTAD report 2000 
showed that the lack of skills and infrastructure is the major restrain to foreign investment, 
especially in African countries.76 Report also stated that developing states cannot attract 
knowledge-based private foreign investment without the sufficient availability of 
technological and human resource capabilities. Vernon argued that the relationship 
between host developing states and TNCs can be analysed in terms of bargaining position, 
which determines the distribution of benefits. 
To elaborate further on Vernon’s “obsolescing bargain” that claimed the initial 
distribution of power favours the TNCs due to the generosity of host developing states 
and their hope to transfer wealth, technology and training in exchange of the access to 
their natural resources.77 However, Vernon claimed that after some time there is a shift in 
the bargaining position to the host developing state, which creates the need for re-
negotiation. Moreover, the only reason that TNCs even agree to the re-negotiations is 
when they have invested substantial amounts and when TNC is already deeply involved 
in the project, which makes it difficult to get out of the initial partnership agreement. The 
important issue to note is that this was only relevant in the 1970s and 1980s. New studies 
have proven that ‘obsolescing bargaining is no longer appropriate as an analytical tool’.78  
Bennet and Sharpe noted that obsolescing bargaining did not apply to the private foreign 
investments in the Mexican automobile industry and high technology-intensive consumer 
goods manufacturing sector.79 As their studies showed that in these two cases the situation 
was opposite as the host developing state had high bargaining position at the beginning, 
which declined over time. One can conclude that the obsolescing bargaining position 
cannot be applied across national boundaries as it varies and is case by case specific.  
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Vernon and Hymer80 argued that in spite of the competitive world where there should be 
no room for bargaining, however the outcomes of negotiations is influenced by the 
bargaining position of both the parties.81 The impact of TNCs on sovereign states by 
means of distribution of the scarcity of the natural resources is yet to be seen. However, 
there is a lack of accountability of TNCs to any authority that would represent the interests 
of sovereign states and would govern TNCs through a treaty based international 
investment law administered by an international institution, which causes jurisdictional 
conflict.82 TNCs can offer and put on the table the resources that the host developing states 
do not have, such as capital, advanced technology and skills. TNCs combine equity 
capital, managerial talent, technology, brand image, marketing ties, distribution network 
and united they compete with other rivals.83 
Foreign investors were given protection extended to access the international tribunals, 
which are under the auspice of international law. Granting such access is a new 
phenomenon under the bilateral investment treaties (BITs), when TNCs can for the first 
time bring suits against governments of host developing states. While the conflict 
between the two parties can be internationalised, the investment agreement or BIT on the 
other hand cannot be internationalised as it remains bilateral between the two signing 
parties. By concluding BITs host developing states agreed to additional protection 
accorded to the foreign investors and as such they have also given consent to result to 
international arbitration in case of any investment legal disputes between the parties. BITs 
were nothing but ‘the result of a grand bargain between an investment-exporting state and 
investment-receiving state’.84 Therefore host developing states should have included the 
obligations for foreign investors when negotiating bilateral investment treaties. However, 
the BITs and its provisions and standards of treatment are discussed more in depth in 
chapter 3. 
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2.4  Aspirations of the United Nations 
 
‘Since its inception, the United Nations and its various agencies have been at the forefront 
of understanding and studying the role of these corporations in development and 
international relations and on the well-being of the nation-states in which they operate’.85 
The UN has also supported the need for richer states to support developing states in their 
socio-economic development.86 
International organisations before the Second World War such as the League of Nations, 
included the World Intellectual Property Organization and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), which later became specialised agencies of the UN. The UN were 
instrumental in establishing institutions to study activities of TNCs and in understanding 
the weight of the matter, since the 1975 when GEP was appointed through the UN 
commission and centre on TNCs that was later taken on the shoulders of the UNCTAD. 
However, in spite of the best efforts the main objective of creating the Codes of Conduct87 
did not see the light of day, notwithstanding that ‘ideas on competition, resource 
allocation, labor relations, the environment, and corruption survived’.88 Codes of conduct 
on TNCs are critically analysed in chapter 3. 
The following are the four principal aims of UNCTAD:  
 
1. To promote international trade and economic development of developing 
countries; 
2. To promote trade and economic co-operation, particularly between 
countries at different stages of economic development and between 
developing countries and between countries with different economic and 
social system; 
3. To formulate principles and policies on international trade and 
development; and 
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4. To promote a more equitable international economic order, a larger voice 
for developing countries in decision making, and a development dimension 
and consensus in international institutions and policies.89 
 
It was in its very early years that the UN released three major publications, the National 
and International Measures for Full Employment 1949; Measures for the Economic 
Development of Under-Developed Countries 1951 and Measures for International 
Economic Stability 1951. 
In his foreword speech in 2011 Ban Ki-moon, The Secretary General of the United 
Nations stated that:  
 
The United Nations was founded on the conviction that the nations of the 
world can and should cooperate to resolve conflicts peacefully and change 
people’s lives for the better.90 
 
Johnson maintained that the UN General Assembly resolutions have no binding effect and 
furthermore that there was no such aspiration.91 Aspirations of the UN are revealed in 
resolutions, however Sloan questioned the existence of their binding force by stating that: 
 
There is, however, in the Charter no express undertaking to accept 
recommendations of the General Assembly similar to the agreement in Article 
25 to accept and carry out decisions of the Security Council. On the other 
hand, it cannot be said that the Charter specifically negates such an obligation, 
and it may be possible to deduce certain obligations for the Charter as a whole 
which it would be impossible to establish from an express undertaking.92 
 
Higgins added that: 
 
Resolutions of the Assembly are not per se binding: through those rules of 
general international law which they may embody are binding on member 
states, with or without the help of the resolution. But the body of resolutions 
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as a whole, taken as indications of a general law, undoubtedly provide a rich 
source of evidence.93 
 
UN Resolutions are not taken into consideration with the same weight of authority as 
sources of international law by courts, unless they restate an existing legal principle. UN 
Resolutions are considered ‘nonbinding recommendations reflecting idealized 
international legal principles’.94 Due to the fact that the UN General Assembly ‘powers 
are limited to making recommendations under the Charter of the UN’.95 
In 1972 the UNCTAD96 affirmed ‘the sovereignty right of developing countries to take 
the necessary measure to ensure that foreign capital operates in accordance with the 
national development needs of the countries concerned’ and expressed ‘its concern [about 
certain aspects of FDI] that disrupt competition in the domestic markets, and their possible 
effects on the economic development of the developing countries’ and recognised ‘that 
the private foreign investment, subject to national decisions and priorities, must facilitate 
the mobilization of internal resources, generate inflows and avoid outflows of foreign 
exchange reserves, incorporate adequate technology, and enhance savings and national 
investment’ and last but not least it urged ‘developed countries to take the necessary steps 
to reverse the tendency for an outflow of capital from developing countries’.97 
In 1974 the UN General Assembly adopted two important resolutions that have 
contributed to setting up norms of international economic relations. One was the 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order 197498 and the 
other was the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order 1974.99 Chatterjee maintained that:  
 
[T]he vast number of the former colonies attained their independence during 
the 1960s and 1970s, and that the principal purpose of the resolutions or 
declarations adopted by the General Assembly during 1969-74 was not only 
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to register the aspirations of the newly born and/or developing countries; they 
were also relevant in many cases to developed States.100 
 
It is important to bear in mind that most of the developed states voted against or have 
abstained to the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 1974, which was adopted 
as part of the NIEO. Australia was the only developed state at the time to vote in favour 
of this Charter.  
In 1988 CTC formulated draft Codes of conduct for TNCs but owing to the opposition 
from developed states it became clear that the aspirations are to vast for the codes to be 
accepted. Based on the draft code of conduct fair and equitable treatment was accorded to 
TNCs in developing states together with most-favoured-nation treatment and national 
courts were proposed as the first port of call for settlement of investment dispute providing 
that they are competent enough to execute such proceedings. However, the UN attempts 
were not successful and as a result CTC ceased to exist in 1993, which also ended the UN 
efforts on the subject. Developed states took advantage of the turmoil of the 1990s, mainly 
the fact that developing states saw foreign investments as a solution to their economic 
difficulties and were consequently open to attracting foreign investments. Due to political 
instability in many developing states as well as in newly independent states together with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, TNCs were demanding better protection for their 
investments. In fact, TNCs demanded higher protection from that available under the 
international law. As a result, the Energy Charter Treaty 1994 was adopted and clearly 
indicated the dominance of the developed states over the developing states in getting their 
aspirations translated in international agreements as legally binding.  
In 2005 at The Millennium Summit meeting the UN made another attempt to balance 
socio-economic development between developed and developing states and has therefore 
set the following Millennium Development Goals (UNMDG): 
 
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. 
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education. 
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women. 
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality. 
Goal 5: Improve maternal health. 
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Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. 
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability. 
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development. 
 
At the same time the UN also set the following UN Millennium Development 
Targets 2015: 
 
For Goal 1: Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a 
dollar a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. 
For Goal 2: Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary 
schooling. 
For Goal 3: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education 
preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015. 
For Goal 4: Reduce by two-thirds the mortality rate among children under 
five. 
For Goal 5: Reduce by three-quarters the maternal mortality ratio. 
For Goal 6: Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and the 
incidence of malaria and other major diseases. 
For Goal 7: Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable 
access to safe drinking water. 
For Goal 8: Develop further an open trading and financial system that is ruled-
based, predictable and non-discriminatory.   
 
While Willis101 claimed MDGs have a clear statement of the nature and purpose of 
development, while Black and White102 strongly disagreed and questioned the basic 
usefulness of the goals and believed that the timeframes set in the MDGs are too ambitious 
and as such not achievable by the set deadline of 2015.  
Failure of achieving the UNMDGs in the set timeframe by 2015, was mainly damaging 
for the world’s poorest states that were not able to benefit from the MDGs, which would 
have significantly contributed towards their socio-economic development.103 Furthermore, 
Salil Shetty,104 the Secretary General of Amnesty International stated that the human rights 
have been violated by the contradiction of governments, namely of developing states in 
spite of their commitment to the MDGs framework. He also believed that public 
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awareness is essential, for which the MDGs should be less target oriented and based more 
on the principles of accountability instead. International debates involved strong 
discussions on the economic and social issues effectively between developed and 
developing states and the importance of finding the right balance.  
Even the Millennium Development Goals Report105 (UNMDG 2007) reported that while 
noticeable progress has been made in some areas there is still a long way to go in order to 
achieve these goals if at all feasible. As an example the UNMDG report voiced their 
concerns over the sub-Saharan African states as none of them have yet met the goals of 
extreme poverty reduction, primary education access or reducing HIV/AIDS epidemic.  
Görg and Greenaway concluded that the effects of foreign investment on host developing 
states are mostly negative.106 Alfaro et al.107 argued that the well-developed and 
functioning financial institutions significantly gain from the foreign investments, when 
the less developed financial institutions lack the ability to use the full potential of foreign 
investment and added that well developed financial markets enable other domestic firms 
and entrepreneurs to capitalise on linkages with new TNCs.108  
Greenwood, Jovanovic109 and McKinnon110 argued that the capital market development is 
crucial for adaptation of best practices in technology and learning by doing. However, 
according to Kose111 not on the macroeconomic level. Furthermore, te Velde and 
Xenogiani112 empirical analysis showed that foreign investment enhances skill 
development only in states that are already well skilled. Cross-country growth regression 
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used by Borensztein et al.113 and Carkovic and Levine114, did not show that foreign 
investment has positive effect on socio-economic growth.  
UN General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
1962 declared that:  
The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural 
wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national 
development and of the well-being of the people of the State concerned.115  
 
Chatterjee maintained that:  
 
There seems to exist a perceived belief that the United Nations is primarily a 
forum or institution for developing countries, but the need for 
interdependence between developed and developing countries requires both 
groups of countries to meet at a common forum to discuss issues and 
formulate policies and principles the implementation of which might lead to 
a better world order, whether political, economic or legal.116 
 
Chatterjee maintained that the need for interdependence is primarily due to the economic 
issues. While the developed states are on the look for trade and investment opportunities, 
the developing states on the other hand own their natural resources. The two can only 
meet on the platform that enables both parties to participate effectively in the international 
trading community for which an effective system is yet to be established, where both 
parties’ interests will be equally represented. 
Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 1960 
identified the aspirations of developing states and colonies for their independence. The 
terms and conditions on which foreign companies should be invited to invest in states and 
identify by the United Nations General Assembly in its Resolution on Permanent 
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Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1962.117 In reality foreign companies have been in 
breach of the philosophy on which these two Resolutions are based, while host developing 
states have failed to negotiate foreign investment contracts with developed states on the 
principles of this two Resolutions.   
Many of the UN early suggestions have been dismissed in the beginning, due to 
misconception as being ideological, however the influence that the UN had on changing 
the mainstream thinking by constantly challenging the existing orders, cannot be denied. 
Ever since 1960s the focus of the UN became monitoring the activities of TNCs and its 
contribution to socio-economic development, predominantly in host developing states. 
One of such observations was highlighted in the United Nations General Assembly 
resolutions on TNCs as early as 1965.118 A panel was formed on initiative of ECOSOC to 
review and evaluate contribution and consequences of private foreign investment.119 
Result of discussions the following ‘Agreed Statement’120 was adopted: 
 
- For FDI to contribute to the development objectives of developing 
countries, it must find its place within the framework of the national 
development program and policies of each host country. 
- Governments of host countries are the best judges of their own 
development objective and need to make opportunities for FDI more 
fully known to potential investors. 
- Joint ventures provide a highly desirable arrangements for bringing 
together private capital, host governments, and local entrepreneurs. 
- Transfer of technological and managerial know-how through foreign 
firms is frequently as important as capital. 
- Steps are needed to increase the absorptive capacity of developing 
countries and their ability to develop new techniques for their own 
special needs.121 
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From the above the conclusion is that the panel had high hopes in host developing states 
to decide on the entry restrictions for private foreign investments in their own states and 
take control over their regulation. 
The second meeting was held in 1970 and focused on benefits that private foreign 
investment might bring to the host developing states and examined the areas of conflict 
that might arise between TNCs and host developing states.122  
In 1971 the UN World Economic Survey initiated in depth research of activities of TNCs 
as well as ECOSOC resolution123, which stated that: 
 
While these corporations are frequently affective agents for the transfer of 
technology as well as capital to developing countries, their role is sometimes 
viewed with awe, since their size and power surpass the host country’s entire 
economy. The international community has yet to formulate a positive policy 
and establish effective machinery for dealing with the issues raised by the 
activities of these corporations.124 
 
The activities of TNCs in terms of their contribution to the socio-economic development 
and capacity building in host developing states are still questionable. However, the 
aspiration of the UN is to become the platform to accommodate for the aspirational gaps 
to be closed between developed and developing states and as a consequence balance the 
interests between TNCs and host developing states. The UN were accused of being 
favouring the developing states and that might have been the reason that developed states 
opposed the proposed UN resolutions that tried to balance the interests between the two 
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2.5  A Critical Analysis of the term “Aspirational Differences” as a factor 
of “control” and “development” 
 
It is no coincidence that BITs were designed by the Western states and based on their 
aspirations of creating such bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in the wake of 
decolonisation in the 1960s in order to protect foreign investment in the host developing 
states.125 Robock and Simmonds maintained that ‘Most developing countries favour 
regional integration as a promising strategy for accelerating their development 
aspirations’,126 however, they did not gain much success on this issue. Despite the 
numerous challenges that the developing states are facing they have made some progress, 
especially in the field of integrating their economies into the global international trading 
system.   
One must not forget that the UN is funded from assessed contributions of countries and 
that makes them dependent on the governments of the member countries and their ability 
to fulfil their financial obligations to the UN. Hence, also the entire UN operations, as 
well as development activities depend on the receiving of such funding. 
Looking at the current situation one could argue that the WTO failed to fulfil its mission 
to supervise and liberalise international trade. Chatterjee maintained that the UN efforts 
over four decades for trade liberalisation have not been met with total success.127 Another 
failure to date was the 2001 Doha Development Round, which was launched with a sole 
purpose to address the developing state’s needs. However, to the present day the issues 
have not been resolved. Developed states are keen to resolve the question of farm 
subsidies and domestic agricultural sector and the developing states are keener to resolve 
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the international liberalisation of fair trade on agricultural products. Chatterjee added that 
two conditions have to be met in order to establish a truly international trade system: one 
is fundamental understanding and development of the rules between the North and the 
South and the other is liberalisation of international trade for the disadvantaged.128 
The UN have made numerous attempts to understand the relationship between the North 
and the South and more importantly to allow the developing states to equally participate 
in the international trade with developed states. In chronological order these attempts 
were the following: 
 
- 1948 Havana Charter – 1948 International Trade Organization(ITO)  
- 1948 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
- 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
- 1965 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Part IV 
- 1965 The International Development Strategy  
- 1966 International Covenant on Economics, Social and Cultural Human 
Rights 
- 1971 Generalized Systems of Preferences (GSP) 
- 1974 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order 
- 1974 Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order 
- 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
- 1994 Uruguay Round – World Trade Organization (WTO) replaced GATT 
- 2001 Doha Development Round 
 
The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights in Article 1 and 2 
refers to the right of self-determination and the right of all people to pursue their economic 
development. Via the Covenant many colonies got their independence especially in the 
1960s. The resolutions adopted in 1974 were long time coming, however they came into 
effect mainly due to the oil crisis of 1973.  
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 1974: 
 
[S]tressed the urgency to establish generally accepted norms to govern 
international economic relations systematically and recognize that it is not 
feasible to establish a just order and a stable world as long as a charter to 
protect the rights of all countries, and in particular the developing States, is 
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not formulated…it reaffirmed  its conviction of the urgent need to establish 
or improve norms of universal application for the development of 
international economic relations on a just and equitable basis…129 
 
The Charter was supposed to be an ‘effective instrument towards the establishment of a 
new system of international economic relations’. These relations were to be ‘based on 
equity, sovereign equity and interdependence of the interests of developed and 
developing countries’. Charter further supported ‘genuine co-operation among States’ for 
which it was believed should be ‘based on joint consideration of and concerted action 
regarding international economic problems’ which it identified as ‘essential for fulfilling 
the international community’s common desire to achieve a just and rational development 
of all parts of the world’. There was a clear understanding of the international community 
that ‘the need to develop a system of international economic relations on the basis of 
sovereign equality, mutual and equitable benefit and the close interrelationship of the 
interests of all States’ is crucial for further socio-economic development of less developed 
parts of the world.130  
In Article 2 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 1974 does not oblige 
the expropriating states to pay compensation to investors in the event of their property 
expropriation.131 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order 1974 states that ‘irreversible changes in the relationship of forces in the world 
necessitates the active, full and equal participation of the developing countries in the 
formulation and application of all decisions that concern the international community’.132 
In 1980s the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) implemented alternative 
measurement of development to GDP and named it Human Development Index (HDI) 
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and in 2001 Human Development Report was published, with the subtitle: making new 
technologies work for human development.133 
Wong agreed with Salacuse and Sullivan that after the Second World War the global 
leaders were striving towards normalising the global economy, also by promoting free 
flow of foreign capital and recognising the significance of the foreign investments.134 
However, Salacuse and Sullivan added that ‘applicable international law failed to take 
account of contemporary investment practices and address important issues of concern to 
foreign investors’ also due to the deficiency in the legal structure that included ‘scattered 
treaty provisions, few questionable customs, and contested general principles of law’.135 
Existing international law, was vague and open to various interpretations and ‘as a result, 
foreign investors had no assurance that investment contracts and arrangements made with 
host developing country governments would not be subject to unilateral change by those 
governments at some later time’.136 
One can conclude that the aspirational differences do in fact play a crucial role, given the 
fact that the past experiences taught little about what to avoid and which mistakes not to 
repeat. At least one would think that the government would at least try to act more 
responsibly in terms of the economy. However, the personal interest seems to have gained 
higher momentum that the common good did. TNCs are after all profit-maximisers while 
developing states are aspiring to achieve socio-economic development and socio-
economic independence. 
Equally, the aspirations of TNCs have not changed, they are still focused on profit-
maximisation, mostly on the expense of cheap resources of the developing states and 
selling it on the free market for a high margin. In spite of the fact that private foreign 
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investment should predominantly be used to benefit the developing state, first by the 
foreign investment, then by employment and also by technology transfer. The reality 
tends to shift from the original idea as the foreign investors soon start to reduce the local 
employability and bring in their own people instead of teaching and training the local 
staff and contributing to the capacity building. Also the involvement of the local 
businesses tends to decrease over time.  
The fault is also of the governments of developing states that have failed to protect their 
natural resources, local businesses and local employment. Another failure of governments 
of host developing states was also in negotiating investment agreements that would be 
beneficial for their socio-economic development with binding provisions for TNCs. 
The topic to be addressed is the aspirations that the three parties have in common and 
how they affect each other. International institutions, namely the UN had significant 
effect on activities of private foreign investments. Equally the former colonial powers 
had to adjust to the new situation of the newly born independent states. There is a negative 
connotation when it comes to socio-economic development, as Kothari argued that 
‘mainstream development studies neglects its colonial past and is, perhaps unwittingly, 
seeking to portray development as something distinct and “good”’.137 
While some scholars are disputing over the origins of development, Rist138 claimed that 
the roots of western thought on development can be seen in the works of Aristotle (384 - 
322 BC) and Saint Augustine (354 - 430 AD), while Cowen and Shenton139 linked them 
with Auguste Comte (1798 - 1857) and Saint-Simon (1760 - 1825) as critical response to 
industrialisation.  
Development in the contemporary sense appeared after the Great Depression and the 
Second World War or in other words the economic and political turmoil that they have 
caused and in connection to the creation of international institutions for reconstruction 
and economic stability, such as the UN, the World Bank (WB), and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). However, there were some development policies and practices 
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related to the colonial development before the Great Depression and the Second World 
War. More specifically in the UK the Colonial Development Act (CDA) as well as 
Colonial Development Fund (CDF), were passed in 1929 with the objective of allocating 
British government money for socio-economic development of their colonies. France was 
not far behind the UK. In 1946 they formed Fonds d’Investissement pour le 
Développement Economique et Social (FIDES). The UK and France have been investing 
in the transport infrastructure, education system, and agriculture production mainly of 
their African colonies. 
Before the CDA ‘assistance to the dependencies took the form of grants-in-aid to those 
in need’ and ‘emergency help to those in distress’.140 In any case the Act stated that ‘for 
the purposes of aiding and developing agriculture and industry in the colony or territory, 
and thereby promoting commerce with or industry in the United Kingdom’.141 One could 
argue that the motives were leaning more towards developing142 the colonies as trading 
partners that will be able to contribute to the economy of the colonial master. However, 
the contribution of the colonial masters towards their colonies in form of financial aid or 
services cannot be denied. Economic domination by default is exploration for profit and 
the question is if the same can be applied to the private foreign investment as well. 
There is also the “behaviour attitude difference”143 between the foreign investors and the 
host developing states. In this respect the UNCTAD has been established in 1964 at the 
Genève Conference ‘to formulate principles and policies on international trade and 
related problems of economic development’. Cowen and Shenton tried to answer the 
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question what is the objective of development. The latter is all but simple task to 
complete. 
Firstly, because the concept of “development” has changed over time and secondly, 
because it applies to all the states not only to the developing states. All of the above makes 
development a complex phenomenon. In addition to this, there has been a shift in 
development from economic growth to the quality of life in terms of the living standards 
predominantly in developed states. 
Development is complex also because it involves a variety of factors such as history, 
political stability, social awareness, geography, natural resources and economy not to 
mention reliable judiciaries. The difficult problem in terms of developing states is the 
lack of adequate or reliable data available, because it has not been gathered on a consistent 
or even regular basis. Reasons for this might be the lack of such institutions or 
mechanisms in place by the local governments to enable such data collection.  
Given the numerous actors involved in the development, which are not only the local 
government and the local people, but also international institutions, NGO’s, aid agencies, 
charities and TNCs,144 it is evident that development is not a stand-alone task. 
Development is in the hands of developers. Thomas agreed that these agencies contribute 
their share in reducing poverty, however he also raised his deep concern over the common 
belief that the development is entirely executed by these developing agencies and added 
that such belief diminishes the complexity of development itself.145 
The relationship between “development” and “economic growth” via trade has been a 
subject matter of many international debates. Developing states have made significant 
trade-offs on the expense of international tree trade. Such as lower wages, longer working 
hours and hence cheaper production cost, child labour, sweatshops and human rights 
issues emerged. Riccardo was in favour of the open market as he claimed that it gives a 
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“competitive advantage” to the state that has the goods, resources or products that could 
be used by means of the open markets.146 
Smith was also in favour of free trade and claimed that the efficient use of scarce 
resources would encourage specialisation and hence give the developing states 
competitive advantage. Stiglitz however argued against the free trade and claimed that it 
does not help the developing or the poorer states to develop, moreover the free trade 
system is one of the factors that contributed to the poverty in the developing states.147 
Thomas pointed out that the key to achieving targets is the social transformation:  
 
[W]hile the application of techniques designed to achieve such targets tends 
to simplify theory to the idea that large-scale social change may be achieved 
straightforwardly by deliberate actions, or even that poverty reduction may 
be achieved by targeting the poor without the need for broader social change, 
and thus provides an equality limited view of the historical process of 
development.148 
 
Thomas also criticised the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), by saying that 
the UN adopted in 2000 as a synthesis of summits and conferences held during the1990s 
and formed a universal framework for development and poverty reduction. 
If contractual arrangements are not made in accordance with the aspirations of both 
parties, then in the financial analysis the expected progress to be achieved by means of 
foreign investment cannot succeed, which has been the case. It is therefore important that 
the attention of TNCs should be drawn to the principles of foreign investment to various 
UN Resolutions in drafting such contracts accordingly. As stated earlier the phenomenon 
of private foreign investments has attained a new dimension in terms of aspirations of 
developing states but TNCs seems to be disregarding that factor. 
The biggest issue regarding private foreign investment to date has been the question of 
control, which has been pointed out by Hymer and the theory of investing the capital 
where the highest return can be earned. Hymer was very critical towards the activities of 
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TNCs and wrote on the “law of uneven development”, namely while analysing American 




2.6  Balancing aspirational differences between the three parties 
 
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are considered the most remarkable development in 
international law. Lehavi and Licht claimed that BITs have transformed the global legal 
landscape of international investment. BITs allow investments between the developing 
and developed states, which is also the main cause for issues due to the lack of balancing 
the aspirational differences between the two parties. 
From the case studies it is evident that the main issue is the imbalance and inequality 
between the developed and the developing states. After the Second World War Europe 
was in desperate need of financial investment in order to repair the devastation and 
destruction after the war. The Marshall Plan generated $17 billion of foreign aid to Europe 
between the years of 1948 and 1952. Together with the rapid economic recovery in 
Europe and increased production, consequently the cost of labour force was increasing as 
well. ‘The era after the Second World War also known as postcolonial era included the 
victorious allies to agree on liberalizing trade’.150 Legal framework was initially aimed to 
forming multilateral agreements for worldwide trade liberalisation.151 
However, the attempts of forming a multilateral investment regime, based on a 
multilateral treaty failed152 and is therefore build on bilateral investment treaties (BITs). 
Kline argued that this is the reason that international economy is unbalanced.153 Since 
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there is no global standard on investment agreements the element of control is open for 
discussion and interpretation.  
As an example Google corporate philosophy in one of their ten points says that ‘you can 
make money without doing evil’.154 However one could question if it is really possible to 
make net gross profit of $33billion, as Google reported in 2013, without making any 
evil.155  
Human Rights Watch report 2006 stated that: 
 
Many multinational, worried about the costs and consequences for their brand 
names if they were blamed for the human rights impact of their business 
practices, woke up and took notice. In response to their critics, some of the 
companies in the line of fire adopted human rights policies. Others, seeing the 
writing on the wall, pre-emptively did the same. Many prominent companies 
have now adopted voluntary codes of business conduct that include respect 
for basic human rights. 156  
 
There is a growing concern over the question of human rights in international 
organisations and foreign policy circles in the recent years. However, thirty years ago, 
this was not the case as Schmitz and Sikkink claimed ‘human rights were considered a 
peripheral and even inappropriate topic for foreign policy’.157 According to Donnelly this 
is due to the fact that states have to deal with various responsibilities that may be in 
contradiction, such as national responsibilities, international responsibilities and 
humanitarian responsibilities.158   
The relationship between the investor and the host state is based on the mutual interest. 
Investor has the capital, technical knowledge, and distribution channels while the host 
developing state has the natural resources, low-cost labour and desirable geographic 
                                                          
154 Google corporate philosophy <http://www.google.com/about/company/philosophy/> accessed 12 June 
2015. 
155 Google financials <http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/goog/financials> accessed 12 June 
2015. 
156 Human Rights Watch Report (World Report 2006) 41. 
157 Hans Peter Schmitz and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Human Rights’ in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas 
Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations (2nd edn, SAGE Publications 
2013) ch 33, 827. 
158 Jack Donnelly, Universal human rights. In theory & practice (3rd edn, Cornell University Press 2013). 
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location. ‘The point of entry is the moment when these specific negotiating advantages 
will serve to inform the bargaining process between the investor and the host country’.159 
TNCs and foreign investments have always been and remained the subjects of great 
interest, while the UN and TNCs have been the two most powerful players in world’s 
economy. ‘Some see TNCs as exploitative and driven by profit at all costs; other view 
them as engines of growth, necessary for economic transformation’ the views are still 
split.160 
The international institutions such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD or World Bank) the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were at the forefront of ‘international 
trade, foreign investment, and economic interdependence’ negotiations.161 
The main question ‘for host countries was how to benefit from inbound foreign 
investment while minimising its negative effects, including its perceived or actual 
infringement on national sovereignty, exploitative behaviour, and political interferences 
and its disregard for local culture, norms, and laws’.162 
The answer is not straightforward, because the studies conducted have reached mixed 
conclusions. On one hand some argue that host developing states had benefited from 
foreign investments in terms of their socio-economic development, while others claimed 




                                                          
159 Ignacio Gómez-Palacio and Peter T. Muchlinski, ‘Admission and establishment’ in Peter T. 
Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds), Oxford Handbook of International Investment 
Law (OUP 2008) ch 7, 233. 
160 Tagi Sagafi-Nejad and John H. Dunning, The UN and Transnational Corporations, From Code of 
Conduct to Global Compact, United Nations Intellectual History Project Series (Indiana University Press 
008) 4. 
161 Tagi Sagafi-Nejad and John H. Dunning, The UN and Transnational Corporations, From Code of 
Conduct to Global Compact, United Nations Intellectual History Project Series (Indiana University Press 
2008) 21. 
162 Tagi Sagafi-Nejad and John H. Dunning, The UN and Transnational Corporations, From Code of 
Conduct to Global Compact, United Nations Intellectual History Project Series (Indiana University Press 
2008) 51. 
163 See also Sidney Dell, The United Nations and International Business (Duke University Press for 
UNITAR 1990) 61. 
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2.7  Conclusions  
 
Bridging the gaps between aspirations of host developing states, the UN and TNCs is a 
long and ongoing process. The same applies in finding the solutions in the fast changing 
environment, which has changed significantly over the past few decades, namely in terms 
of TNCs. There has been a disproportionate growth of TNCs comparing to the developing 
states and their socio-economic development.  
Over the course of increased private foreign investments, it has become obvious that it 
will not suffice as higher protection of human rights, properties and more reliable 
judiciaries are required to provide the foundations for socio-economic development that 
is the basis for socio-economic independence.  
Attempts of the UN have not been met with success, such as the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States 1974, namely the Article 2 (c) has not gained the momentum 
it was intending, notwithstanding the fact that was initiated by developing states. Request 
for the New International Economic Order 1974 was also put forward when it became 
clear that the current economic order was not sustainable. The UN tariff negotiations were 
taking place, however not to the benefit of developing states until 1964 when the 
UNCTAD was formed that allowed developing states to take part in tariff negotiations 
for the first time.  
Proposal for multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) between OECD members was 
heavily criticised by developing states as well as civil society and therefore did not receive 
the needed support to be adopted. It seems that the attempts to bridge the aspirational 
gaps, made them a bit wider. However, it is not a fault of a single party as they were all 
equally responsible for failing to make consensual agreements. It was indeed the lack of 
agreement and opposition that made most of the proposed changes fail and therefore 
could not take effect. Developing states were trying to copy other models instead of 
shifting the focus towards capacity building and gaining socio-economic independence 
and therefore TNCs refused to support their proposals.  
There was also an attempt to draft agreement for a prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation payment with the UN General Assembly Resolution entitled Permanent 
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Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1962,164 known as the Cordell Hull formula added 
for compensation payment. However, payment of compensation has been the main reason 
for disputes between foreign investors and host developing states that has made 
significant progress, which can be seen in the new BITs models, namely the UK-India, 
but has not yet been resolved on the global scale. The NAFTA for example recognises 
just and appropriate compensation payment, as do some of the newest BIT models in 
oppose to Hull formula.  
The UN Codes of Conduct on Transnational Corporations165 made an attempt to 
“monitor” the activities of transnational corporations in host developing states however 
they did not manage to gain the needed support to become part of customary international 
law.  
In any case economic rights are directly connected to the socio-economic and political 
rights. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of Sates 1974 refers to three different 
types of obligations and rights, one is inherent rights used as “have the right”, second is 
the inherent duties or responsibility used as “have the duty or responsibility” and third is 
the non-obligatory duties “should”.166 
Corporations should care more about the environment where they are operating and 
review their expectations accordingly. In this quest the governments and States with their 
legal system should be better equip to serve the revision of expectations and not allow 
TNCs to continue making such enormous profits without capacity building or reinvesting 
a portion of their profits back to the host developing states. Significant progress can be 
seen on this front as many developing states are reviewing their BITs and some new ones 
are much clearer in their scope and provisions. Moving forward the buy-back should be 
included as well as re-negotiation clause in all investment agreements that should also be 
reviewed based on their performance and transfer of profits. The competition between 
TNCs should not be based on the measurement who makes more profit but on the basis 
of which company does more common good and reinvest more into the socio-economic 
development of developing states while still making sufficient profit to satisfy their 
                                                          
164 UNGA Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1962. 
165 UN Codes of Conduct on Transnational Corporations 1982. 
166 Charles Chatterjee, ‘The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: An Evaluation after 15 
Years’ (1991) 40(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 669, 678. 
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shareholders. TNCs should strive towards integration with social as well as economic 
environment of the developing states. In this attempt the international institutions from 
United Nations onwards play a crucial role to facilitate this co-operation. The United 
Nations (UN) have failed on many attempts to make themselves relevant to the point that 
they will be able to fully fulfil their main objectives, on which they have been founded. 
However, one cannot deny some of the successful attempts of the United Nations.167  
With the help of globalisation of telecommunication and internet revolution as well as 
technology that enabled access to numerous information and data that has never before 
been possible and as easy available, significant and accurate analysis can be made to set 
the grounds for the future courses of actions. As a consequence, to the data availability 
the public awareness became the highest as ever before and it is moving in the right 
direction. At this point one can question whether public awareness will be able to use 
their power and information to force their governments on national levels and pressure 
TNCs on a global level to act accordingly following the demands for common good. 
Again, international institutions will play a crucial role in facilitating communication 
between the civil society, governments of the states and senior management of TNCs to 
reach agreements and more importantly to ensure that these agreements are fulfilled. Last 
but not the least it is the role of law in these communications, negotiations and 
cooperation process as it is fundamental in achieving feasible success. Law has the power 
to enforce and impose sanctions in case of any violations. Therefore, one cannot deny the 
most important role that law has for each and every single party individually from national 
to international laws that apply to governments of states, the International institutions, 
and inter-governmental institutions as well as to the TNCs. 
To reiterate that the needed judiciaries have to be built with the help of capacity building 
and properly trained staff in order to follow the rule of law and not engage in cases of 
bribery and corruption. Law should therefore offer the necessary protection and 
determine consequences in cases of its violation. However, these state institutions in order 
to facilitate and execute such actions have to be built from the ground and that should be 
the focus of the capacity building. However, there are limits to the law in solving disputes 
                                                          
167 See further Louis Emmerji, Richard Jolly, Thomas G. Weiss, Ahead of the curve? UN Ideas and 
Global Challenges (Indiana University Press 2001); Tagi Sagafi-Nejad and John Dunning, The UN and 
Transnational Corporations, From Code of Conduct to Global Compact (Indiana University Press, 2008).  
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as not everything can be resolved by means of law. Which is why the negotiation process 
is of crucial importance between the parties for which aspirational differences have to be 
met in order to negotiate acceptable investment agreement that will be beneficial for both 
parties and facilitated by the international institutions, predominantly the United Nations, 




Chapter 3 The Limits of Law: Regulating the Conduct of 
Transnational Corporations and A Critical Analysis of some 
Bilateral Investment Treaties  
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
The Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational 
Corporations recommended the Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights referred to as 
the Norms in 2001.1 The complexity of the Norms led the Working Group to elaborate on 
the responsibilities of the Norms in a separate document called Commentary on the 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights 2003.2 
The relationship between human rights and business enterprises contributed to the 
formation of a set of standards that were based on their conduct, such as international 
human rights law and best business practices. The objectives of the Norms were to 
combine the two into one applicable guideline of conduct that is mutually acceptable and 
beneficial to all parties involved. The leading issue remains to be the successful 
enforcement and the perception of legally binding resolutions and treaties in international 
law that are formed on principles of investment agreements and the principles of 
jurisdiction of investment treaty based international arbitration.3  
The Norms are viewed as a basis for developing a treaty however the United Nations 
Draft Code of Conduct 19904 were unfortunately not adopted. Relationship between the 
UN and TNCs were challenged with the start of negotiations on international investment 
agreements, when governments of host developing states tried to negotiate with 
developed states the Code of conduct for TNCs. Sauvant maintained that ‘The Code was 
meant to establish a multilateral framework to define, in a balanced manner, the rights 
                                                          
1 UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2001/3 and updated version E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/13 (annex) (2002); Norms: 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12 (2003); Commentary: E/CN.4/Sub.2?2003/38 (2003). 
2 UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (2003). 
3 See Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity (OUP 2002).  
4 UN Doc E/1990/94, 12 June 1990. 
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and responsibilities of transnational corporations and host country governments in their 
relations with each other’.5 The problem occurred when TNCs were asked to follow the 
Norms and good corporate practice when engaging in global economy and operating in 
host developing states. In the 1970s numerous crises emerged giving rise to the discontent 
between developing states and TNCs. This was primarily due to different views between 
host developing states and TNCs on the issue of negotiating a compromise in contracts, 
for which both TNCs and host developing states are equally responsible. Collapse of the 
Bretton-Woods model6 was one of the issues that led to the economic crisis, elevated oil 
prices caused the energy crisis in 1973 and numerous bribery scandals that were revealed 
globally by the US congressional committees among others.7  
Furthermore, collapse of the Soviet Union, privatisation process, expropriation and 
nationalisation of natural resources, made the need for codes of conduct almost 
meaningless. While TNCs have become key actors in international economy, the 
governments of host developing states failed to supervise their activities or negotiate their 
responsibilities accordingly. In addition to the issue of regulating TNCs activities across 
the borders of the home states, issues relating to foreign investments and preservation of 
environment became important.8 This resulted in the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development 1992,9 which was produced by the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) that helped raise environmental awareness.  
In 1966 the meetings started with the initial Group of 31 developing states that expanded 
to the Group of 77 developing states and by 1982 it already had 120 members all of which 
were developing states.10 Developing states started exploring their bargaining position 
                                                          
5 Karl P. Sauvant, ‘The Negotiations of the United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations, Experience and Lessons Learned’ (2015) 16 The Journal of World Investment and Trade 
11-87, 11. 
6 International monetary system that was based on stable and convertible exchange rates, which was 
occasionally amended to adjust the balance of payments was functioning for 25 years after the Second 
World War. In 1971 the Bretton Woods monetary system was replaced with floating exchange rates 
7 See further Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (OUP 
2007). 
8 Seymour J. Rubin, ‘Transnational Corporations and International Codes of Conduct: A Study of the 
Relationship between International Legal Cooperation and Economic Development’ (1995) 10(4) 
American University International Law Review 1275-1289. 
9 UN Doc A/CONF151/26 (Vol. I), (1992) 31 ILM 874. 




and their socio-economic development options.11 The next conference was held in 
Mexico, when the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of the States 1974 was 
presented.12 Leaders of developing states were very keen on setting the norms that would 
help with the socio-economic development and help balance the economic relations 
between them and the developed states. Aspirations of developing states were written in 
the ‘Action Programme for Economic Co-operation’.13 The sequence of events could have 
been very different if it was not for the Middle East conflict, which caused the dramatic 
rise of oil prices by OPEC that endangered developing states chances of achieving their 
goals for socio-economic development and independence. Developing states continued 
to fight for balancing the economic differences, which produced Declaration on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order and Programme of Actions on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order 1974.14 The first agreement 
between developing and developed states was recorded in Development and International 
Economic Co-operation 1975.15 
There is another relationship to be considered and that is the relationship between TNCs 
and the governments of host developing states.16 Problem of TNCs activities was given 
priority in terms of its importance in 1972,17 which led to appointment of the Group of 
Eminent Persons18 to study the impact of TNCs on development and on international 
relations. In the quest for a new international economic order the codes of conduct became 
                                                          
11 See Charter of Algiers at Ministerial Meeting of the Group 77 on 24 October 1967 in UN Doc MM 
77/I/20 (1967); The Lusaka Declaration was formed in 1970 in 10 Int’l legal Mat. 215 (1971); 
Declaration on Non-Alignment and Economic Progress; Lima Declaration 1971 and UN Doc 
MM/77/II/11. 
12 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA Res 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974 (A/ 
9631) (1974) 
13 UN Doc A/9330 at 85-100 (1973). 
14 UNGA Res 3201, Spec. Sess. 6 UN GAOR Supp. (No.1) at 3; UN Doc A/9559 (1974); UNGA Res 
3202, Spec. Sess. 6 UN GAOR Supp. (No.1) at 5; UN Doc A/9559 (1974). 
15 UNGA A/RES/S-7/3362 Development and international economic co-operation. 16 September 1975. 
16 It is deemed essential to note that the concept of nation-state might have become obsolete in the 20th 
century as states are no longer single nation states, mainly owing to the mass immigration processes and 
consequences of the two World Wars. Most of the states today are mixed nation states and it might be a 
good time in the light of recent events to review the nation-state concept, however the topic of this 
discussion is outside of the scope of this research. 
17 International codes of conduct were the vehicle of control and guidance in the quest to regulate 
activities of TNCs namely in the host developing states under the auspice of the New International 
Economic Order (NIEC). 
18 There were 20 people appointed to the Group, eight people came from less-developed states, two from 
communist states, and ten from the developed states. The Group produced the report UN ECOSOC, The 




a legal phenomenon and were intended as a tool that would control the activities of TNCs, 
predominantly in host developing states. 
Some scholars19 believe that TNCs are standing in the way of developing states socio-
economic development, which called for implementation of codes of conduct for TNCs. 
However, the issue is that the codes of conduct have been in the making for quite some 
time now and have not achieved much success in their implementation. The difficulties 
of codes of conduct became especially evident during the negotiation process. The UN 
General Assembly passed a resolution containing Codes of Conduct for Law Enforcement 
Officials in 1980.20  




3.2  A Critical examination of some of the major Codes of Conduct as 
means of controlling activities of transnational corporations (TNCs) 
 
When the oil conglomerate Chevron was ordered to pay 18 billion dollars in damages it 
was ‘the largest judgment ever awarded in an environmental lawsuit’ the case was far 
from over and the media tagged it as local plaintiffs’ fruitless legal struggle with the help 
of a corrupt judiciary that was dependent politically as well as economically on the 
foreign oil companies.21 
The incident of Chevron exposed the vulnerability of governing the transnational 
corporations (TNCs) in a manner appropriate to avoid abuses of human rights and 
conducting environmentally harmful activities. Therefore, corporate governance that will 
better control such activities is deem necessary. The case of Chevron also exposed the 
failure of international as well as domestic law in handling such cases. Muchlinski 
                                                          
19 See for example R. Murray, Underdevelopment, international firms and the international division of 
labour In J. Tinberger (ed), Towards a new world economy (Rotterdam University Press 1972); Rhys 
Jenkins, Transnational corporations and uneven development, The internationalization of Capital and the 
Third World (Routledge 2013, first published in 1987). 
20 UNGA Res 34/169, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.  46) 185, UN Doc A/RES/34/169 (1980), reprinted in 
19  INT'L LEGAL MAT.  526 (1980).   
21 Patrick R. Keefe, ‘Reversal of Fortune’ The New Yorker (9 January 2012). 
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maintained that after 2010 there have been examples of ‘holding multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) accountable for harm caused by their overseas operations and, at the level of 
international law, calls for the extension of human rights responsibilities to corporate 
actors’.22 The suggested method would be to name and shame the TNCs that are engaging 
in harmful activities. As TNCs are concerned with their corporate imagine as bad 
reputation might have a negative impact on the value of their shares. While Friedman 
maintained that ‘there is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits’ as long as it ‘engages 
in open and free competition without deception or fraud’.23 Studies have shown that in 
the long-term CSR can be beneficial to the TNCs.24 Reputational approach might 
therefore be more effective way towards TNCs self-regulation. 
As an alternative is the notion of “soft law” concept. Syracuse maintained that “soft law” 
is conceptually and substantively inadequate and misleading in filling the voids’.25 In 
addition to “soft laws” being considered as legally non-binding more like a moral 
compass rather than the rule. It is essential to reiterate that the codes of conduct are much 
needed and it is unfortunate that after all the attempts to finalise them over the years they 
have not yet materialised.26 There are also no legal repercussion in cases of any violations 
a part from the imposed sanctions.27 However, the importance of codes should not be 
                                                          
22 Peter T. Muchlinski, ‘The Changing Face of Transnational Business Governance: Private Corporate 
Law Liability and Accountability of Transnational Groups in a Post-Financial Crisis World’ (2011) 18(2) 
Indian Journal of Global Legal Studies 665.  
23 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago 1970) 112. 
24 See Philip Kotler & Nancy Lee, Corporate social responsibility: doing the most good for your company 
and your cause (Wiley 2005) 14. 
25 Harri Kalimo and Tim Staal, ‘Softness in International Instruments - The Case of Transnational 
Corporations’ (2015) 42(2) Syracuse Journal of International Law 365. 
26 The UN are not a state and as such have no parliament to enforce the laws. Therefore the conclusion is 
that there is a lack of understanding on the definition and concept of a state. Regardless of that fact, the 
members of the UN are however sovereign states and as such should be obliged to follow the binding 
resolutions that have been adopted by the majority members. As an example France did not sign the Limited 
Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water however they are still not allowed to violate the conditions agreed in the treaty in spite of the 
fact that they have not signed the treaty. Failure of following the resolutions or treaties can result in sanction, 
which have unfortunately not proven to be effective. The question to answer is whether international 
organisations have law making powers. 
27 See further case studies on the UN sanctions <https://www.globalpolicy.org/global-taxes/41751-un-
sanctions-case-studies.html> accessed 26 February 2016. 
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disregarded just yet as they have the potential to form the basis for new standards that 
could potentially become a customary part of international law.28 
Shortcomings of the “hard law” and its inability to adequately govern the activities of 
TNCs called for assistance of “soft laws”. Olsson maintained that ‘Soft law rests on the 
idea that the binary nature of law (law is either hard or not law at all) is not suitable to 
accommodate the growing complexity of contemporary international relations’.29 Some 
scholars have come to ‘the conclusion of an agreement in treaty form does not ensure that 
a hard obligation has been incurred’.30 
However, the “hard laws” cannot take credit in solving the issues, as there have been 
many examples of ‘provisions concerning controversial social issues have been put into 
very general and probably meaningless, hortatory language, simply to show that 
something has been done, but where is little intention to see these provisions having any 
real legal effect’.31 
The question that one should ask is, if the “hard law” and the “soft law” both fail, what 
should then be implemented instead, if “no law” is not an option. The possible answer to 
that question could be the codes of conduct, effectively Draft Code of conduct which: 
  
[C]ontains obligations ranging from respect for the sovereignty and political 
system of the host state, respect for human rights, abstention from corrupt 
practices, full disclosure or observance of tax and competition laws, to 
obligations on TNCs not to abuse their economic power in a manner 
damaging to the economic well-being of the countries in which they operate.32 
 
Conduct of TNCs has been under review especially in regards to the environmental and 
the human rights protection. More importantly conduct of TNCs questions their liability 
                                                          
28 See Chin Leng Lim and Olufemi A. Elias, The Paradox of Consensualism in International Law 
(Developments in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2012). 
29 Ilhami Alkan Olsson, ‘Four Competing Approaches to International Soft Law’ (2013) 58 Scandinavian 
Studies in Law 177 <http://www.scandinavianlaw.se/pdf/58-9.pdf> accessed 1 March 2016. 
30 See Christine Chinkin, ‘Normative Development in the International Legal System’ in Dinah Shelton 
(ed), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System 
(OUP 2003) 25. 
31 Peter T. Muchlinski, ‘Human Rights, Social Responsibility and the Regulation of International 
Business: The Development of International Standards by Intergovernmental Organisations’ (2003) 3 
Non-State Actors and International Law 123-152, 129. 
32 Peter T. Muchlinski, ‘Human rights, social responsibility and the regulation of international business: 
The development of international standards by intergovernmental organisations’ (2003) 3 Non-State 
Actors and International Law 123-152, 130. 
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under international law.33 Johns maintained that ‘Transnational corporations (“TNC”) 
does not have a concrete presence in international law’34 and asked ‘Why then has 
international law traditionally not recognised the TNC as an international actor and a legal 
subject?’35 However ‘the juristic personality of the TNC was confirmed in the Barcelona 
Traction, Light and Power Co Case as analogous to that of individuals, that is, as a 
national of a state.36 In 1970 Alvarez maintained that ‘a corporation seems as much a 
subject of international law as an individual or an international organization’.37 However, 
in cases ‘outside of ATCA38 decisions by U.S. courts, corporations have generally not 
been found liable under international law and are therefore not “subject” of international 
law’.39 There are five characteristics that a corporation have in legal terms; legal 
personality, limited liability, transferable shares, delegated management under a board 
structure, and investor ownership.40 International legal status of TNCs is still quite unclear 
in spite of the fact that it has legal personality in international law, to some degree.41 As 
such TNCs cannot take part in international institutions, however that does not exclude 
their participation in front of the international tribunals under the International 
Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes42 (ICSID) 1965 or the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1994. Nye expressed his concern by maintaining that 
                                                          
33 See Menno T. Kamminga and Suman Zia-Zarifi (ed), Liability of Multinational Corporations under 
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2012); see also the Human Rights Watch < https://www.hrw.org/> 
accessed 24 October 2015. 
34 Fleur E. Johns, ‘The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of International and 
Legal Theory (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 893. 
35 Fleur E. Johns, ‘The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of International and 
Legal Theory (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 894. 
36 Fleur E. Johns, ‘The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of International and 
Legal Theory (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 894; see also The Barcelona Traction, Light 
and Power Co Ltd Case (Belgium v Spain), ICJ Reports, 1970, 3 para 70 (Barcelona Traction). 
37 José E. Alvarez, ‘Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?’ (2011) 9 Santa Clara Journal of 
International Law 3. 
38 ATCA is Alien Tort Claims Act. 
39 José E. Alvarez, ‘Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?’ (2011) 9 Santa Clara Journal of 
International Law 3. 
40 See Reinier Kraakmaan, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry B. Hansman, et al. The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law A Comparative and Functional Approach (2nd edn, OUP 2009) 1. 
41 See Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Multinational enterprises and the law (University of London Press 2012); 
see further Statute of the international court of justice <http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2#CHAPTER_II> accessed on 27 October 2015.  
42 Muchlinski has expressed his concern over the relationship between investor-state in regards to the 
dispute settlement, where the investor can choose the method of dispute settlement that is national or 
international system, which automatically gives the investor the superior position to exclude the national 
legal system of the host country, during the course of investment and as provision in the bilateral 
investment treaty (BIT) in Peter T. Muchlinski, ‘The Changing Face of Transnational Business 
Governance: Private Corporate Law Liability and Accountability of Transnational Groups in a Post-
Financial Crisis World’ (2011) 18(2) Indian Journal of Global Legal Studies 665.    
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‘hundreds of organizations and legal regimes exist to manage the global dimensions of 
trade, telecommunications, civil aviation, health, environment, meteorology and many 
other issues43 which poses the danger to the autonomy of sovereign states.44  
The relationship between TNCs and host developing states has always been a subject of 
research of many academics namely Hymer, Vernon, Huntington and others.45  
 
Muchlinski maintained that:  
 
[T]he World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the World Bank, are doing little 
to regulate such practices while, at the same time, creating a deregulated 
global space in which MNEs will be increasingly free to act as they will, and 
in which there is little by way of democratic accountability for the actions of 
these powerful private actors.46 
 
As maintained in the draft UN Code of Conduct for TNCs that contain obligations of 
TNCs ranging from respect for the sovereignty of host developing state, human rights, 
political systems, refraining from corrupt practices, not abusing its economic power47 to 
contribution to the sustainable development and local capacity building.48 ‘TNCs are 
expected to conduct their economic affairs in good faith and in accordance with proper 
standards of economic activity, while also observing fundamental principles of good 
socio-political and ethical conduct’.49 
Activities of TNCs are mainly problematic due to the fact that they operate in multiple 
jurisdictions. As Stiglitz maintained that ‘An increasing fraction of commerce within each 
                                                          
43 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ‘Parliament of Dreams’ (World Link 2002) 
<http://bazaarmodel.net/phorum/read.php?1,133> accessed 27 October 2015; Joseph S. Nye, The 
Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (OUP 2003). 
44 The same concern has been expressed by Reymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational 
Spread of US Enterprises (Basic Books 1971). 
45 See further Susan Strange, Big Business and the State in Multinationals in the global political economy 
in Lorraine Eden and Evan H. Potter (eds), Multinational in the Global Political Economy (first edition 
1993, Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 104-07. 
46 Peter T. Muchlinski, ‘Human Rights, Social Responsibility and the Regulation of International 
Business: The Development of International Standards by Intergovernmental Organisations’ (2003) 3 
Non-State Actors and International Law 123-152, 124. 
47 See UNCTAD Social Responsibility UNCTAD Series on issues in international investment agreements 
(New York and Geneva, UN 2001). 
48 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Paris, OECD 2000) Ch2. 
49 UNCTAD Social Responsibility UNCTAD Series on issues in international investment agreements 
(New York and Geneva, UN 2001) 11. 
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country is conducted by corporations that are owned and controlled from outside its 
borders and that often conduct business in dozens of countries’.50 While some domestic 
laws are in line with the international law, there is still a big gap between them, which 
leads to gaps in the legal consequences51. Therefore, TNCs are powerful enough to be 
able to choose to operate in the host developing state where legislation is more 
beneficial.52 This situation a priori gives TNCs an advantage with better bargaining 
position, effectively in negotiating investment agreements. 
Over the years the concern over the social dimension of international business was raised 
effectively owing to the lack of existing regulations. Moreover, international agreements 
have not included any social issues in their agreements. The Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI) did not include any labour or environmental standards, which could 
have also been the reason for their collapse.53 A ‘failure to follow the terms of a voluntary 
code could be evidence of a breach of contract’54 however if the terms and conditions are 
not negotiated and agreed in the investment contract there could be no breach. While the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) failed, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
proliferated, namely in the 1990s and would on the other hand, in most cases, include:  
 
[N]on-discrimination, based on most-favoured-nation and national treatment 
standards; investment guarantees against expropriation or civil unrest and in 
support of free transfer of funds and dispute settlement.55 
 
                                                          
50 Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of Cross-Border Legal 
Framework in a Globalized World Balancing Rights with Responsibilities’ (2007) 23(3) American 
University International Law Review 451–558.   
51 For example, average enforcement of a contract in OECD countries is 351 days, while it takes local 
courts 880 days in Pakistan and 1,442 days in Bangladesh, see Report on ‘Business and Governance’, 
Financial Times, 14 March 2007, 5. 
52 See further Thomas Donaldson, The Ethics of international Business (OUP 1992). 
53 Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) initiative failed in October 1998. The most interesting 
thing to note was the fear allegedly from the developing states that MAI would impose obligations to the 
developing states without any benefits. The loudest opponents to the MAI were actually the developed 
states. What followed the MAI were the BITs, which were in terms even more disadvantageous for the 
developing states. The number of signed BITs has been increasing rapidly ever since the first one was 
signed to 2,928 in 2015, out of which 2,276 are in force; International Investment Agreements 
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA> accessed on 27 October 2015. 
54 Peter T. Muchlinski, ‘Human Rights, Social Responsibility and the Regulation of International 
Business: The Development of International Standards by Intergovernmental Organisations’ (2003) 3 
Non-State Actors and International Law 123-152, 129. 
55 Peter T. Muchlinski, ‘Human Rights, Social Responsibility and the Regulation of International 
Business: The Development of International Standards by Intergovernmental Organisations’ (2003) 3 
Non-State Actors and International Law 123-152, 127. 
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However, developing states have not taken the initiative to include provisions that would 
define the terms of the capacity building requirements, local management participation, 
succession clause, re-negotiation clause, performance evaluation clause, transfer of 
profits clause or joint venture terms and conditions in the BITs. Equally BITs contain no 
provision on the obligations of foreign investors towards host developing states, as well 
as preservation of the environment or protection of human rights. A ‘contractual 
commitment to sell technology, equipment, or a plant in exchange for the purchase of a 
certain quantity of the products produced as a result in full or partial payment’56 can be 
reflected in compensation or a buy-back.57 Buy-backs are high financial commitments 
over a longer time period. Chatterjee maintained that ‘a transfer of capital plant or 
equipment is required to buy-back a pre-determined quantity of manufactured product in 
a predetermined currency’.58 In terms of buy-back agreements it is also determined which 
currency to repay the ‘debt occasioned by the acquisition of the capital plant or 
equipment’.59 An important supplement to the buy-back method are “turn-key contracts” 
that ‘allow the local people in the country into which the capital plant / equipment has 
been transferred, to have training in order to ensure that over a period of time (which 
becomes a term of the contract) the local people would be able to operate and manage the 
industry’.60 Such contracts include “product-in-hand”61 or “market-in-hand”62, but 
preferably both. However, buy-backs are not without the risk, such as fluctuation of the 
exchange rate if not included in the clause on agreed rate during the negotiations process, 
time line between contract and manufacturing for the market demand and possible delays 
in production. In any case ‘the advantages of buy-back seem to outweigh its 
disadvantages’.63  
                                                          
56 Leo G.B. Welt, Unconventional forms of financing: Buy-back/compensation/barter (1989-1900) 22 
N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol. 461, 462. 
57 See Leo G.B. Welt, Trade Without Money: Barter and Countertrade (Aspen Law & Business 1984) 8-
9. 
58 Charles Chatterjee, Legal aspects of trade finance (Routledge 2006) 11. 
59 Charles Chatterjee, Legal aspects of trade finance (Routledge 2006) 11.  
60 Charles Chatterjee, Legal aspects of trade finance (Routledge 2006) 12. 
61 With product-in-hand the local people are trained to manufacture the final products. 
62 With market-in-hand the transferor helps the host states to enter the foreign markets with their 
products. 
63 Charles Chatterjee, Legal aspects of trade finance (Routledge 2006) 12. 
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The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights points out the ‘governance 
gaps created by globalisation’64 based on legal void, which is created in cases when TNCs 
avoid the control and influence decisions. Kalimo and Staal wrote about the ‘legal void 
as a regulatory situation in violation of the laws of the TNC home state or of international 
law’. 65  
De Feyter argued that ‘the home state is faced with the difficulty that, in principle, the 
reach of domestic law is limited to its own territory’.66 However, ‘at the level of national 
law, a non-binding code of conduct can acquire legal force in private law’.67  
Activities of TNCs are of significant importance due to the fact that they are spread over 
a number or host developing states and have significant impact on the global economy. 
Consequently, their jurisdictions fall under a number of different jurisdictions that are not 
compatible among themselves. One of the rare legally binding Conventions is the 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business 
Transactions 1998.68 
The above is not always the case as TNCs tend to identify the host developing states that 
for example have softer laws on labour force, such as the number of working hours, which 
TNCs explore since efficiency is considered to be of crucial importance, together with 
cost reduction. Moreover, some states may have very low taxes or none at all on the 
enormous profits that the TNCs can sometimes achieve, which makes the decision of 
TNCs very easy when choosing their headquarters and subsidiaries around the globe. 
However, Muchlinski maintained that ‘the real problem may be a lack of proper 
                                                          
64 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN Human Rights Council, 8th 
Sess., Protct, Respect and Remedy 6-7, 15, UN. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 2008. 
65 Harri Kalimo and Tim Staal, ‘Softness in International Instruments - The Case of Transnational 
Corporations’ (2015) 42(2) Syracuse Journal of International Law 365. 
66 Koen De Feyter, Globalisation and Human Rights, in International Human Rights in a Global context, 
68, 81/82 (Filipe Gomez Isa & Koen de Feiter eds, 2009).  
67 Peter T. Muchlinski, ‘Human Rights, Social Responsibility and the Regulation of International 
Business: The Development of International Standards by Intergovernmental Organisations’ (2003) 3 
Non-State Actors and International Law 123-152, 129. 
68 OECD Doc DAFFE/IME/BR(97) 20 8 April 1998 <http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf> accessed on 24 October 2015. 
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regulation in the host country of local businesses and institutions for which MNEs may 
not be responsible’.69 
The question of limits of law becomes even more relevant now than ever before. Mainly 
because umbrella clause enables foreign investment law to extend to contractual dispute 
in terms of allowing breach of contractual obligation to be elevated to breach of BITs, 
which is protected with a set of standards and gives access to international arbitration. 
That directly contradicts international law which maintains that a breach of a contract of 
a state does not give rise to direct international responsibility.70 
Conference on transnational corporations (CTC) maintained that:  
 
[N]on-binding Codes of Conduct may become a course of law for national 
authorities as well as for transnational corporations themselves, since both 
can rely upon and utilise the Code to fill the gaps in the relevant laws and 
practices…[and transnational corporations] may help to shape pertinent legal 
principles through their continuous practice.71 
 
Charney explored the role of universal rules to fill the gap of domestic legislation72 
because the developing states tend to have their standards set very low compering to the 
developed states. In some rare cases the developing states recognise universal jurisdiction 
outside the borders of their territories. Donovan and Roberts argued that these cases are 
not very common and that they are also very limited.73 While international law has the 
ability to allow states to exercise jurisdiction of their nationals abroad with the help of the 
nationality principle, which conflicts with the territoriality principle.  
Knox74 suggested that the human rights could be implemented directly, almost directly, 
indirectly or transposed into domestic law. In the case of environmental laws, it can only 
                                                          
69 Peter T. Muchlinski, ‘Human Rights, Social Responsibility and the Regulation of International 
Business: The Development of International Standards by Intergovernmental Organisations’ (2003) 3 
Non-State Actors and International Law 123-152, 135. 
70 J Wong, ‘Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties Of Breaches of Contract, Treaty Violations 
and the Divide between Developing and Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Dipsutes’ (2006) 14 
George Mason Law Review 135. 
71 CTC, Certain Modalities for Implementation of a Code of Conduct in Relation to Its Possible Legal 
Nature, UN Doc. E/C 10/AC 2/9, 22 (1978) 8. 
72 Jonathan I. Charney, 'Universial International Law' (1993) 87(4) The American Journal of International 
Law 529. 
73 Donald F. Donovan and Anthea Roberts, 'The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction' 
(2006) 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 142. 
74 John H. Knox, 'Horizontal Human Rights Law' (2008) 102 AM J. INT'l L. 1. 
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be done by transposition or indirect application of international law. Knox also added that 
TNCs have a limited set of obligations. The only case in which TNCs would have been 
bound by the international law is when host developing state and home state of TNCs 
would directly adopt international law.  
It is interesting to note that as from 1979, the global economy has been growing at a high 
rate, while the developing states have become even poorer.75 In the early 1970s it became 
obvious that this situation cannot continue and that intervention of the international 
community via international institutions, namely the UN would be needed in order to 
establish the balance between developed and developing states. One of the important 
items on the agenda was to start controlling and regulating activates of TNCs, especially 
in the host developing states. To that effect the UN Economic and Social Council adopted 
the Resolution76 in 1974 by which the UNCTC was created and started with its operations 
a year later, in 1975. ‘Rightly or wrongly, transnational corporations (TNCs) or 
multinational business enterprises (MNEs) are perceived to be the major obstacles 
standing in the way of the economic development and progress of the lesser developed 
nations of the world’.77 The effects of TNCs on socio-economic development of host 
developing states is still inconclusive. 
Many countries individually have been trying to implement codes of conduct in their 
domestic legislation that would regulate the activities of TNCs inside their judiciaries. By 
implementing such codes, the objective of the host developing states was to become 
economically independent, and more importantly would help to create the environment 




3.3  Limits of Law and application of Codes of Conduct  
 
                                                          
75 See Thomas H. Reynolds, ‘Clouds of Codes: The New International Economic Order through Codes of 
Conduct: A Survey’ (1982) 75 Law Libr. J. 315.  
76 UN Doc A/PV/2315 (1974). 
77 Thomas H. Reynolds, ‘Clouds of Codes: The New International Economic Order through Codes of 
Conduct: A Survey’ (1982) 75 Law Libr. J. 315, 321. 
129 
 
It has been over four decades ago that the UN Convention on Transnational Corporations 
drafted the UN Code of Conduct on TNCs. The objective of this code was to specify the 
rights and duties, together with responsibilities of TNCs in their relations with host 
developing states. Unfortunately, the code of conduct does not seem to have achieved 
much success. Therefore, the question to what extent should the rules and responsibilities 
for TNCs be followed remains open and unanswered. The situation of balancing the 
interests is still open for discussion on the international level between all three parties.  
In 1998 the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
established the Working Group.78 It was the Working Group that came up with the idea 
of writing the codes of conduct for enterprises that would have their origins in human 
rights. The problem came when the name “Codes of Conduct” was changed numerous 
times to “Guidelines”, “Principles”, “Draft Norms and Responsibilities”, which uses 
binding as well as non-binding norms, all of the subsequent failed to grasp the importance 
of the mission and the objective to create the needed legal grounds. The discrepancy was 
also in the terminology that used the term “companies”, which included ‘any business 
enterprise, regardless of the international or domestic nature of its activities; the 
corporate, partnership, or other legal form used to establish the business entity; and the 
nature of the ownership of the entity, including any privately-owned or government-
owned entity’.79 This definition avoided making distinctions between different entities be 
it international or domestic and it also prevented TNCs abusing the options of distinction 
and finding ways to register and operate as a domestic entity in opposed to TNC in host 
developing state. 
The draft code of conduct suggested that governments would be responsible for 
maintaining human rights standards in their states by stating that: 
 
States have the primary responsibility to promote, secure the fulfilment of, 
respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights, transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises, as organs of society, are also responsible for 
                                                          
78 S.C.Res 1998/8 of 20 August 1998. The Working Group was based on the Working Methods and 
Activities of Transnational Corporations in Principles Relating to the Human Rights of Companies, U.N. 
Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/WG 
79 In draft Guidelines at section I, para. 21. 
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promoting and securing the human rights set forth in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,…80  
 
In this respect TNCs have the obligation to respect human rights.81 The UN have been on 
the forefront of recognising human rights and incorporating them in their documents and 
resolutions. The UN International Bill of Human Rights (IBHR) is a document, consisting 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covent on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.82 The importance of the UN resolutions was the fact that the global community’s 
awareness was building up in recognition of the growing power and influence of TNCs, 
effectively via the private foreign investments, which was initiated by the ITT scandal in 
Chile.83 At the General Assembly President Allende asked for help and warned about the 
dangers of TNCs increasing their economic power, political influence and corruption.84 
In the 1970s it was also the time when many developing states freed themselves from 
their colonial masters and became independent sovereign states and members of the 
United Nations. The non-aligned developing states85 organised numerous meetings with 
                                                          
80 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) preamble. 
81 It is interesting to note that Human Rights have not become Fundamental Rights and moreover were 
not adopted in any of the constitutions to make them legally binding. 
82 William H. Meyer, Human rights and international political economy in third world nations: 
multinational corporations, foreign aid and repression (Praeger 1998) 9.  
83 UN Doc E/SR 1822 (1972) was created on request of Mr. Santa Cruz a representative from Chile, who 
asked that the activities of transnational corporations have to be closely reviewed and studied due to the 
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Report UN Doc ST/ECA/190 (1973) and UN Doc ST/ESA/15 (1973). Two decades earlier 1954, there 
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Nationalism in Central America in the Twentieth Century (University of Illinois at Urbana – Champaign 
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84 Many corporations have been discovered to make illegal payments, paying foreign government 
officials, politicians and political parties, and other corporate bribery activities, which was highlighted in 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Investigation findings report 1977. Estimated 400 
corporations voluntarily disclosed their wrongdoing. See U.S. House of Representatives, Unlawful 
Corporate Payments Act of 1977, Report No. 95-640, 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/houseprt.html accessed 20 February 2016> 
accessed 16 March 2016; See also U.S. House of Representatives, Report on Questionable and Illegal 
Corporate Payments and Practices 1976; See further Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Improved Disclosure Acts of 1977; U.S. 
Senate Report No.95-114 (1977) 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/senaterpt.html> accessed 20 February 2016.  
85 Developing states with natural resources were thinking of the possibility of joining in cartels, following 
the OPEC example, which was discussed by Fred Bergsten, ‘One, two, many OPECs … ? The threat is 
real’ Foreign Policy (No.14 Spring 1974) 84–90. 
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the purpose to stimulate the economic cooperation and where the idea of New 
International Economic Order came about. The Declaration on the Establishment of a 
New International Economic Order 1974 provided for the:  
[R]egulation and supervision of the activities of transnational corporations by 
taking measures in the interest of the national economies of the countries 
where such transnational corporations operate on the basis of the full 
sovereignty of these countries.86  
A similar request was made by the UN Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States 
1974.87 The two mentioned UN Declarations were instrumental in creating the 
Commission on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) and its secretariat.  
The OECD guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are very clear, especially in chapter 
II “General Policies” it stated that ‘Enterprises should take fully into account established 
policies in the countries in which they operate, and consider the views of other 
stakeholders’.88 
Among the areas specific for the TNCs conduct it included also that TNCs should 
‘Contribute to economic, environmental and social progress with a view to achieving 
sustainable development’ while respecting ‘the internationally recognised human rights 
of those affected by their activities’. TNCs should also ‘Encourage local capacity building 
through close co-operation with the local community’. One very relevant requirement, 
especially at present, was the requirement on ‘creating employment opportunities and 
facilitating training opportunities for employees’ which clearly instructs the expectation 
from TNCs in terms of the local employment and capacity building. In the quest to 
ensuring the above it also instructs TNCs to ‘Refrain from seeking or accepting 
exemptions’ because it is rightfully expected that TNCs would ‘apply good corporate 
governance practices’ during the course of their conduct as well as an ‘effective self-
regulatory practices and management systems’. The main critics addressed the 
                                                          
86 UNGA Res A/RES/S-6/3201 1974 <http://www.un-documents.net/s6r3201.htm> accessed 23 October 
2015. 
87 UNGA Res A/RES/29/3 1974. 
88 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Publishing 2011) Ch II, 19. 
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disassociation between TNCs and civil societies for which it was recommended that 
TNCs should ‘foster a relationship of confidence and mutual trust’.89  
The Guidelines go further and specifically instruct TNCs to ‘Promote employee 
awareness’ by means of training and further skill development. TNCs should also 
‘Refrain from discriminatory or disciplinary action against employees who make bona 
fide reports to management’ which would suggest that TNCs are expected to operate 
under full transparency and any deviation from the good corporate practice should be 
immediately addressed and resolved. Such corporate practice should also be promoted 
and advocated. Last but not least the Guidelines advice against ‘any improper 
involvement in local political activities’ for obvious reasons, while the co-operation with 
local communities and authorities is strongly advisable any potential coercion on 
decision-making is however not tolerated.90  
‘[T]NCs are expected to conduct their economic affairs in good faith and in accordance 
with proper standards of economic activity, while also observing fundamental principles 
of good socio-political and ethical conduct’.91 ‘The basic problem and main concern of 
all guidelines for MNE's is to integrate the transnational business activities of MNE's into 
the national economic and social systems of the host countries in which they operate’.92 
However, from the codes of conduct one can conclude that these codes are actually 
directed to the states and not to the TNCs, while the OECD Guidelines are specifically 
addressed to TNCs. The process of implementing codes of conduct in domestic legislation 
should first have to be created and then adopted by all member states and incorporated 
into their domestic legislation.  
There exists a significant gap in aspirations between the economic objectives of TNCs 
and those of host developing states. The reached agreement included additional protection 
under international minimum standards for foreign investors instead of creating 
mechanism to control the activities of TNCs in host developing states. These standards 
                                                          
89 All references from OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Publishing 2011) 
Ch II, 19. 
90 OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Publishing 2008) 
<http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/1922428.pdf> accessed on 24 October 2015. 
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include fair and equitable, MFN and national treatment, full protection and security, 
protection against expropriation, access to technology, abolishing cartels, access to 
international arbitration and restrictive business practices. However, the question if the 
TNCs are violating the law by using their competitive advantages, remains to be 
undetermined. However, all of the existing standards seems to protect the interests of the 
foreign investors more favourably than those of host developing states. 
International law applicable to TNCs is rather a new phenomenon.93 Therefore an attempt 
was made to examine the conduct of TNCs in host developing states. As stated in the 
codes the objective was to ‘maximise the contributions of transnational corporations to 
economic development and growth and to minimise the negative effects of the activities 
of these corporations’. Draft codes also instruct TNCs not to interfere with the policies of 
host developing states in any way. Developing states were in favour of the ius cogens 
principle for the right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources.94 
The control of transnational corporations (TNCs) is mainly exercised via national level, 
which offers the most effective control over activities of TNCs. Schachter maintained that 
nation-state concept will start to fade away and new structures will emerge in order to 
control the activities of TNCs.95 He also predicted the expansion of communication 
technology that will result in greatest involvement of civil society that will cause overlap 
of private and public international law. The latter has potential for continuous growth as 
the property gains new dimensions and international “persons” emerge.96  
The most known are the “Sullivan Principles” created in 1977 for TNCs activities in 
South Africa.97 The Sullivan Principles were not mandatory for TNCs, but were strongly 
encouraged.98 They have later evolved in Global Sullivan Principles of Social 
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Responsibility in which TNCs committed to ‘respect our employees’ voluntary freedom 
of association’, ‘compensate our employees to enable them to meet at least their basic 
needs’, and ‘provide a safe and healthy workplace; protect human health and the 
environment; and promote sustainable development’.99 
Codes of conduct are voluntary in nature and as such are not imposed on TNCs. With the 
increased number of TNCs the number of codes has also increased. The United Nations 
(UN) draft code of conduct unfortunately was never finalised due to numerous 
disagreements among developed and developing states. Hence the consensus on the codes 
of conduct was not reached. In any case the draft codes provided some guidance to be 
followed in the future, however they were not adopted by TNCs.100  
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopted set of 
guidelines for TNCs.101 The guidelines provided for standards that TNCs should follow 
while conducting their activities, including employment, environmental protection and 
human rights stating that ‘respect the human rights of those affected by their activities 
consistent with the host government’s international obligations and commitments’.102 The 
OECD guidelines received mixed reviews. 
 
The report stated that: 
 
Whatever the ultimate fate of the entire Code of conduct may be, it is very 
significant that a global body, composed of representatives of a wide variety 
of political and economic systems, and countries at various levels of 
                                                          
Sullivan Principles as a Role Model for Developing International Codes of Conduct—Lessons Learned 
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development, have agreed, albeit ad referendum, on the basic principles of a 
Code of Conduct to be observed by TNCs in international business.103 
 
The report was a product of drastic shift in the international environment, where for the 
first time TNCs and developing states were not in a conflicting relationship, but started 
working on mutual benefits. 
 
 
3.4  A Critical Analysis of some of the provisions of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) with reference to Aspirational Differences 
 
Multilateral treaties were taken over by bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in the late 
1970s, mainly due to the lack of international investment treaties on protecting and 
regulating foreign investment. As Schill stated that:  
 
[D]espite the earlier failure of multilateral approaches in establishing 
substantive obligations on the treatment of foreign investment and parallel to 
the wave of uncompensated expropriations in many developing countries in 
the decades following their independence, the ICSID Convention.104 
 
International investment treaties were meant to protect against expropriation, requiring 
protection and security, and fair and equitable treatment (FET) and to build on closer 
commercial and political relations.105 It was important to access the global market and the 
US was therefore developing rights to protect private foreign investors. The purpose of 
the investment treaties was economic,106 however the actual reason was to protect the 
investors in host developing states.107 Moreover, the treaties should have also helped 
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reduce differences and contribute to peaceful relationships between the states, which is 
the condition for equal access to international trade and investment.  
After the Second World War the Havana Charter of 1948 was another attempt to renew 
the multilateral investment treaties, which ‘contained no provision on the regulation of 
foreign investment’108 but it only recognised the need for investment and not for the 
protection of foreign investment109 to: 
 
[P]rovide reasonable opportunities for investment acceptable to them and 
adequate security for existing and future investment, and…to give due regard 
to the desirability of avoiding discrimination as between foreign 
investments.110   
 
Article 12(1) (c) of the Havana Charter states inter alia that: 
 
A Member State has the right: (i) to take any appropriate safeguards necessary 
to ensure that foreign investment is not used as a basis for interferences in its 
internal affairs or national policies, (ii) to determine whether and to what 
extend and upon what terms it will allow future foreign investment; (iii) to 
prescribe and give effect on just terms to requirements as to the ownership of 
existing and future investment; (iv) to prescribe and give effect to other 
reasonable requirements with respect to existing and future investments.111 
 
The above article does not explain how to implement these actions nor does it provide any 
guidelines as to how to monitor the implementation process. Article 46 of the Havana 
Charter only refers to restrictive business practices in international trade, which involved 
restricting competition and fostering monopolies.112 
Vernon argued that BITs do not promise much, also they can easily be breached and 
therefore represent fragile investment arrangements.113 ‘National markets are held 
together by shared values and confidence in certain minimum standards. But in the new 
                                                          
108 Surya P Subedi, Internatinal Investment Law (3rd edn, Hart Publishing 2016) 36. 
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global market, people do not yet have that confidence’.114 The objective of a BITs115 is to 
promote as well as protect foreign investment116 through market-orientated policies, 
transparent and non-discriminatory investment practice and international law.117 In spite 
of the fact that the number of bilateral investment agreements (BITs), international 
investment agreements (IIAs) and free trade agreements (FTAs) have been growing with 
an exponential rate over the past four decades, since the first bilateral investment treaty 
was signed in 1959 between Pakistan and Germany.118 While confidence in their success 
in terms of promoting and protecting the foreign investment is not questionable, their 
contribution to the socio-economic development of host developing states is still vague. 
Dolzer and Schreuer  suggested that in 2008 there has been over 2,500 BITs in force.119 
Since 1959 the BITs become one of the most widely used types of international 
investment agreements for protecting and influencing foreign investment.120 BITs have 
been the fundamental tool that contributed to the transformation of international 
investment law over a very short period of time.121 
The phenomenal proliferation of the BITs occurred in the mid-1990s with over 1,300 
treaties negotiated among over 160 states.122 The provisions of BITs are very similar to 
                                                          
114 Kofi Annan, Press Release SG/SM/6881 1 February 1999. 
115 Most of BIT have been concluded without a proper market orientated value. 
116 Investment Instruments Online: What are BITs?, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
<http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page___1006.aspx> accessed 4 September 2015; ‘Treaties typically 
cover the following areas: scope and definition of investment, admission and establishment, national 
treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment, compensation in the event of 
expropriation or damage to the investment, guarantees of free transfers of funds, and dispute settlement 
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117 Efraim Chalamish, ‘The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto Multilateral Agreement?’ 
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118 Beviglia Zampetti and Americo Sauvé Pierre, ‘International Investment’ in Andrew T. Guzman and 
Alan O. Sykes (eds), Research handbook in international economic law (Cheltenham 2007) 215. 
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Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and 
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each other.123 There are many reasons for the similarities. The use of the model, drafted 
by the developed states based on the 1967 Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, being the 
main one.124 Developing states were keen on attracting the foreign investments125 
notwithstanding that initially they objected to the format of BITs, but have conceded to 
its use.  
Treaties have a very long history, dating back to the Colonial era when they have 
concluded treaties of “Friendship, Commerce and Navigation” (FCN) to establish trade 
relations with its treaty partners. The first such agreement was the Treaty of Amity and 
Commerce,126 negotiated with France in 1778.127 Other agreements include Treaty of 
Amity and Commerce, with the Netherlands128, Sweden129 and Prussia.130 Treaty of Peace 
and Friendship,131 Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation,132 and Treaty of 
Friendship, Limits and Navigation.133 
Disputes between the foreign investors and host developing states were initially taken to 
the local courts.134 Developed states concerns of the legal system and protection of their 
investments in the host developing states resulted in dispute resolution being conducted 
in front of international arbitration, which opened a new set of challenges.135 The main 
                                                          
123 See Ibrahim El. Shihata, Preface to Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties 
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125 See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investmcnt Regime (1998) 
19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 373. 
126 U.S.-Fr., July 16, 1782, 8 Stat. 12. 
127 In 1776 Benjamin Franklin, Silas Dean and Arthur Lee were elected as agents of the diplomatic 
commission that will be sent to secure a formala alliance and negotiate a treaty between the United States 
and France.  
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reason was the need to revisit the negotiation process, change the drafting of BITs and 
include comprehensive treaty provisions, leaving no room for interpretations.136 
Many states stressed that international law does not offer adequate mechanisms to protect 
foreign investment.137 For that reason states in Latin America adopted the Calvo doctrine, 
which enabled the foreign investors the treatments that were given to its own national 
investors138 and required ‘aliens to submit disputes arising in a country to that country’s 
courts’.139 In international law international minimum standards are binding as stated by 
the arbitral tribunal that ‘It should be kept in mind that the customary minimum standard 
is in any case binding upon a State and provides a minimum guarantee to foreign 
investors…’140 ‘A state is not subject to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal 
without its consent’141 however many signed bilateral investment treaties (BITs) included 
provision that under the ICSID convention 1965 ‘Each Contracting Party herby consents 
to submit’ to the ICSID142 ‘for settlement by conciliation or arbitration’ for ‘any legal 
disputes arising between that Contracting Party and a national or company of other 
Contracting Party concerning an investment of the latter in the territory of the former’.143 
This provision establishes unconditional consent of the parties to submit investment 
disputes before ICSID upon request of an investors, who is in this instance a national of 
                                                          
136 Dispute settlement provisions are very common in the BITs and allow the foreign investors to take 
host states in front of the ICSID, which has been heavily criticised as being in favour of the foreign 
investors and also due to the numerous cases put in front of the international courts, unable to cope with 
the volume in respectable timely matter. The situation resulted in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela 
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no longer use the ICSID, according to Ling Ling He,  Razeen  Sapideen,  'Investor-State  Arbitration  
under Bilateral  Trade  and Investment  Agreements:  Finding Rhythm  in  Inconsistent Drumbeats'  
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the other contracting state. The problem as it seems was in the fact that developing states 
did not negotiate terms and conditions for TNCs in the investment agreements.144 
Unfortunately there was no established mechanism in place to protect the foreign 
investment in host developing states, because during the colonial period there was no 
need for such mechanism. Therefore, the developing states should have developed one, 
which they did not seem to be able to do.  
‘At its most basic level, a BIT is an agreement between two countries (Contracting States) 
that ‘governs the treatment of investments made in the territory of each state by 
individuals or companies from the other state’.145 Wong argued that the driving force 
behind ever-increasing percentage of disputes over foreign investments are being 
resolved through international arbitration or domestic lawsuits is the proliferation of the 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs).146  
Salacuse and Sullivan argued that most of the BITs provide for two distinct dispute 
resolution systems, in addition to the obligations of the Contracting States, BITs also 
contain provision for dispute settlement system in the event of the violation of the treaty 
or investment contract(s)/agreement(s)147 to allow investor-state dispute settlement.148 
According to Salacuse and Sullivan the first type of dispute arises between the two 
contracting states (state to state arbitration) and the second type of disputes arises between 
                                                          
144 Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (H.Holt and company 1942). 
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the host developing state and foreign investor, independent from their home country with 
their grievance against the host developing state directly to international arbitration.149 
Over the last 50 years a number of international investment treaties was signed in the 
form of bilateral investment treaties (BITs).150 Developing states have been struggling to 
develop and overcome the transition period and were looking to take example from the 
developed states to which they have aspired. Intervention of TNCs into developing states 
and their contribution to socio-economic development received mixed reviews. That also 
bring into question the role of diplomatic intervention and peacekeeping missions, which 
contain coercive elements that should not have been used.151 If the parties making 
investment agreements would have been less ambitious the objectives would have been 
more realistically achieved and the possibility of socio-economic development would 
have been much greater and would avoid having dominance of any of the state over 
another. Durkheim maintained that there is no such thing as natural integration, only a 
coercive one.152 
Sornarajah argued that there is no added value or additional benefits that BITs bring to 
the table other than regulating the foreign investments.153 Hinderlang154 was one of the 
                                                          
149 Dispute resolution and investment disputes could be avoided by implementing the re-negotiation 
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critics of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), together with the host developing 
states.155 As a response to the criticism the UNCTAD proposed some reforms in 2013 
Report, one of which is re-negotiating concluded investment agreements.156  
Salacuse and Sullivan claimed that investors take treaties into consideration before 
making their investment choice.157 According to Neumayer and Spess,158 empirical 
research showed that developing states that sign numerous BITs can count on doubling 
their foreign investments. On the other hand, Tobin and Rose-Ackerman159 claimed that 
BITs do not have much, if any, positive effect on foreign investment. Moreover, their 
study from 2005 showed that BITs may actually reduce foreign investments to host 
developing states. The relationship issues between the host developing state and foreign 
investor has been ongoing since Vernon160 “obsolescing bargain”, through “credible 
commitment” by North161 and as “political risk” by Henisz.162 Muchlinski163 argued that 
BITs make promises in the form of vague standards and uncertain meaning and hence the 
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need for arbitration to give meaning to the treaty language. UNCTAD reported that BITs 
signed between Switzerland with Egypt and Sudan was one of the very few to have 
concretely defined the sector for promotion and protection of the foreign investment, 
which was ‘production, commerce, tourism, and technology’.164 The preamble to the 
Korea-Trinidad and Tobago BIT, of 2002 provides inter alia that ‘Convinced that these 
objectives can be achieved without relaxing health, safety and environmental measures 
of general Application’, 165 and the US-Uruguay BIT that was signed in 2005 stated that 
‘Desiring to achieve these objectives in a manner consistent with the protection of health, 
safety, and the environment, and the promotion of consumer protection and 
internationally recognized labour rights’.166 Most of the BITs have fairly the same 
structure, in their preambles they set down the general objectives and purpose and hence 
the suggestion would be to make the preambles clearer and more specific as to their 
purpose on the case by case examples.  
Muchlinski also stressed that there are no international standards that could force a state 
to allow private foreign investment if they so wish, because ‘countries are free to set the 
limits of permissible entry in their national laws as they see fit’167 and their sovereign 
power enables them to regulate the entry of foreign investors. Entering into a country 
with private foreign investment according to Gómez-Palacio and Muchlinski can be done 
via two models, one is “controlled entry” and the other is “full liberalization”. In the 
former the host state controls the entry of private foreign investments and in the latter 
non-discrimination standards applies, which include also the most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) and fair and equitable treatment (FET) standards.168 Laviec argued that the 
reference to fair and equitable treatment (FET) should not be interpreted as international 
minimum standards.169 BITs usually contain the two most common standards of 
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treatment, one is most-favoured-nation treatment and the second is fair and equitable 
treatment.170  
Critical analysis of some of the BITs examined some of the selected provisions, which 
will support the ideas developed in this research. The BITs signed between the UK with 
Bangladesh171 and the US with Bangladesh172 as an example to show that there is not much 
difference between the BITs. Namely some of the provisions that will be closely reviewed 
will reveal that there is no difference in the provisions between the two, notwithstanding 
the differences between the states. The latter questions the contribution of BITs to the 
developing states and suggests that there should be noticeable differences in the 
provisions between the two and should include additional provisions that might be taken 
for granted by the developed states. Bergstrand and Egger173 argued that the main purpose 
of BITs is encouraging private foreign investment. However, the contribution of BITs 
namely for host developing states is inconclusive174 and yet the number of signed BITs 
was growing.175 
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The UK has signed the BIT with the People Republic of Bangladesh with ‘Desire to create 
favourable conditions for greater investment by nationals and companies of one State in 
the territory of the other State’ added that: 
 
Recognizing that the encouragement and reciprocal protection under 
international agreement of such investments will be conducive to the 
formulation of individual business initiative and will increase prosperity in 
each States; 176 
 
In the BIT between the UK and Bangladesh provision has been made ‘for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments’ one cannot help but wonder how the protection of 
investment can be applied equally for the UK investments in Bangladesh as the 
Bangladesh investments are protected177 in the UK as discussed in the AAPL case.178 The 
High Commission for Bangladesh London reports that the biggest source of FDI for 
Bangladesh is coming from the UK, which amounted to 88.08 million USD in 2009, out 
of total FDI to Bangladesh 700.16 million USD. Majority of British investment go to oil, 
gas, textile, tea, financial and other service sectors. The reason is that ‘Bangladesh offers 
the most liberal investment climate in South Asia’.179 The Foreign Private Investment 
(Promotion and Protection) Act 1980, which deals with promotion and protection of 
investment in Bangladesh, ‘ensures equal treatment for local and foreign investors and 
legal protection to foreign investment in Bangladesh against nationalisation and 
expropriation’.180  
BIT signed between the US and Bangladesh stated that: ‘Desiring to promote greater 
economic cooperation between them, with respect to investment by nationals and 
companies of one Party in the territory of the other Party; and: 
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Recognizing that agreement upon the treatment to be accorded such 
investment will stimulate the flow of private capital and the economic 
development of the Parties’; the provision is referring to the economic 
development of both parties for which there is no clear definition of the sort 
of economic development nor monitoring to check that in fact such economic 
development has indeed taken place.181 
 
As seen from the above examples there is not much variation among the terminology 
used, unless the contracting parties decide to clearly specify the sectors for which the 
protection and promotion of the investment applies or a specific public policy, goals such 
as protection of health, safety, environment, consumers or promotion of labour rights.182 
The main element of the treaty is the provision defining the terms and the scope. The 
following provision of the BITs is usually concerned with definitions. Newer BITs also 
include intellectual property rights in addition to assets and equity in order to capture the 
non-equity investments. However, the entry restrictions have not extended to the 
“performance requirements” other than in the US-Albania BIT by ‘prohibiting four 
specific types of performance requirements’183 that were negotiated during the negotiation 
process.  
The following provision focuses on the fact that states are free to set their own entry limits 
as well as their national laws.184 The “full liberalisation” model implies the non-
discrimination standards, which can be seen in the US – Uruguay185 and Canada and 
Uruguay186 BITs for example. 
Regarding the ‘Promotion and Protection of Investments’ in the UK-Bangladesh BIT as 
stated in Article II:  
 
                                                          
181 US – Bangladesh BIT, 1986. 
182 Peter T. Muchlinski, ‘The Framework of Investment Protection: The Content of BITs’ in Karl P. 
Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs, The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (OUP 2009) ch 2. 
183 See the US – Albania BIT, 11 January 1995, Art VI of Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment. 
184 See Ignacio Gómez-Palacio and Peter T. Muchlinski, ‘Admission and establishment’ in Peter T. 
Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds), Oxford Handbook of International Investment 
Law (OUP 2008) ch 7. 
185 The United States of America and The Oriental Republic of Uruguay, 4. November 20005 
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2380> accessed 20 February 2016. 
186 The Government of Canada and The Oriental Republic of Uruguay, 29 October 1997 
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/642> accessed 20 February 2016. 
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Each Contracting Party shall encourage and create favourable conditions 
for nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party to invest capital 
in its territory, and, subject to its right to exercise powers conferred by its 
laws existing when this Agreement enters into force, shall admit such 
capital.187  
 
As seen from the above article the main objective of BIT is to encourage and create 
favourable investment conditions, which adds a layer of protection and provides for a 
legal remedy through international arbitration. Initially BITs were intended to stimulate 
socio-economic development, which should also protect investment with higher 
standards. All signed BITs include fairly the same provisions on creating favourable 
investment conditions, including protecting the private foreign investment against any 
mistreatment or violation of BITs. 
 
Article (2) provides inter alia that parties ‘shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable 
treatment and shall enjoy full protection and security in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party’.188 
Fair and equitable treatment is the most common article included in the BITs, together 
with “full protection and security”. These provisions accord higher protection for the 
foreign investors than those of international law. The other common provision of BITs is 
most-favoured-nation treatment (MFN), which grants foreign investors the same 
standards as it would to its own nationals or no less favourable to any other nation. 
Developing states are free to set their own entry restrictions for foreign investments that 
are subject to international minimum standards under international customary law and 
additional treatment standards under BITs. Such treatments are known as the obligation 
of the host developing state to foreign investors. Full protection and security and fair and 
equitable treatment are considered to be absolute in their nature. While most-favoured-
nation treatment is not, because the treatment depends on the situation and state 
discretion, as such is therefore relative. Strict liability also applies as in AAPL case189 for 
example. 
                                                          
187 UK – Bangladesh BIT, Art II (1). 
188 UK – Bangladesh BIT, Art II (2). 
189 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Reports 254, final award of 
27 June 1990, discussed in fn336, ch4.5 at 220. 
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In the US – Bangladesh BIT on article II stated on Treatment of Investment:  
 
Each Party shall maintain favourable conditions for investment in its territory 
by nationals and companies of the other Party. Each Party shall permit and 
treat such investment, and activities related therewith, on a basis no less 
favourable than accorded in like situations to investment or related activities 
of its own nationals or companies, or of nationals or companies of any third 
country, whichever is the more favourable…190 
 
As seen in the previous BIT of UK – Bangladesh the articles 1 are very similar in its 
contents with the US – Bangladesh BIT, which in Article 3 provides that: 
 
Investment of nationals and companies of either Party shall at all times be 
accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection and 
security in the territory of the other Party. The treatment, protection and 
security of investment shall be in accordance with applicable. National laws, 
and shall in no case be less than that required by international law. Neither 
Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary and discriminatory measures the 
management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition, 
expansion, or disposal of investment made by nationals or companies of the 
other Party…191 
 
Fair and equitable treatment is the most common and mandatory standard of BITs.192 
Notwithstanding the compulsory nature of the FET standard it remains open to 
interpretations. While the host developing state cannot be accountable and liable for all 
injuries, but only when due diligence was not followed or if the government did not take 
reasonable measure to protect the foreign investor.193 The terminology of reasonable and 
unreasonable is also ambiguous.  
The most-favoured-nation protection of investments and investors as in examples below. 
Some countries even extend the clauses to prior investments made, before the BIT was 
signed, however not all. The UK – Bangladesh BIT includes provision on MFN treatment 
in Article 3. 
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UK-Bangladesh states in Article 4 on Compensation for Losses:  
 
Nationals or companies of one Contracting Party whose investments in 
the territory of the other Contracting Party suffer losses owing to war or 
other armed conflict, revolution, a state of national emergency, revolt, 
insurrection or riot in the territory of the latter Contracting Party shall be 
accorded by the latter Contracting Party treatment, as regards restitution, 
indemnification, compensation or other settlement, no less favourable 
than that which the latter Contracting Party accords to its own nationals 
or companies or to nationals or companies of any third State.194  
 
As seen from the above article, compensation is due in cases when damages or 
losses occur. The BIT further states if the foreign investor ‘suffer losses in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party resulting from:  
 
(a) requisitioning of their property by its forces or authorities, or  
(b) destruction of their property by its forces or authorities, which was not 
caused in combat action or was not required by the necessity of the situation, 
shall be accorded restitution or adequate compensation. Resulting payments 
shall be freely transferable as soon as possible.195 
 
Compensation for losses can be due to armed conflict or internal disorder and it is a clause 
that most of the BITs contain, however not as an absolute right but more of a treatment 
such as the most-favoured-nation treatment in terms of just and appropriate196 
compensation payment. These standards however have not been universally accepted. A 
large number of BITs include ‘just’ or ‘appropriate’ compensation payment following 
NAFTA and the UN.197 However a number of BITs include full compensation payment, 
which means ‘prompt, adequate and effective’, but as stated earlier neither has been 
universally agreed.198 Most BITs do include free transfer of compensation. The clause on 
“full security and protection” covers physical integrity of an investment against 
interference by use of force. 
                                                          
194 UK – Bangladesh, Art 4 (1). 
195 UK-Bangladesh BIT Art 4.  
196 UK-India BIT  1994, Netherlands-Poland BIT Art. 5. 
197 UNGA Res 1803 of 1962, Permanent Sovereignty over natural resources, Article 4.  
198 Canada – Peru BIT 2006, Art. 13. 
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US-Bangladesh states in Article 3 on Compensation for expropriation: 
 
No investment or any Part of an investment of a national or a company of 
either Party shall be expropriated or nationalized by the other Party or 
subjected to any other measure or series of measures, direct or indirect 
tantamount to expropriation (including the levying of taxation, the 
compulsory sale of all or part of an investment, or the impairment or 
deprivation of its management, control or economic value), all such actions 
hereinafter referred to as "expropriation", unless the expropriation:  
(a) is done for a public purpose;  
(b) is accomplished under due process of law;  
(c) is not discriminatory;  
(d) does not violate any specific provision on contractual stability or 
expropriation contained in an investment agreement between the national or 
company concerned and the Party making the expropriation; and  
(e) is accompanied by prompt, adequate199 and effective compensation. 
Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the investment...200  
 
This provision of BIT is specific on its stands against taking, with some exceptions as 
seen in the above provisions also support non-discrimination. The rulings of tribunals on 
expropriations have been mixed. There was not a unified rule that could be applied to the 
expropriation exemptions as it depends heavily on the circumstances under which 
expropriation or nationalisation took place.  
In the following article of the same BIT it states that: 
 
If either Party expropriates the investment of any company duly incorporated, 
constituted or otherwise duly organized in its territory, and if nationals or 
companies of the other Party, directly or indirectly own, hold or have other 
rights with respect to the equity of such company, then the Party within whose 
territory the expropriation occurs shall ensure that such nationals or companies 
of the other Party receive compensation in accordance with the provisions of 
the preceding paragraph.201  
 
One of the main objectives of BITs is protection of foreign investments from taking or 
other interference with property rights.202 Taking of an investment is considered violation 
                                                          
199 The term adequate is used by the developed countries as the term suggests. 
200 US – Bangladesh BIT Art 3(1). 
201 US – Bangladesh BIT Art 3(2). 
202 Most of the BITs follow the Hull formula, see for example Green Haywood Hackworth, ‘Property 
Rights: General Considerations’ (1942) 3 Digest of International Law 655-665. 
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of customary international law even when there is no such provision in the BITs or when 
no BIT is signed. The core provision of BITs are the standards of treatment. The investor 
states were the one that have requested the clause to be included in the BITs in order to 
protect against taking of assets owned by foreign investors. Muchlinski argued that 
‘sovereignty-oriented challenges appear to have been mitigated and replaced by an 
acceptance of international standards of treatment’.203 
Disputes between the parties are usually done via negotiations or ad hoc arbitration. 
Negotiation process between the developing and developed states became more and more 
relevant in the sphere of international trade for conducting transnational business.  
While the USA – Bangladesh BIT states in Article II regarding Treatment of Investment: 
 
Each Party shall maintain favourable conditions for investment in its territory 
by nationals and companies of the other Party. Each Party shall permit and 
treat such investment, and activities related therewith, on a basis no less 
favourable than accorded in like situations to investment or related activities 
of its own nationals or companies, or of nationals or companies of any third 
country, which is the more favourable.204 
 
BIT ‘treaty between the United States of America and the people Republic of Bangladesh 
concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of investment’ was signed in 
1986 and came into force in 1989. The concern is over the use of the term reciprocity 
used in the BITs between developed and developing states as there is little evidence to 
support that reciprocity between developed and developing states exist.  
The purpose of BITs to promote greater economic co-operation, stimulating the flow of 
private capital as well as economic development and more importantly should be based 
on reciprocity. However, the BIT between USA and Bangladesh it also states in Article I 
(ii) ‘Each party reserves the right to deny to any of its own companies or to a company of 
the other Party the advantages of this Treaty’. 
                                                          
203 Peter T. Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds), Oxford Handbook of International 
Investment Law (OUP 2008) 4. 
204 US – Bangladesh BIT, 1986 Art 2(1); See for example UK, US spot problems for investing in 
Bangladesh, bdnews24.com (22 October 2014) <http://bdnews24.com/business/2014/10/22/uk-us-spot-
problems-for-investing-in-bangladesh> accessed 15 October 2015.  
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The role of law in this case should be set to protect the interest of the developing states 
on the same level as it does developed states and foreign investors. It should therefore not 
allow the developing states to sign and commit to the investment agreements that do not 
include the clear and specific provisions on the benefits for the developing states, such as 
capacity building, succession clause, re-negotiation clause, distribution of profits and 
performance review. The role of law should therefore work on the behalf of the 
developing states and should protect them more from hazards, namely environmental and 
not allow exploration of their natural resources or labour force. For that purpose, the 
terminology used in BITs should also be reviewed. Rich and developed states aspirations 
should be reviewed, because they expect the developing states to not only act but to be 
the same as the developed states are, which is fundamentally not possible and questions 
the feasibility of reciprocity.  
The role of law should also include the protection of people, that is the local people of 
the developing state in order to ensure their involvement in the decision making process 
and management participation, which should be included in the number of local senior 
executives as well as the number or percentage of local people employed by the foreign 
company and more importantly to be involved in capacity building as the main objective. 
It is important to review the contribution of TNCs to the developing states in which they 
operate in a balanced way as the existing reviews came to mixed conclusions on the 
contribution of TNCs activities in terms of capacity building in host developing states.  
The role of the most favoured nation treatment is supposed to ensure a better standards 
of protection. Schwarzenberger maintained that international minimum standards are 
needed and should apply to foreign investors. Notwithstanding that some states 
negotiated lower custom duty rates or another benefit, which fell under the WTO, the 
state that granted such special treatment is not allowed to discriminate and should 
therefore offer any such special treatment to all other WTO members. Hence the MFN 
treatment has been a subject of strong criticism. On the basis of the MFN treatment and 
Hull standards states could potentially argue for higher compensation payment.205 Dolzer 
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and Stevens206 maintained that fair and equitable standards of treatment carries obligation 
to full compensation payment and not appropriate as it should. 
The biggest criticism of BITs provisions is the questionable reciprocity, which should be 
a two-way process by which both parties would derive benefits from signing such 
investment agreements, however as it seems BITs were favouring foreign investors over 
host developing states. Therefore, the balance has to be found in order for both parties to 




3.5  Controlling foreign investments through BIT provisions and general 
treatment standards 
 
Since the Second World War the question of rules governing the behaviour of TNCs has 
been on the table for discussion. The negotiations however only began in the 1970s with 
the UN Codes of Conduct on TNCs. The assets of TNCs are protected under the 
international law, investment treaties or customary international law. However, the 
obligations of TNCs are not yet clearly defined by the force of law in terms of their legally 
binding obligations. 
It was not only the scholars, but the United Nations itself who were very much aware of 
the global business practices that could harm the international socio-economic 
development, especially of the least developed countries (LDCs).  
Investment has been defined from the profit making standing point and not with capacity 
building in mind. Each of the concluded BITs are concerned by transfer of profits and 
therefore lack human element. BITs do not mention that domestic law of host developing 
states will be the law to resolve any disputes that might arise between developing state 
and foreign investors. This leads to believe that TNCs do not have the confidence or faith 
in their judiciaries. BITs give international law to settle any disputes that arises, which is 
opposite to the main element of the Calvo doctrine. 
                                                          
206 Rudolf Dolzer and Margaret Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff 1995). 
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However, if the government of the host developing state changes, the BITs will stay in 
force provided a succession clause has been incorporated into the BIT or the State 
Contract. The question therefore is what happens when states dissolve. Such examples 
have been seen recently in Timor and Sudan. From the legal perspective the BITs would 
have to be modified as the BIT that has been signed with a state that no longer exists and 
therefore would have to be re-negotiated with the new state(s). 
Under international law states have the right to regulate and control the entry and 
activities in their sovereign territory. It is economic right of a states and its discretion to 
allow foreign investment in their territory.207 Sovereign states have full authority to decide 
on the restrictions that they will impose on the foreign investments within the state.208 
Legislative jurisdiction give the states the right to evaluate the importance of foreign 
investments and its implications on the socio-economic development and well-being of 
their citizens, notwithstanding the potential risks that such foreign investment might 
entail. Hence the investment laws of a state must be created with the potential risks in 
mind to control the activities of foreign investor inside their borders as well as codes of 
conduct and some additional policies. This is especially important when the developing 
states are trying to attract and promote foreign investment.209 
Sornarajah maintained that:  
 
[T]here is now an increasing expectation, particularly among developing 
countries and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), that home states of 
multinational corporations should exert control over the activities of their 
corporate nationals operating overseas.210 
 
It is expected from the developed states that they will take over the control of their TNCs 
and their operations abroad, especially in terms of legal control over their actions. ‘The 
argument is that it is therefore incumbent on the home state to ensure that these benefits 
                                                          
207 See further Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (6th edn, OUP 2003) 498. 
208 See Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2nd edn, OUP 
2012). 
209 See Jeswald W. Salacuse, ‘Host Country regulation and Promotion of Joint Ventures and Foreign 
Investment’ in David N. Goldsweig and Roger H. Cummings (eds), International Joint Ventures: A 
Practical Approach to Working with Foreign Investors in the U.S. and Abroad (Amer Bar Assn 1990) 
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are not secured through injury to other states or to the welfare of the international 
community as a whole’.211 It is important to bear in mind that while states have rights they 
also have duties.  
Developing states have expressed their aspirations and maintained inter alia that:  
 
Multinational Enterprises should strictly abide by all domestic laws and 
regulations in each and every aspect of the economic and social life of the 
host members in their investment and operational activities. 212  
Developing states called for TNCs to respect domestic laws and regulations as a dominant 
legal system. The involvement of government was recognised as being of crucial 
importance to ensure that TNCs are respecting and following the domestic regulations 
with the role to ‘undertake obligations, including to ensure that the investor’s behaviour 
and practices are in line with and contribute to the interests and development policies’.213 
The main objective was very clear and that is contribution of foreign investment to the 
socio-economic development of the host state, effectively contributing to the capacity 
building. A balanced manner was specified as the way forward for cooperation between 
TNCs and host developing states in order to create mutually beneficial investment 
agreements. The most important observation was that government of host developing 
states have to address the obligations of private foreign investment vis-à-vis host 
developing state in a balanced way.  
Sornarajah maintained that: 
 
[T]he subject can ever be discussed without taking into account the 
responsibility of the multinational corporations or the responsibility of their 
host states to ensure that they are held accountable for the violations of norms 
relating to their conduct in several areas such as human rights or the 
environment.214  
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In spite of the existing prohibition of TNCs to get involved in the political affairs of host 
developing states, there were speculations that TNCs have interfered. As a reference point 
it is often the engineered coup that overthrows the democratically elected presidents.215 
Investment laws vary between developing and developed states. As an example the US 
with strong liberal economic politics have restricted foreign investment in some industries 
such as commercial aviation, telecommunication, maritime industry, and real-estates.216 
There is a noticeable difference between investment laws among states, which also tends 
to change over time. Between the years 1991 and 2002 there was a strong trend towards 
liberalisation ‘Despite growing concerns and political debate over rising protectionism, 
the overall policy trend continues to be toward greater openness towards FDI’.217 In spite 
of liberalisation trend there was still great suspicion regarding the complete liberalisation 
for foreign investment for obvious reasons concerning national security, competition, 
safety, environment, health issues and effect on society. All of the above had significantly 
influenced the negotiation process, which was leaning in support of removing the barriers 
of foreign investments. Foreign investment was promised to contribute to socio-economic 
development on a global scale, which is the reason that all investment treaties have in 
their title or preamble to either “promote” or “encourage” Protection of Investment. There 
is also provision known as “admission clause” which means that the investor has to 
comply with the host developing state’s laws and regulations when such clause exists.218 
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The two types of entry seen negotiated in the BITs as mentioned earlier is the controlled 
entry model in which the local law prevails and the liberalised entry model, in which the 
treatment is no less favourable to the investor from third party than it is to the nationals 
as seen in the US – Uruguay BIT.219  
Foreign investors would like to protect their investments inside the host developing states 
from any risks that might occur during the course of their investment. For that purpose, 
the general standards of treatment are used to restrict the governments of developing 
states to act irrationally and violate these standards for which the compensation must be 
paid in case injuries occur. These general standards of treatment include fair and equitable 
treatment, full protection and security, most-favoured-nation treatment and national 
treatment in accordance with international law. The most important thing to note is ‘that 
while investment treaties specify standards for state behaviour towards investors, they 
generally do not impose standards for the behaviour of investors towards the host country 
or its government’.220 In NAFTA Article 1105 it is stated that ‘Each Party shall accord to 
investment of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, 
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security’.221 
There were some discussions regarding the “fair and equitable treatment” ‘whether the 
fair and equitable treatment mandated by the Treaty is a more demanding standards than 
that prescribed by customary international law’ the tribunal concluded that ‘the BIT 
standards was not different from the minimum standard required under customary 
international law concerning both the stability and predictability of the legal and business 
framework of the investment’.222 
The question remains if the two standards are part of customary international law, should 
they be included separately in the BITs.223 In Pope&Tablot224 case, the tribunal discussed 
in length the relationship between customary international law and NAFTA Article 1105. 
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The tribunal found that the fair and equitable treatment extends beyond the minimum 
international law standards by saying that ‘the language and evident intention of the BITs 
makes the discrete (i.e. additive) standards of interpretation the proper one’.225 
‘Compliance with the fairness elements must be ascertained free of any threshold that 
might be applicable to the evaluation of measures under minimum standard of 
international law’.226 
The main objective of the investment treaties is protection and ‘foreign investors in many 
parts of the world are protected primarily by international treaties…For all practical 
purposes, treaties have become the fundamental source of international law in the area of 
foreign investment’.227 According to Puchala and Hopkins international regimes 
‘constrain and regularize the behaviour of participants, affect which issues among 
protagonists are on and off the agenda, determine which activities are legitimized or 
condemned, and influence where, when, and how conflicts are resolved’228 in international 
law, when states meet the non-state foreign investor. There are a number of topics that 
are present in all investment agreements, which makes them remarkably similar to one 
another in their structure. Sornarajah maintained that ‘First, applicable international law 
failed to take account of contemporary investment practices {and needs, and did not} 
address important issues of concern to foreign investors’.229 
In US – Estonia BIT the tribunal concluded that ‘BIT required the signatory governments 
to treat foreign investment in a ‘fair and equitable’ way. Under international law, this 
requirement is generally understood to ‘provide a basic and general standard which is 
detached from the host State’s domestic law’. While the exact content of this standard is 
not clear the Tribunal understands it to require an ‘international minimum standard’ that 
is separate from domestic law, but that is, indeed, a minimum standard’.230  
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In SD Myers the Tribunal stated that ‘In some cases, the breach of a rule of international 
law by a host Party may not be decisive in determining that a foreign investor has been 
denied ‘fair and equitable treatment’, but the fact that a host Party has breached a rule of 
international law that is specifically designed to protect investors will tend to weigh 
heavily in favour of finding a breach of Article 1105’.231 
 
In 2001 NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC) issued Note of Interpretation: 
 
Minimum standard of Treatment in Accordance with International Law 
 
1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard 
of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to 
investments of investors of another Party. 
2. The concepts of ‘fair and equitable’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not 
require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens. 
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the 
NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there 
has been a breach of Article 1105(1).232 
 
Saracuse maintained that ‘While developed countries have strongly supported the 
existence of a minimum international standard, many developing countries have denied 
its very existence in customary international law’.233 The reason for which is that the right 
of developing states to regulate foreign investment under their national law and exercise 
of their sovereignty rights had to be balanced with the principles of international 
minimum standards. International minimum standards were accorded paramountcy over 
national law. Based on this conclusion it is surprising that developing states would want 
the minimum standard to be taken for granted in investment treaties without explicitly 
including it as a clearly defined provision of BITs.234 
In Azurix v Argetine Republic the tribunal stated that ‘The purpose of the third sentence235 
is to set floor, not ceiling, in order to avoid a possible interpretation of these standards 
                                                          
231 SD Myers v Government of Canada (Partial Award 12 November 2000, 2001 40 ILM 1408) 64. 
232 Note of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (NAFTA Free Trade Commission, 31 July 
2001). 
233 Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (OUP 2013) 227. 
234 See further UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment (1999) 13. 
235 Referring to Art II.2(a) of the Argentina and US BITs, which states that ‘investment shall at all times 
be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection and security and shall in no case be 
accorded treatment less than required by international law’. 
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below what is required by international law’. The conclusions were based on the analysis 
of the text of the provision and the Tribunal concluded that it is not ‘of material 
significance for its application of the standard of fair and equitable treatment to the facts 
of the case’. Tribunal added that ‘The minimum requirement to satisfy this standard has 
evolved’ and therefore ‘its content is substantially similar whether the terms are 
interpreted in their ordinary meaning, as required by the Vienna Convention or in 
accordance with customary international law’.236 
Due to the lack of clear definition of the fair and equitable treatment standard it is 
therefore open for interpretation based on the case by case studies as indicated in the 
examples of Tribunal decisions in different cases.237 In a way it gives the flexibility, which 
might not necessarily be needed in practice as might be better off with a precise definition. 
Arbitral decisions mainly rely on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 and 
namely on “good faith”, objectives and purpose.238 ‘What is unfair or inequitable need not 
equate with the outrageous or the egregious. In particular, a State may treat foreign 
investment unfairly and inequitably without necessary acting in bad faith’.239 There have 
been no such examples where the State would be found to have acted in bad faith. The 
most important thing remains balanced approach to the interpretation as well as to the 
cooperation between the parties and bearing in mind the previous decisions made by the 
Tribunals on similar cases. 
Essential element of the rule of law is due process as the opposite is classified as “denial 
of justice”240 and therefore ‘the tendency of the jurisprudence of international tribunals 
and of previous codifications of the law of responsibility of States has been to give only 
a generalised meaning to “denial of justice” and to refrain from establishing a list of those 
wrongful acts and omissions which would constitute a “denial of justice”’.241  
                                                          
236 Azurix v Argentine, ICSID Case No ARB/01/12, award of 14 July 2006, 361. 
237 See P Weil, ‘The State, the Foreign Investor, and International Law: The no Longer Stormy 
Relationship of a Ménage Á Trois’ (2000) 15 ICSID Rev-FILJ 401. 
238 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 
Article 31(1). 
239 Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co SA v Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No 
ARB/99/6 Award 12 April 2002) 116. 
240 See further Ian Brownlie, Principles of Publi International Law (6th edn, OUP 2003) 506. 
241 F.V. García-Amador, Louis B. Sohn and Richard Baxter, Recent Codification of the Law of State 
Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (Springer 1974) 180. 
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Fair and equitable treatment is open to interpretation. However as shown in some of the 
case examples the restriction of behaviour is only addressed in regards to the host 
developing states. The restriction of behaviour of private foreign investor should be 
considered in the future and might result in a provision added in the BITs that would set 
behaviour standards and obligations for the foreign investors and not only for the host 
developing states. 
The Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment is a widely used provision in the investment 
treaties. Its main purpose is non-discrimination of foreign investments. Host developing 
states did not see the MFN treatment in any way endangering their sovereignty. In The 
Energy Charter 1994 the MFN treatment is covered in terms of management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment, and disposal. There are some variations of MFN treatment 
in the investment treaties that grant such treatment to the foreign investors, which means 
that it is not uniform for all.242 The purpose of MFN treatment is also aimed at increasing 
the bargaining position of the host state.243 At the same time MFN treatment limits 
freedom of one state to according more favourable treatment to one other state, without 
according it to every other state. 
While there is no specific or clear definition in the BITs regarding the MFN treatment it 
is left to the Tribunals to interpret if the host state is obliged to offer such treatment to the 
foreign investors or not. Furthermore, there have been cases with ruling on both sides of 
the argument, which only reiterates that there is no uniform consensus on the MFN 
treatment. The trend of extending MFN clause to international arbitration for foreign 
investors started in 1963 with Ambatielos244 case, Maffezini245 case, Tecmed246 case, 
                                                          
242 See Brunei-Korea BIT (14 November 2000) Art 3.2.; Malaysia-Chile BIT (11 November 1992) Art 
3(1); Turkey – Pakistan BIT (16 March 1995), namely the case Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi 
AS v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No ARB/03/29 (Decision on Jurisdiction 14 November 
2005) in which the tribunal decided that Pakistan was obliged to offer fair and equitable treatment even if 
there was no such provision in the BIT; Maffezini (Emilio Augustin) v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case 
No ARB/97/7, award on Jjurisdiction of 25 January 2000; All of the cases were allowed the MFN 
treatment based on the similar treaties that the host state has signed with other parties. However this was 
not the case in Salini Costruttori SpA v Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No ARB/02/13, 
decision on Jurisdiction of 9 November 2004 and Plama Consortium v Bulgaria, ICSID Case No 
ARB/03/24, decision on Jurisdiction of 8 February 2005. 
243 See UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking (2007) 38. 
244 Ambatielos case (Greece v UK) (1963) RIAA 107. 
245 Emilio Augustin Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/97/7, 25 January, 2000 (decision 
on jurisdiction) namely para 54-56, 64. 
246 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB 
(AF)/00/2, award of 29 May 2003. 
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Siemens v Argentina247 case, but did not apply to 1952 Anglo Iranian Oil Company248 case 
it seems as if the trend ended with Salini v Jordan249 and Plama v Bulgaria250 case. 
National treatment was referred in the UN Montevideo Convention 1933 in Article 9, 
which stated inter alia that: 
The jurisdiction of States within the limits of national territory applies to all 
the inhabitants. Nationals and foreigners are under the same protection of the 
law and the national authorities and the foreigners may not claim rights other 
or more extensive than those of the nationals.251 
 
Under the law of the land foreign investors are not entitled to any greater, but the same 
protection as accorded to the nationals of the state. 
Another provision that would require further clarification is the compensation 
requirement in case of the breach of the treatment standards. It is interesting to note that 
‘no investment treaty specifically addresses these questions or even provides that 
contracting parties who breach these treatments standards are liable to compensate either 
the injured investor or its home state’.252 Topic of taking has been reviewed in more depth 
in Chapter 4. 
In general the state is liable to pay reparations for wrong doing under customary 
international law.253 This decision by the Permanent Court of International Justice was 
primarily based on Chorzów Factory case254 regarding compensation payment stating that 
it should ‘wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation 
which would, in all probability, have existed if that had not been committee’.255 The 
                                                          
247 Siemens AG v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/02/8, decision of 3 August 2004. 
248 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case (Iran v UK), ICJ Reports 1952, 109. 
249 Salini Cotruttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No 
ARB/02/13, decision of 15 November 2004. 
250 Plama Consortium Ltd v Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No ARB/03/24, decision of 8 February 
2005. 
251 The Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention, 1933), (1976) 70 AJIL 
445. 
252 Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (OUP 2013) 255. 
253 See Matthew Weiniger, ‘The Standard of Compensation for Violation of the Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard’ in Federico Ortino et al (eds), Investment Treaty Law: Current Issues II “Nationality 
and Investment Treaty claims” and “Fair and Equitable Treatment in Investment Treaty Law” 2 (British 
Institute of International and Comperative Law 2007) 197. 
254 Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) (Indemnity) (Mertis), PCIJ (1928), Series A No 17, 29. 
255 MTD v Chile, ICSID Case No ARB/01/7, award of 25 May 2004, 238. 
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amount of compensation payment again depends on the case by case examples, which the 
Tribunals took in consideration when deciding on the compensation amounts. In any case 





3.6  Conclusions 
 
Treaties as instruments of international law and defined in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties 1969256 are similar in its structure, while some specific provisions might 
vary.  
States make agreements for investments by means of investment treaties or investment 
agreements, which are designed to promote and protect foreign investment as part of the 
international law.257 Investment treaty drafting has not yet been defined in full and is open 
to improvements. The next problematic element is the requirement to exhaust local 
remedies of local courts included in ‘exit’ or ‘opt out’ clause, which is only present in 
some of the most recent BITs and as such is open to interpretations. 
When the investment law does not exist in a state, that state has to therefore offer the 
same status, benefits and privileges to the foreign investors as to their own nationals, 
because the customary international law applies. However, the provisions of BITs do not 
always take precedence over the customary international law as was evident from the 
number of cases and decisions rendered by the international courts, predominantly ICSID. 
By signing BITs, the commitment is made by the host developing state to offer higher 
protection to the private foreign investors from that available under international law. As 
long as best efforts are made even when the same level of protection cannot be offered, 
the host developing states cannot be criticised. Therefore, the problem is in terminology, 
                                                          
256 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 
1980). 
257 See for example Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 
U.S.- Arm., Sept. 23, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. No. 11 (1993) <http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/ 
iia/docs/bits/us_armenia.pdf> accessed 25 February 2016. 
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such as “reciprocity”, as there simply cannot be such reciprocity due to obvious reasons 
based on fundamental differences between the contracting states, however best efforts in 
this case suffice.  
Increase in international business put pressure on the conduct of TNCs and therefore 
transparency and accountability was called for, due to the socio-economic impact that the 
activities of TNCs have mainly on host developing states. Such concerns have helped to 
increase the standards of treatment. TNCs are accountable to the domestic law of the host 
developing states as well as to the international law, International Labour Organization 
(ILO), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and best practices, however 
there is a lack of clarity on the extend of TNCs accountability. 
The main question remains open, which is what is the main problem of socio-economic 
development. It could be the lack of policy-making, unreliable judiciaries, lack of 
democracy or even ineffective government structure in the host developing states. Host 
developing states might also lack the confidence in their own abilities. One thing is clear 
and that is that not all developing states are the same. In any case the terms of BITs should 
be better negotiated and more clear and specific in defining its provisions. That would 
also avoid leaving them open to interpretations.  
The biggest issues are the fact that there is no clause in BITs that clearly requests the 
support of development in terms of socio-economic development and capacity building. 
There is also no requirement for local management participation, profit distribution, 
performance review or re-negotiation clause. As most of the BITs are very similar to one 
another none contains the above mentioned clauses. Having these clauses included in the 
BITs it would make them legally binding. Therefore, host developing states should have 
negotiated terms and conditions, including codes of conduct for foreign investors in the 
provisions of BITs. High aspirations of host developing states should have been translated 
in legislation and included in BITs during the negotiations. 
Reasons that developing states did not voice their concerns during the negotiation process 
could be related to their big borrowing debt and thinking that therefore they do not have 
a voice. Continuous and limitless borrowing and financial aid dependency is also not the 
solution. The solution should be capacity building towards socio-economic development 
that will enable socio-economic independence in terms of economic self-sufficiency. In 
165 
 
any case there are initiatives recently taken by Latin American states to include such 
clauses in the new BITs. Both the parties are to be blamed for not taking such actions 
earlier. Another question open for discussion is how to regulate contracts with TNCs. The 
question of binding resolutions remains unanswered. BITs have contractual character but 
not law making abilities. International organisations should therefore effectively take 
over the role of monitoring the conduct between TNCs and host developing states.258 As 
only parliament can pass laws the question is if the soft law in this case would suffice? 
Policy-makers have to strike a balanced agreement acceptable to both, developed and 
developing states. 
BITs are, regardless of the fact that there is no proof that they help increase foreign 
investments flow in host developing states, still important for regulating and protecting 
foreign investments, until an alternative is found. In the meantime, BITs are setting 
standards of protection, provide investor-state arbitration and protect foreign investments. 
Significant progress in new models of BITs has been made, however the impact of BITs 
on capacity building and socio-economic development in host developing states remains 
to be seen.  
  
                                                          
258 See Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and 
Materials (CUP 2006). 
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Chapter 4: A Critical Examination of the system of protection 
of the interests of TNCs and host developing states 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
Law regulates the conduct of human beings and corporate entities. The main difference 
between specialised areas of law and international law is that international law governs 
the relationships between states. States were given legal personality and as such became 
subject of international law and able to possess international rights and duties, including 
the right to bring international claims.1 The origins of international investment law may 
be formed on the principle of state responsibility for wrongful acts, protection of aliens, 
and protection of the right to property of foreigners. The main note is on protection of 
aliens and their property. 
There have been many discussions among scholars on the topic of international 
investment law in the past few years.2 Roberts maintained that ‘The greatest criticism of 
modem custom is that it is descriptively inaccurate because it reflects ideal, rather than 
actual, standards of conduct’.3 The international investment law is ever evolving and is 
faced with the challenge to find the balance between states sovereignty and the protection 
of foreign investments.4  
                                                          
1 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th edn, Routledge1997) 1. 
2 Georg Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investment and International Law (Praeger 1969); Rosalyn Higgins, 
‘The taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law’ (1982-1983) 176 
Recueil des Cours 259; Muthucumaraswamy Sarnarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment 
(CUP 2010); Santiago Montt, State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Global Constitutional and 
Administrative Law in the BIT Generation (Hart Publishing 2011); Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreur, 
Principles of International Investment Law (OUP 2008); Peter T. Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and 
Christoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP 2008); Jeswald 
W. Salacuse, The Law of International Inveestment Treaties (OUP 2010); Louis T. Wells and Rafiq 
Ahmad, Making Foreign Investment Safe, Property Rights and National Sovereignty (OUP 2006); 
Martins Paparinskis (ed), Basic Documents on International Investment Protection (Hart Publishing 
2012); Muthucumaraswamy Sarnarajah, Resistance and Change in the International Law of Foreign 
Investment (CUP 2015). 
3 Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A 
Reconciliation’ (2001) 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 769. 
4 See Brigitte Stern, 'The Future of International Investment Law: A Balance Between the Protection of 
Investors and the States' Capacity to Regulate’ in Jose E. Alvarez, Karl P. Sauvant, Kamil Girard Ahmed 
and Gabriela P. Vizcamno (eds), The Evolving International Investment Regime: Expectations, Realities, 
Options (OUP 2011); José E. Alvares and Kathryn Khamsi, ‘The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors - 
A Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment Regime’ in Karl P. Sauvant (ed), The Yearbook on 
International Investment Low and Policy 2008-2009 (OUP 2009) ch 10, 379.  
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ICJ maintained that: 
 
Considering the important developments of the last half-century, the growth 
of foreign investments and the expansion of international activities of 
corporations, in particular of holding companies, which are often 
multinational, and considering the way in which the economic interests of 
states have proliferated, it may at first sight appear surprising that the 
evolution of the law has not gone further and that no generally accepted rules 
in the matter have crystallized on the international plane.5 
 
Barcelona Traction6 case demonstrated the ICJ awarding opinion that only the state in 
which the corporation is incorporated has the authority to sue, which also indicates the 
importance of protection of such corporate nationality over the ownership nationality, 
which is shareholders and which does not hold the same right by stating that: 
Notwithstanding the separate corporate personality, a wrong done to the 
company frequently causes prejudice to its shareholders. But the mere fact 
that damage is sustained by both company and shareholders does not imply 
that both are entitled to claim compensation…whenever a shareholder’s 
interests are harmed by an act done to the company, it is to the latter that he 
must look to institute appropriate action, for although two separate entities 
may have suffered from the same wrong, it is only one entity whose rights 
have been infringed.7 
 
Foreign investment law is the oldest and the least developed area of international law.8 
International Centre for Settlement of Investor Disputes (ICSID) that was set up in 1965 
under the auspices of the World Bank with the primary role to resolve disputes between 
host states and private foreign investors. It has since been dealing with disputes arising 
from violation of investment treaties, starting with AAPL v Sri Lanka in 1987, which was 
based on the investor-state dispute settlement provision in the investment treaty.  
                                                          
5 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co (Belgium v Spain), ICJ Reports 1970, 3 46-47. 
6 Barcelona Traction Company was established under Canadian Law, doing business in Spain and having 
the majority of shareholders were Belgian nationals. Which is why Belgium brough a suit on the 
shareholders behalf against Spain. Spain objected by claiming that the alleged injury was caused to the 
company and not the shareholders, hence Belgium lacked the locus standi to bring the claim. 
7 Barcelona Traction. Light and Power Co (Belgium v Spain), ICJ Reports, 1970, 3 para. 44. 
8 Surya P Subedi, International Investment Law (3rd edn, Hart Publishing 2016). 
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Number of signed BITs proliferated and according to UNCTAD has reached 3,236, out 
of which 44 BITs have been terminated.9 The Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention 
suggests the use of both domestic and international law in case the parties cannot agree 
otherwise10 however UNCTAD stated that 58 arbitrations were initiated in 2012 and 56 
in 2013.11 
Foreign investment law has triggered much controversy together with the outcomes of 
investment treaties and arbitration awards. Especially after the Second World War and 
the end of colonialism the issue of nationalisation became very relevant.12 Independent 
states had the right to choose their economic policies, which was recognised by the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relationship and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 1970 stated 
that ‘each state has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic 
and cultural systems’ and that ‘the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic 
system’.13 
BITs that were initially based on the objective of protecting and attracting foreign 
investments will have to be reviewed as states concerns over the undue protection of 
foreign investor’s increases. As a result, starting with Latin American states, many of 
which are following the example of reviewing the existing BITs and even terminating 
them and withdrawing from ICSID.14 
                                                          
9 UNCTAD, World Investment Report (Geneva 2014) 124. 
10 One of the first cases that included Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention was Klöckner Industrie-
Anlagen GmbH and others v United Republic of Cameroon and Société Comerounaise des Engrais, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2, decision on Annulment of 3 May, 1985, 1 ICSID Reports 1990, 90. 
11 UNCTAD, World Investment Report (Geneva 2014) 124. 
12 For historical overview see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (OUP 2002) 
13 UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) of 1970; Ch 3, Article 1 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States 1974.  
14 Bolivia, stated that there is a lack of balance between public and private interests, Venezuela, Ecuador, 
India, Indonesia and South Africa, who are looking in re-negotiating the existing BITs. All states however 
reject to include the clause in investment treaty that would allow foreign investors to sue a host state. 
Among developed states Australia is changing policy to subject the foreign investors under national 
courts; see Leon Trakman, ‘Investor-State Arbitration: Evaluating Australia’s Evolving Position’ (2014) 
15(1) Journal of World Trade Law 152. The US and EU are also working on Transatlantic Trade and 




The Abs-Shawcross Convention 195915 was the first attempt at creating a multilateral 
treaty that would be protecting foreign investments. As it turned out it was another failed 
attempt at creating codes of conduct on foreign investment, as was the multilateral 
agreements on investment (MAI). The failure could be due to the fact that they were both 
favouring the foreign investors and developed states in terms of their provisions. As it 
seems the ICSID Convention was the only one that gained success. 
Protection of investment is protection of foreign investment from the host developing 
state’s interference as well as protecting host state’s interests. Role of international 
investment law is to find a balance between interests of host states and foreign investors 
in order to prevent potential conflicts. It has now become clear that balance has to be 
struck between protecting foreign investors and host state sovereignty. 
Over time the importance of TNCs was increasing and it has become apparent that States 
are not capable of generating sufficient capital through economic activities to support 
their economy and contribute to their socio-economic development towards socio-
economic independence. On the other hand, TNCs are making enormous profits by means 
of their economic activities. While developing states are struggling to achieve socio-
economic development. As a consequence, developing states have realised the potential 
that foreign investments could have on their socio-economic development.  
Developing states were developing different strategies to attract private foreign 
investments.16 Investors, on the other hand, looked for investment opportunities. 
Therefore, the developing states had to ensure secure and stable investment environment 
in order to attract the foreign investors. Existing international standards such as National 
Treatment or Non-Discrimination standard were not sufficient for offering required 
guarantees and protection of the foreign investments in host developing states. As a result, 
the agreements among states were made to set some basic standards for investment 
protection. The reason standards were not sufficient and that international law could not 
                                                          
15 See Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention (1959); Georg Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investment and 
International Law (Praeger 1969); Lord Shawcross, ‘The Problems of Foreign Investment in International 
Law’ (1961) 102 Hague Recueil 334. 
16 However that was not the reason for developing states to sign BITs; see Deborah L. Swenson, ‘Why do 
developing countries sign BITs?’ (2005) 12(1) Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 131-155. 
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enforce them is because of the fact that states could exercise their sovereignty and have 
the right to nationalise foreign property under international law against compensation.17 
Since the 1960s private foreign investors and host developing states started signing 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which for the first time enabled foreign investors’ 
access to international investment tribunals, such as ICSID for investor-state dispute 
resolution. The main objective of BITs was to attract foreign investment and offer 
additional protection for investments to the foreign investors inside the host developing 
states. Consequently, states were also responsible for providing protection for foreign 
investments. With Convention for the Settlement of Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Tribunal was created in 1965.18 Provisions in the investment agreements, such as fair and 
equitable treatment, most-favoured nation and national treatment are open to 
interpretation and hence the need for further clarification.19  
States, being developed or developing have started taking actions, over increasing 
concerns that disproportionate protection is given to the foreign investors, by looking for 
alternative investor-state arbitration mechanism, reviewing existing BITs and in some 
cases even terminating some existing BITs and withdrawing from the ICSID, following 
Bolivia and Brazil. Therefore, ever evolving international investment law is faced with a 





                                                          
17 See Resolutions on the Permanent Sovereign of each State over its Natural Resources of 14 December 
1962 (Resolution No. 1803-XVII), 25 November 1966 (Resolution No. 2158) and 17 December 1973 
(Resolution No. 3201-XXVIII), New International Economic Order of 1 May 1974 (Resolution No. 3201 
and 3202-SVI) and the Economic Rights and Duties of the States (Resolution No. 3281-XXIX of 12 
December 1974). 
18 Antonio R. Parra, The History of ICSID (OUP 2012); On 31 December 2000, 133 States were parties to 
the ICSID Convention.   
19 See Antonio R. Parra, ‘Provisions on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern Investment 
Laws, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Multilateral Investments on Investment’ (1997) 12 ICSID Rev. – 
Fly 287, 294.    
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4.2  The meaning of protection of private foreign investment by means of 
International Investment Law and International minimum standards 
 
International minimum standards of treatment20 derive from the doctrine of denial of 
justice. The OECD defined international minimum standards as: 
 
[A] norm of customary international law which governs the treatment of 
aliens, by providing for a minimum set of principles which States, regardless 
of their domestic legislation and practices, must respect when dealing with 
foreign nationals and their property.21 
 
International minimum standards were used in 1962 in the LFH Neer v United Mexican 
States22 and Harry Roberts (USA) v United Mexican States case23. In the former case Paul 
Neer was a murdered US national and the widow filled for lack of due diligence and 
investigating the murder, but the Commission concluded that international minimum 
standards on the treatment of aliens were not violated, but stated that it recognises 
insufficiency questioning ‘Whether this insufficiency proceeds from deficient of an 
intelligent law or from the fact that the laws of the country do not empower the authorities 
to measure up to international standards is immaterial’.24 The former case was about a US 
national who was imprisoned in a cell for nineteen months without sanitary facilities or 
furniture. The Commission concluded that the treatment was cruel and inhumane. 
Schwarzenberger recognised the ambiguity and fluidity of the traditional international 
minimum standards and its dependence on conditions that are no longer in existence and 
added that an investor’s legitimate expectations should not include strict application of 
traditional rules of property protection.25 
                                                          
20 See Adriana Sánchez Mussi, 'International Minimum Standard of Treatment' 
<https://asadip.files.wordpress.com/2008/09/mst.pdf> accessed on 15 December 2015. 
21 OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs. Working Papers on International Investment. 
Number 2004/3. Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law. September 
2004, 8.  
22 LFH Neer and Pauline Neer (US) v United Mexican States (1926), 4 RIAA iv. 60. 
23 Harry Roberts (USA) v United Mexican States, General Claims Commission, Convention of 8 
September 1923, of 2 November 1926, 4 RIAA 77 at 80: ‘that test is, broadly speaking, whether aliens are 
treated in accordance with ordinary standards of civilization. We do not hesitate to say that the treatment 
of Roberts was such as to warrant an indemnity on the ground of cruel and inhumane imprisonment’. 
24 LFH Neer and Pauline Neer (US) v United Mexican States (1926), 4 RIAA iv. 60, 61-62. 
25 Georg Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investments and International Law (Stevens & Sons 1969) 
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In the case of NAFTA ‘Free Trade Commission issued an interpretation equating the 
standard to the minimum standard of customary international law’.26 Other standards are 
Fair and Equitable Treatment, National Treatment, Most-Favored Nation treatment, 
Compensation payment that applies in the expropriation cases and full protection and 
security standard of treatment. Payment of compensation is also required in cases of 
violation of the investment contract. 
The standards of treatment that states grant to aliens have evolved over the years in the 
form of international investment law, property rights27 and human rights. In Article 5 – 
Minimum Standard of Treatment treaty provision for Canada’s investment protection 
treaty states: 
 
1. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with 
the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens, 
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. 
2. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and 
security” in paragraph 1 do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that 
which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens. 
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of this 
Agreement, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that 
there has been a breach of this Article.28 
 
The principle of good faith, recognized in Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v 
Mexico,29 falls under the minimum standard of fair and equitable treatment. Dozler 
maintained that ‘the substance of the standard of fair and equitable treatment will in large 
part overlap with the meaning of a good faith clause in its broader setting’.30 ‘Together 
with other standards which have grown increasingly important in recent years, the fair 
and equitable treatment standard provides a useful yardstick by which relations between 
                                                          
26 Marcela Klein Bronfman, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: An Evolving Standard’ (2005) 10 Max 
Planck Y.B. U.N.L. 609. 
27 Uti posseditis principle. 
28 Canada’s 2003 Model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA)  
<http://www.naftaclaims.com/files/Canada_Model_BIT.pdf> accessed 15 March 2016. 
29 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/00/2), 
award of 29 May 2003, 43 ILM 133 (2004). 
30 Rudolf Dolzer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties’ (2005) 39 Int’l 
Law 87, 91. 
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private foreign investors and governments of capital-importing countries may be 
assessed’.31 The Fair and Equitable Treatment standards are based on the treaty law, for 
which the main source of information is taken from bilateral investment treaties (BITs).32 
 
Sornarajah maintained that: 
 
Many investment treaties provide that a fair and equitable standard of 
treatment is to be provided to investors and their investments, in addition to 
the international minimum standard and full protection and security.33 
 
Vasciannie maintained that fair and equitable treatment only enforces the international 
minimum standards.34  
The failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) that were being negotiated 
between OECD members put forward the element of fairness and Most-Favored Nation 
treatment. MFN prevent discrimination of foreign investors, which is the principal idea 
of international minimum standards. 
The UNCTAD view from the investors’ perspective is that: 
 
[T]he fair and equitable component provides a fixed reference point, a definite 
standard that will not vary according to external considerations, because its 
content turns on what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances. The fair and 
equitable standard will also prevent discrimination against the beneficiary of 
the standard, where discrimination would amount to unfairness or inequity in 
the circumstances. 35   
 
At the same time: 
 
                                                          
31 Stephen Vasciannie, ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and 
Practice’ (1999) 70(1) BYIL 99. 
32 See Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff 1995); C.C. 
Kirkman, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: Methanex vs. United States and the Narrowing Scope of Nafta 
article 1105’ (2002) 34 Law and Policy in International Business Review 343, 390. 
33 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (2dn edn, CUP 2004) 
349. 
34 Stephen Vasciannie, ‘The Fair and Equitable Standard in International Investment Law and Practice’ 
(1999) 70(1) BYIL 99, 104. 
35 UNCTAD, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ (UN 1999) UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/11 Vol. III) 16. 
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[N]ational and MFN treatment, as contingent standards, protect each 
beneficiary of these standards by ensuring equality or nondiscrimination for 
that beneficiary vis-a-vis other investments.36  
 
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) 1994 includes the provision on investment that calls 
for fair and equitable treatment at all times. As such it is known to protect the interests of 
foreign investors’ and their expectations. Wilde maintained that principle of protection 
‘is often combined with the principle of transparency: that government administration has 
to make clear what it wants from the investor and cannot hide behind ambiguity and 
contradiction’.37 The origins came from the North American Free Trade Association 
(NAFTA), World Trade Organisation (WTO) and some of the bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs). 
  
An international convention admittedly establishes rules binding the 
contracting states only, and based on reciprocity; but it must be remembered 
that these rules become generalized through the conclusion of other similar 
conventions containing identical or similar provisions.38 
 
Clarity of customary international law is needed in addition to the international minimum 
standards as they are currently open to interpretation. Mann39 examined the difference 
between international minimum standards in comparison with the fair and equitable 
standard as to which standards are higher. However according to NAFTA in customary 
international law fair and equitable standards are not higher than international minimum 
standards. 
Host states have to develop laws to regulate activities of TNCs in their sovereign territory. 
TNCs will have to sacrifice a portion of their profits, which is why negotiation process 
should establish the terms and conditions of private foreign investment. The only way to 
put pressure on TNCs is by legislation and investment agreements that would include 
capacity building, profit distribution, performance review, succession clause and re-
negotiation clause that would be contractually binding for TNCs. Hence the practice of 
                                                          
36 UNCTAD, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ (UN 1999) UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/11 Vol. III) 16. 
37 Thomas W. Wälde, ‘Energy Charter Treaty-Based Investment Arbitration. Controversial Issues’ (2004) 
5 The Journal of World Investment & Trade 373, 376. 
38 Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of its twelfth Session, Doc. A/4425, in: 
(1960) 2 ILCYB 145.  
39 F. A. Mann, Further Studies in International Law (Clarendon Press 1990) 234–251. 
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foreign investment needs to be reviewed. A good example to follow is Bolivia, Brazil, 
Ecuador, Indonesia, South Africa and Venezuela which are attracting private foreign 
investments despite not recognizing ICSID and terminating some of the existing BITs.  
Mahmood maintained that: 
 
[O]wing to the weaker bargaining power of the then newly independent 
capital importing states, no comparable internationally recognized standards 
of minimum protection of national interests from foreign firms could be 
formulated, even though such firms today are known to have a profound 
impact on local economies because of the extensive protection and power 
they yield through lopsided BITs and other general customary standards of 
treatment of foreign investment.40 
 
The question which system of law applies to the issues of investment, international or 
domestic still awaits clarification.41 However violation of international minimum 
standards of treatment in customary international law falls with the principle of State 
responsibility.42 Article 42 of the ICSID leaves space for interpretation to the question of 
applicable law, depending namely on the type of the investment agreement, which can be 
contract or treaty based. Article 42(1) favours the principle of party autonomy43 and 
maintains that there is no clear distinction between the respective scope of international 
and domestic law.44 In practice ‘the circumstances of each case may justify one or another 
solution’.45 LG&E, Siemens and Enron Tribunal however maintained the 
complementarity of international and domestic law.46 LG&E Tribunal stated that: 
                                                          
40  Nida Mahmood, ‘Democratizing Investment Laws: Ensuring Minimum Standards for Host States’ 
(2013) 14(1) The Journal of World Investment & Trade 79–113. 
41 See Ole Spiermann, ‘Applicable Law’ in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Investment Law (OUP 2008) ch.3. 
42 See A. O. Adede, ‘The Minimum Standards in a World of Disputes’, in R. St J. MacDonald and 
Douglas M. Johnston (eds), The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy 
Doctrine, and Theory (Martinus Nijhoff 1986) 1001. 
43 See cases Amco v Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, decision of ad hoc Committee of 
16 May 1986, 25 ILM 1439 (1986), 1 ICSID (1990) 509; Wena Hotels Ltd v Arab Republic of Egypt, 
ICSID Case No ARB/98/4, Decision of the ad hoc Committee, 28 January 2002, 41 ILM 933 (2002). 
44 Wena Hotels Ltd v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/98/4, Decision of the ad hoc 
Committee, 28 January 2002, 41 ILM 933 (2002) 941 para. 39. 
45 Wena Hotels Ltd v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/98/4, Decision of the ad hoc 
Committee, 28 January 2002, 41 ILM 933 (2002) 941 para. 39. 
46 LG & E Energy Corporation v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/02/1 of 30 April 2004 para 88; 
Siemens AG v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/02/8, DECISION OF 3 August 2004, para. 77; 
Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, LP v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/3, decision 
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Initially, scholarly authorities and some ICSID Tribunals admitted that the 
conjunction “and” means “and in the case of lacunae, or should the law of the 
Contracting State be inconsistent with international law”.47 However, any 
limitation to the role of international law under these terms would imply 
accepting that international law may be subordinate to domestic law and 
would obviate the fact that there are a growing number of arbitrations initiated 
on the basis of bilateral or multilateral investment treaties.48 
 
The Tribunal maintained that: 
 
It is this Tribunal’s opinion that “and” means “and,” so that the rules of 
international law, especially those included in the ICSID Convention and in 
the Bilateral Treaty as well as those of domestic law are to be applied.49 
 
The Tribunals citations above demonstrate the complimentary nature of international and 
domestic law. Despite Klöckner-Amco doctrine that is favouring the supremacy of 
international law over the domestic law in case of investment conflict. 
 
International law overrides domestic law when there is a contradiction since 
a State cannot justify non-compliance of its international obligations by 
asserting the provisions of its domestic law.50 
 
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 international law 
cannot be used as a substitute following the failure to respect treaty agreement.51 
Principles that emerged over the course of investment disputes is the pacta sunt 
servanda.52 In the case of a treaty the investor agrees to the provision of applicable law, 
defined in the treaty.  
                                                          
on jurisprudence of 14 January 2004; award of 22 May 2007, para. 207; CMS Gas Transmission 
Company v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, 17 July 2003, para. 116.  
47 Gaillard, Emmanuel and Banifetami, Yas, The Meaning of “and” in Article 42(1), second sentence, of 
the Washington Convention: The Role of International Law in the ICSID choice of the law process, 
ICSID Review, (2003) 12(2) Foreign Investment Law Journal 375, 381-382. 
48 LG&E v Argentina, Article 95. 
49 LG&E v Argentina, Article 96. 
50 LG&E v. Argentina, Article 94. 
51 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, especially Article 27. 
52 An example of pacta sunt servanda was in Saudi Arabia v Aramco 27 ILR 117 (1963);  Lena 
Goldfields Ltd v USSR (1930) for historical context see V.V. Veeder, ‘The Lena Goldfields arbitration: 
The historical roots of three ideas’ (1998) 47 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 755; Arthur 
Nussbaum ‘The arbitration between the Lena Goldfields Ltd. And the Soviet Government’ (1950-51) 36 
Cornell Law Quarterly 31; Klöckner v Cameroon, ICSID Case No Arbi74/3, Award, 21 October 1983, 2 
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There is a need for a clear global standard of treatment that should be based on non-
discrimination, transparency and due process in the course of foreign investment.53 
International foreign investment law allows private entities to make claims against host 
states54 in front of international tribunal.55 It also indicates that the state has waved the 
immunity56 to their sovereignty,57 because an act of state undermining the rights under 
customary international law or a treaty, guaranteed to aliens, gives rise to state 
responsibility under ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts 2001.58 In case of breach of investment treaty damages have to be paid59 under 
fundamental principles of foreign investment protection.  
MFN treatment is a treaty clause that caries legal obligation, which assumes principle 
ejusdem generis that has not been considered by arbitral investment tribunals.60 MFN 
clause was denied by the ICSID Tribunal in Plama Consortium Limited v Bulgaria case,61 
which encouraged the UK model BITs to add Article 3(3) that was clear on including 
MFN principle in dispute settlement procedures. It is equally important that the 
investments are carried out ‘in accordance with Host State Law’ as in recent cases 
                                                          
ICSID Reports 9; Decision of ad hoc Committee, 3 May 1985, I ICSID Rev-FILU 89 (1986); CME BV v 
Czech Republic; CME (Netherlands) v Czech Republic, Final Award, 14 March 2003 
<http://www.italaw.com/documents/CME-2003-Final_001.pdf> accessed 10 December 2015. 
53 Todd J. Grierson-Weiler and Ian A Laid ‘Standards of Treatment’ in Peter T. Muchlinski, Federico 
Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Inwestment Law (OUP 
2008) ch 8. 
54 See Federico Ortino, ‘The Investment Treaty System as Judicial Review’ (2013) 24 America Review of 
International Arbitration 437. 
55 See Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 121-150 
<https://www.international-arbitration-attorney.com/wp-content/uploads/arbitrationlaw65.pdf> accessed 4 
January 2016; Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (OUP 2007) 96.   
56 Freeman Snow, International Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 697. 
57 Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 121; Gus Van Harten, Investment 
Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (OUP 2007) 133.   
58 UN Doc A/56/10. 
59 Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 131; Van Harten, Investment 
Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (OUP 2007) 101.   
60 Maffezini v Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/97/7; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, SA and 
Vivendi Universal SA v Argentina Republic, ICSID Case No.ARB/03/19 
<http://www/worldbank.org/icsid> accessed 10 December 2015, Pia Acconci, ‘Most Favoured Nation 
Treatment’ in Peter T. Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of International Investment Law (OUP 2008) ch 10. 
61 Plama Consortium v Bulgaria, ICSID Case No Arb/03/24, decision on Jurisdiction of 8 February 2005, 
44 ILM 721 (2005), ICSID Tribunal in para 203 stated that ‘one cannot reason a contrario that the 
dispute resolution provisions must be deemed to be incorporated’ and in para 204 that ‘Rather, the 
intention to incorporate dispute settlement provisions must be clearly and unambiguously expressed’. 
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jurisdiction was denied by the tribunal due to non-compliance with the host state law 
based on the provision on protection of investment in the BITs.62 
Due process is without a doubt another requirement that should deserve attention. The 
International Court of Justice in the ELSI Case, the Court made a reference to due process 
by maintaining that ‘a wilful disregard of due process of law, an act which shocks, or at 
least surprises, a sense of juridical propriety’ will amount to a denial of justice.63 
Reference to due process was also made in Amco v Indonesia case.64 The view was that 
due process is a general principle of international law. The provision in most of BITs also 
include due process under expropriation and compensation. On the other side, the view 
was that due process was not properly drafted in the awards.65 There are also cases of non-
physical taking of property, but taking over ownership, management and as a result there 
is depreciation of the value. Issues such as illegal taking is a reason to terminate the 
BITs.66 Due process was also referred to in Article IV of the draft MAI67 and NAFTA 
Article 1110(1) and 1105(1).68  
                                                          
62 Inceysa Vallisoletana SL v El Salvador ICSID Case No Arb/03/26 Decision on Jurisdiction 2 August 
2006 <http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0424_0.pdf> accessed 13 December 
2015> accessed 2 March 2016; See for analysis Christina Knahr, ‘Investments  in  accordance with host 
state law' Transnational Dispute Management (TDM 5, September 2007) < https://www.transnational-
dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1070> accessed 13 December 2015; Fraport AG Frankfurt 
Airport Services Worldwide v  The Philippines ICSID  Case No Arb/03/25, Award, 16 August 2007 
<http://www.italaw.com/documents/FraportAward.pdf> accessed 13 December 2015.  
63 International Court of Justice in the ELSI Case, in 1989 in para 128. 
64 Amco v Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, decision of ad hoc Committee of 16 May 
1986, 25 ILM 1439 (1986); 1 ICSID (1990) 509. 
65 See Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, ‘ICSID involvement in Asian foreign investment disputes’ (1995) 
4 Asian Yearbook of International Law 69-98. 
66 BITs are in general long-term investment agreements for various durations as negotiated in the BITs for 
ten, fifteen, forty years. Some of the BITs can also remain in force after the termination in terms of 
protection of the investment. Most of the treaty termination provisions contain a continuing effects clause, 
which means it will respect all agreements made prior to the termination. For example Bolivia denounced 
the ICSID Convention effective 3 November 2007, Ecuador denunciation took effect 7 January 2010. In 
2008, Ecuador terminated nine BITs - with Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Romania and Uruguay. Denounced BITs El Salvador and Nicaragua, and 
the Netherlands and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. In 2010, Ecuador’s Constitutional Court 
declared arbitration provisions of six more BITs (China, Finland, Germany, the UK, Venezuela and United 
States) to be inconsistent with the country’s Constitution. It is possible that Ecuador will take action to 
terminate these (and possibly other) BITs. January 2012 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela denounced the 
ICSID Convention. See British Petroleum v Libya, award 10 October 1973; (1979) 53 ILR 296. 
67 Draft MAI, Article IV 2.1(c).  
68 Art 1110(1) and Art 1105(1) of NAFTA. 
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Protection of investment was not needed in colonial period because colonies fell under 
the protection and jurisdiction of their colonial masters.69 The need for international 
investment law first came about after the number of independent states started growing.70 
Treaties such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1994 and Energy 
Charter Treaty 1994 were adopted, together with the World Tarde Organisation (WTO) 
1995. Further aspirations to establish instruments on investments within WTO did not see 
the light of day due to concerns and disagreements expressed by both developing and 
developed states.  
The increasing number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which were interpreted 
based on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 196971, revealed weak links in 
the area of dispute settlement and awards. One of first such examples was the AAPL v Sri 
Lanka.72 AAPL v Sri Lanka was the first case that involved BIT as a primary source of 
law under ICSID. Santa Elena v Costa Rica case,73 further revealed vulnerability of 
awards by questioning the non-compensable regulatory takings stated that international 
law was “controlling”.74 The prevailing doctrine was the Klöckner-Amco that also 
represented the interpretation of Article 42 of the ICSID.75 However in 2002 Wena 
doctrine came about, following the Argentina financial crisis of 2001/2002 in Wena 
Hotels Ltd. v Arab Republic of Egypt,76 questioning entitlement of foreign investors to the 
full protection and security in which the position of the tribunal was based on requirement 
for due diligence.  
At the beginning of 21st century there was a shift of private foreign investment that started 
for the first time coming from developing states, namely emerging economies of Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) in Europe and North America. ‘It is 
indeed ironic that the United States – long the Leading opponent of the Calvo Doctrine – 
                                                          
69 See Antony G. Hopkins, ‘Property Rights and Empire Building’ (1980) 40(4) Journal of Economic 
History 787. 
70 See Eduardo Galeano, Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of Pillage of a Continent (first 
published 1971, Cedric Belfrage tr, Monthly Review Press 1973). 
71 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. 
72 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd (AAPL) v Sri Lanka (1990) 4 ICSID Reports 245. 
73 Santa Elena v Costa Rica (2000) 39 ILM 317; (2002) 5 ICSID Reports 153. 
74 Santa Elena v Costa Rica, 191, para. 65. 
75 Klöckner industrie–Anlagen GmbH and others v United Republic of Cameroon and Societe 
Comerounaise des Engrais, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2, decision on Annulment, 3 May 1985, 1 ICSID 
Reports (1990) 90; Amco v Republic of Indonesia, decision of ad hoc Committee of 16 May 1986, 25 
ILM 1439 (1986), 1 ICSID (1990) 509.   
76 Wena Hotels Ltd. v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/98/4, para 84. 
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may now be considered its proponent, at least in regard to national treatment and indirect 
expropriation’.77 Relationship between TNCs and states helped shape the international 
investment law over the years of practice of foreign investments and international trade. 
Topics such as protection of foreign investment, liability, activities of states, and activities 
of TNCs have open the way to further formulating investment law.78 
Higgins maintained that ‘the notion of “property” is not restricted to chattels. Sometimes 
rights that might seem more naturally to fall under the category of contract rights are 
treated as property’.79 Sacerdoti maintained that ‘All rights and interest having an 
economic content come into play, including immaterial and contractual rights’.80 
Domestic law continues to be the main source of protecting the foreign investments. 
Widespread of BITs especially in the recent years has contributed to increasing the 
standards of foreign investment protection. Proliferation of investment treaties 
encouraged the developments in international law namely on the protection of foreign 
investment as it was still undergoing development. The International Court of Justice 
stated that: 
  
Considering the important developments of the last half-century, the growth 
of foreign investment and the expansion of international activities of 
corporations, in particular of holding companies, which are often 
multinational, and considering the way in which the economic interests of 
states have proliferated, it may at first sight appear surprising that the 
evolution of the law has not gone further and that no generally accepted rules 
in the matter have crystallised on the international plane.81 
 
                                                          
77 Christopher Duggan, Don Wallace, Noah Rubins and Borzu Sabahi, Investor–State Arbitration (OUP 
2008) 488. 
78 See Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore and Mathew Weiniger, International Investment 
Arbitration: Substantive Principles (OUP 2007); Christopher Duggan, Don Wallace, Noah Rubin and  
Borzu Sabahi, Investor – State Arbitration (OUP 2008); Christoph Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A 
Commentary (2nd edn, CUP 2009); Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Pradell, Law and Practice of 
Investment Treaties, Standard of Treatment (Kluwer Law International 2009); Jennifer A. Zerk, 
Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility, Limitations and Opportunities in International Law 
(CUP 2006); Janet Dine, Companies, International Trade and Human Rights (CUP 2005). 
79 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law’ 
(1982-1983) 176 Recueil des Cours 263, 271. 
80 Giorgio Sacerdoti, ‘Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection’ (1997) 
269 Recueil des Cours 251, 381. 
81 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co (Belgium v Spain), ICJ Reports 1970, 3, 46-7. 
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Amendments to rules and regulations were done in the spirit of attracting the foreign 
investments as a source of financing, namely developing states and in the hope to 
contribute to their socio-economic development.82 The UNCTAD considers BITs 
essential for the protection of foreign investment on international level.83 As the treaties 
and investment protection law developed over the years so did the investor-state dispute 
resolution increase in number of presented cases before the ICSID.84 Vattel maintained 
that states have the right to control foreigners entering their borders and once the border 
is crossed foreigners become subject of domestic laws and host developing states are 
required to offer them protection.85 
Asante recognised the disagreement between developing and developed states regarding 
the relationship among international minimum standards, international and domestic law 
in regard to which should take control over foreign investments stating that: 
 
The industrialised Western countries insist that the code must unequivocally 
stipulate the applicability of international law in the relations between the 
governments and transnational corporations. The developing countries, while 
recognising that states may have multinational obligations in this area, are 
reluctant to accept the term ‘international law’ because of its traditional 
connotations, and have instead proposed a formula calling for states to fulfil, 
in good faith, their international obligations in this area. 86  
 
Developing states argued against ‘vague’ and ‘imprecise’ principles of customary 
international law concerning private foreign investments and have advocated for precise 
definitions that would not leave any room for interpretation.87 Without a doubt the biggest 
concern for foreign investors are the numerous cases of expropriations in the host 
                                                          
82 See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, 'Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment - A General Account, with Particular 
Reference to the Role of the World Bank Group' (1991) 6(2) ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law 
Journal 484-509. 
83 UNCTAD, 'Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999', (New York, Geneva: United Nations 2000). 
84 After 1995 the number of investor-state dispute cases proliferated at ICSID, see UNCTAD, 'Bilateral 
Investment Treaties 1995- 2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking', (United Nations 2007) 1. 
85 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations (Liberty Fund 2008) 266-268. 
86 Samuel K.B. Asante, ‘International Codes of Conduct and NIEO’ in Proceedings of the First Yugoslav 
International Seminar on Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order (1986) 245, 247. 
87 B. Stern, ‘The Future of International Investment Law: A Balance between the Protection of Investors 
and the States Capacity to Regulate’ in José Enrique Alvarez and Karl P. Sauvant (eds), The Evolving 
International Investment Regime: Expectations, Realities, Options (OUP 2011); José E. Alvares and 
Kathryn Khamsi, ‘The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors – A Glimpse into the Heart of the 
Investment Regimé’ in Karl P. Sauvant (ed), The Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 
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developing states, which have to be followed by an appropriate compensation88 payment.89 
Cheng maintained that: 
 
The rationale of compensation for expropriation consists in the fact that 
certain individuals in a community, or certain categories of individuals, 
without their being in any way at fault, are being asked to make a sacrifice of 
their private property for the general welfare of the community, when other 
members of the community are not making corresponding sacrifices. 90  
 
Cheng maintained that sacrifices are made on the expense of host developing states and 
the local people of the community, which entails giving away their private property that 
might not be necessarily used for public good. Cheng added that: 
 
The compensation paid to the owners of the property taken represents 
precisely the corresponding contributions made by the rest of the community 
in order to equalise the financial incidence of this taking of private property.91 
 
The US and the UK took measures by enforcing legislation in order to protect their 
nationals by ensuring “fair treatment” for their assets and rights: 
(a) Suspension of bilateral foreign aid programmes in the taking States;  
(b) denial of trade preferential treatment;  
(c) blocking or freezing of the assets and bank accounts of the taking States and 
their nationals in the investor States; and  
(d) voting against loan applications by the taking States in multilateral financial 
institutions or State-owned financial institution.92 
 
The measures taken did not prove to be effective. In fact, some might argue they had the 
opposite effect. Ellingsen and Wärneryd argued that different industries require different 
levels of protection as most authors believed and stated that ‘Any industry wants as much 
                                                          
88 UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 1974 supports appropriate compensation 
payment. 
89 See Adeoye A. Akinsanya, Expropriation of Multinational Property in the Third World (Praeger 1980) 
25–46.   
90 Bin Cheng, ‘The Rationale of Compensation for Expropriation’ (1958–1959) 44 Problems of Public 
and Private International Law 257, 297. 
91 Bin Cheng, ‘The Rationale of Compensation for Expropriation’ (1958–1959) 44 Problems of Public 
and Private International Law 257, 297. 




protection as it can get, and thus the level of protection should be positively correlated 
with the political influence of the industry. Implicitly, this assumption underlies most of 
the empirical work in the area’.93  
Expropriation94 cases can be divided into two categories. First is appropriation of property 
by the state, such as Sedelmayer v Russian Federation95 and Wena v Egypt.96 Second 
category is initial state approval of investment followed by state intervention. Such cases 
are Metalclad,97 CME v Czech Republic98 and Tecmed SA99 There are also such cases 
where both criteria is applicable such examples are seen in Biloune and Marine Drive 




4.3  Customary International Law on protection of Private foreign 
investment and State responsibility 
 
In 1949 the Commission named State responsibility at its first session as one of the topics 
for codification on principles of international law governing State responsibility that was 
not identified as priority until 1953 on request of the United Nations General Assembly.101 
                                                          
93 Tore Ellingsen and Karl Wärneryd, ‘Foreign Direct Investment and the political economy of 
protection’ (1999) 40(2) International economic review 357–379, 357. Author is referring to J.J. Pincus, 
‘Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs’ (1975) 83(4) Journal of Political Economy 757-778; Lester 
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95 Sedelmayer v The Russian Federation, award dated 7 July 1998 
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96 Wena Hotels Ltd v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/98/4, 41 ILM 933. 
97 Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/97/1, award of 30 August 
2000, 40 ILM 36. 
98 CME Czech Republic BV v Czech Republic, Ad Hoc UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, partial award 13 
September 2001; IIC 62 (2003), final award 14 March 2003 <http://www.italaw.com/documents/CME-
2003-Final_001.pdf> accessed 10 December 2015. 
99 SD Myers v Canada (2000) 40 ILM 1408 para. 283, 1st partial award of 13 November 2000. 
100 Award on Jurisdiction and Liability of 27 October 1989, 95 ILR 183. After Biloune has been deported 
government allegedly reacquired the assets with the lease for the resort premises, which is the reason the 
case involves government appropriation.  
101 The International Law Commission held its first session at Lake Success, New York, from 12 April to 
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In 1955, the seventh session took place and initiated the study of State responsibility for 
which F.V. Garciá Amador was appointed to produce the reports on topic of responsibility 
for injuries to the persons or property of aliens. The title was amended in 2001 to 
‘Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts’.102 International relations are 
govern by customary international law, which in case of the law of state responsibility 
remains effectively under auspice of custom.103 
When TNCs come in host developing states they are supposed to generate employment, 
but developing states should develop their own capacity inside their domestic sectors and 
create more employment rather than rely on the external employment generators. State 
responsibility should be protection and should also enforce that their system of law takes 
precedence over international law and include obligatory provision on capacity building 
in their investment agreements. It seems as if host developing states have failed to 
negotiate the state contracts that would help them to achieve capacity building.  
Private foreign investors believe that the level of protection for their investments should 
be much higher and should protect them from political instability that might change laws 
or policies that have an effect on their investment. However, state responsibility does not 
include intent to expropriate.104 Since investment was identified as being beneficial to the 
socio-economic development, developing states were trying to promote and encourage 
foreign investment. However, ‘as far as developing states are concerned, FDI has not 
accounted for accelerated economic growth’.105 
States responsibility should primarily be to protect their citizens, but states have extended 
the protection to foreign investors by signing BITs. Bronfman argued that ‘states realized 
that they must grant the foreign investor the same, and even greater protection, than that 
which is granted to their own citizens’.106 Subedi maintained ‘that much of international 
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investment law had been written by Western countries’, which ‘favour maximising the 
protection of foreign investors’107 over host developing states.  
 
Customary international law governing the treatment of foreign investment 
has been reshaped to embody the principles of law found in more than two 
thousand concordant bilateral investment treaties. With the conclusion of 
such a cascade of parallel treaties, the international community has vaulted 
over the traditional divide between capital-exporting and capital-importing 
states and fashioned an essentially unified law of foreign investment.108 
 
The Doctrine of state responsibility include protection against injury to aliens and alien 
property.109 Asante maintained that: 
  
[H]ost states are enjoined by international law to observe an international 
minimum standard in the treatment of aliens and alien property. The duty to 
observe this standard-objective international standard-is not necessary 
discharged by according to aliens and alien property the same treatment 
available to nationals. 110 
 
Asante added that: 
 
Where international standards fall below the international minimum standard, 
the latter prevails. Breach of the minimum standard engages the responsibility 
of the host State, and provides a legitimate basis for the exercise by the home 
State of the right of diplomatic protection of the aliens, a right predicated on 
the inherent right to protect nationals abroad.111  
 
The role of International investment law should be addressing disputes arising from the 
relationship between state sovereignty and investment liberalisation.112 States should take 
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the responsibility for securing their natural resources and socio-economic development 
by balancing the interests of the investors accordingly.113 Host developing states on one 
hand are trying to protect their interests by regulating the foreign investors, while the 
foreign investors are trying to protect their interests and establish sustainable investment 
relationship. 
Sornarajah maintained that ‘It is undeniable, however, that treaties on foreign investment 
could limit the state’s sovereignty to treat the foreign investor in violation of the treaty 
standards which protect him’.114 Trakman maintained that ‘it is important to note that FDI 
does not ensure economic growth’.115 Two contradicting theories regarding the foreign 
investment impact on socio-economic development of host developing states are still 
present116 and include theories from neo-liberal, classical to the theory of dependency.117 
Stiglitz for example is among the economists, which contradicts the neo-liberal economic 
theory.118 Brower and Schill believed that foreign investment is beneficial to socio-
economic development and as such requires protection. They also believed that ‘both 
capital-importing and capital exporting countries derive benefits from increased flows of 
foreign investment’ because ‘investment treaties create a legal infrastructure for the 
functioning of a global market economy by protecting property rights, offering contract 
protection, establishing nondiscrimination as a prerequisite for competition through 
national and most-favored-nation treatment, and making effective dispute-settlement 
mechanisms’. As such it creates ‘Perfect market conditions presupposed, this leads to the 
efficient allocation of capital, economic growth, and development’ which is consequently 
beneficial for both parties.119 
                                                          
113 See Louis B. Sohn and R.R. ‘Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of 
Aliens’ (1961) 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545. 
114 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (3rd edn, CUP 2010) 
120. 
115 Leon E. Trakman, ‘Foreign direct investment: Hazard or opportunity?’ (2009-2010) 41 Geo. Wash. 
Int'l L. Rev. 1, 5. 
116 See Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, ‘The Clash of Globalisations: Its Impact on the International 
Law on Foreign Investment’ (2003)10 Canadian Foreign Policy 1. 
117 See Peter B. Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital 
in Brazil (Princeton University Press 1979); Björn Hettne, Development Theory and the Three Worlds 
(Longman 1988). 
118 See Ha-Joon Chang, Bad Samaritans: The Guilty Secrets of Rich Nations and the Treat to Global 
Prosperity (Random House Business 2008); Joseph Stiglitz, Making Globalisation Work (Penguin 2006); 
see also Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Penguin 2009). 
119 Charles N. Brower and Stephen W. Schill, ‘Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of 
International Investment Law?’ (2009) 9 Chicago Journal of International Law 471, 496. 
187 
 
Sornarajah maintained that ‘The right of a state to control the entry of foreign investment 
is unlimited, as it is a right that arises from sovereignty… a sovereign entity can surrender 
its rights even over a purely internal matter by treaty’.120 While the draft Codes of Conduct 
on Transnational Corporations stated that ‘States have the right to regulate the entry and 
establishment of transnational corporations including determining the role that such 
corporations may play in economic and social development and prohibiting or limiting 
the extent of their presence in specific sectors’.121 Based on the lack of clarity on the state 
responsibility as a result the Draft Codes on ‘General provisions relating to the treatment 
of transnational corporations stated that ‘In all matters relating to the Codes, States shall 
fulfil, in good faith, their international obligations, including generally recognised and 
accepted legal rules and principles’.122 
Host developing states have concluded bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and committed 
themselves to offer a set of standards, which included fair and equitable treatments, MFN 
and national treatment, investor-state arbitration, protection and security for the foreign 
investment, due process and appropriate compensation payment123 in cases of 
expropriation.   
 
A number of international law scholars maintained that: 
 
States are more likely to violate customary international law as the costs of 
compliance increase, they insist that the sense of legal obligation puts some 
drag on such deviations. Our theory, by contrast, insists that the payoffs from 
cooperation or deviation are the sole determinants of whether States engage 
in the cooperative behaviors that are labelled as customary international law. 
This is why we deny the claim that customary international law is an 
exogenous influence on States' behaviour.124 
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Behaviour of states became particularly challenging after BITs were conducted. The main 
problem regarding foreign investment was the open interpretation of the principles. 
‘Violation of the fair and equitable treatment principle by the host state concerned is the 
most common allegation made by foreign investors before international investment 
tribunals’.125 Violation of customary international law can only damage state reputation 
in relationship with the other states.126 However states have to care for their reputation127 
and ‘all things equal, nations will strive to have a reputation for compliance will not 
always be of paramount concern because all things are not equal’.128  
The UN Charter129 states that under international law no single state or small group of 
states is able to create or change customary international law, ‘despite the difference in 
power and influence of States, no individual or small group of States is now dominant’ 
because ‘Decisions tend to reflect the power relationship and the right of all States to 
participate in reaching them’.130 Wolfke argued that ‘The possibility of the big powers 
openly imposing rules on minor nations no longer exist’ and added that ‘practice being 
the nucleus of custom, those states are the most important which have the greatest share 
and interests in such practice – that is, in most cases the great powers’ because ‘Such 
acceptance on the part of the great powers frequently has a decisive effect…’.131 
The general belief has been that new states are bound by customary international law by 
virtue of the fact that they are a state, as a result of opinio juris132 and not by power.133  
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When aliens enter states, the role of international law is to ensure certain standards for 
their treatment as in the opposite case the states can be held liable for mistreatment.134 
There is however no unified system of sanctions in existence in international law.135 
Sornarajah maintained that ‘The theory of state responsibility for injuries to aliens rests 
on the idea that an injury to an alien is an injury to his home state’,136 which is the basic 
principle of international diplomacy ‘Whoever ill treats a citizen injures the state which 
must protect the citizen’.137 The Panevezys–Saldutiskis Railway Case138 changed this view 
to ‘Whoever ill treats the citizen indirectly injures the state, which must protect its 
citizens’.139 ‘While generally adhering to the standard of national treatment, these states 
also claim that in exceptional instances they could discriminate in favour of their own 
citizens’,140 however very few cases actually exercised this.141 ‘[O]nce the alien 
voluntarily takes the risk of investing in a host state, he must bear the risk of potential 
injury to his investment and must be satisfied with then same standard of compensation 
as is given to the nationals of the state who suffer the same fate as he does. It is a 
potentially sound principle of risk allocation’.142 
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Connell143 argued that states are born in the existing international law. However, there is 
no agreement on international law in terms of foreign investment protection that all states 
would agree upon. There is only the rule regarding payment of compensation in case of 
taking of alien property by the host state, which was primarily formed on the cases of 
compensation payment in the post-colonial period.  
International law on state responsibility instructs to protect their nationals abroad.144 
Furthermore the failure of the state to provide compensation to those whose human rights 
were violated145 results in a law suit against the state, as seen in the Neer v United Mexican 
States146 case example. 
Customary international law is clear on the payment of appropriate compensation in case 
of nationalisation.147 Lillich and Weston148 contradict the payment of full compensation, 
but do agree to a partial compensation payment. The overwhelming majority of writers 
support the view that partial compensation was the basis of these agreements.149 This 
request is in contradiction to the customary international law, which is in favour of full 
compensation payment in case of nationalisation or taking of alien property and 
expropriation. 
It is state responsibility to compensate for taking as a consequence for damages caused. 
No state can change the customary rule even if a state was not born at the time.150 The 
main objective of customary international law is the intention to be bound and it also 
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demands payment of full compensation. Partly is based on the theory of unjust 
enrichment.151 The foundation for compensation payment were laid in case concerning 
the Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia in 1925.152 The Permanent Court 
maintained that expropriation must be for ‘reasons of public utility, judicial liquidation 
and similar measures’.153 The quote of the Permanent Court of International Justice stated 
that ‘the principle of respect for vested rights…forms part of generally accepted 
international law’154 that was used for case examples of acquired rights.  
The Statute of the International Court of Justice in Article 38 (b) states that one of the 
provisions of international law is ‘international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law’.155 Customary international law is fundamental to understanding 
international law.156 Reuter maintained that ‘customs enjoys privileged status in the 
international order: “custom” is even more central than the treaty’.157  
New actors such as intergovernmental, non-governmental organisations and transnational 
companies have been given international legal personality ‘even if only granted by 
treaties concluded between states’.158 International law has expanded in its scope and it: 
 
[C]onsists of rules and principles of general application dealing with the 
conduct of states and of international organizations and with their relations 
inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural 
or juridical.159 
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States are conscious of their sovereignty and perhaps are therefore failing the UN not due 
to the ‘lack of sanctions in cases of violations of international norms’ but due to its 
execution, which raises the question of the role of international law.160 However, the areas 
of international law cover the position of states, state succession, state responsibility, 
peace and security, the laws of war, the law of treaties, the law of the sea, the law of 
international waters-courses, the conduct of diplomatic relations, international 
organisations, economy and development, nuclear energy, air law and outer space 
activities, the use of resources of the deep sea, the environment, communications and the 
international protection of human rights.161 The Vienna Convention defines the treaty as 
‘an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by 
international law’.162 Byers maintained that treaty rules are based on the general 
customary rules.163 While D’Amato expressed his concern for effectiveness and 
enforceability of treaties and their binding elements to the signatories.164 Fidler was 
exploring the challenges that customary international law is facing.165 Kelly maintained 
that ‘there is neither a common understanding of how customary international legal norms 
are formed, nor agreement on the content of those norms’ and added that: 
 
Controversy is inevitable because the elements of CIL legal theory are empty 
vessels in which to pour one's own normative theory of international law .... 
Rather than undergoing a revitalization, CIL is disintegrating into a useless, 
incoherent source of law that is of little guidance in determining norms.166  
 
Swaine stated that ‘Even custom's most ardent supporters, however, have difficulty 
explaining how it arises, and more particularly, why customary practices should be 
considered binding on states’.167 Wolfke maintained that ‘the intangibility of custom, in 
the numerous factors which come into play, in the great number of various views, spread 
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over centuries, and in the resulting ambiguity of the terms involved’168 presents the 
problem for understanding the customs. For that reason, Roberts called for ‘articulation 
of a coherent theory…’169 Lack of clarity on customary international law can endanger its 
importance. D’Amato maintained that ‘if custom creates law, how can a component of 
custom require that the creative acts be in accordance with some prior right or obligation 
in international law?’ and asked ‘How can custom create law if its psychological 
component requires action in conscious accordance with law pre-existing the action?’170 
States are trying to exercise their control over private foreign investment beyond 
customary international law.171 Sornarajah maintained that state sovereignty is subject to 
the principles of customary and treaty-based international law.172 While developed states 
recognise the importance of customary international law in protecting the foreign 
investments the developing states are becoming sceptical.  
Hackworth stated the US position is the following:  
 
[T]he Department of State does not intervene in cases involving breaches of 
contract between a foreign state and a national of the United States in the 
absence of showing a denial of justice ... The practice of declining to intervene 
formally prior to a showing of denial of justice is based on the proposition 
that the Government of the United States is not a collection agency and cannot 
assume the role of endeavouring to enforce contractual undertakings freely 
entered into by nationals with foreign states.173  
 
The main concern of the foreign investors is the fear for security of their assets in the host 
developing states. Foreign investors are also the subject of host states jurisdiction.174 The 
nature of investments is long-term, which means that the circumstances can significantly 
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change over time. Some of these circumstances can be significant, such as coup d’etat, 
wars, economic crisis, revolutions that could lead to a change of regime. Such actions can 
potentially jeopardise the relationships between the host states and foreign investors. In 
extreme cases governments can seize assets and property of foreign investors. It was 
mainly on the initiative of the foreign investors that insisted on host states to adopt and 
respect the international minimum treatment standards. As a result, the investment treaties 
were primarily aimed at securing and protecting the investor property rights from acts of 
expropriation, and nationalisation from host governments. 
The provision on expropriation and nationalisation is also written in the NAFTA Article 
1110, which states that ‘no Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an 
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory’.175 Unfortunately NAFTA did 
not include the provision, which would define the two terms and was therefore left to 
interpretation.176  
However, state sovereignty gives a state the right to expropriate on their territory, which 
is not considered illegal under international law, as long as compensation is paid.177 
According to the NAFTA Article 1110: 
 
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment 
of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to 
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment (‘expropriation’), 
except: 
(a) For a public purpose; 
(b) On a non-discriminatory basis; 
(c) In accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and 
(d) On payment of compensation in accordance with paragraph 2 through 6.178 
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The primary role of a state is to protect its citizens and its economic interests in order to 
do that they are allowed to take appropriate measures as per ICL Article 25 of the Draft 
articles on Responsibility of States for Wrongful Acts 2001.179 
In the Energy Charter Treaty 1994, Article 13(1) states: 
 
(1) Investments of Investor of a Contracting Party in the Area of any other 
Contracting Party shall not be nationalized, expropriated or subjected to a 
measure or measures having effect equivalent to nationalization or 
expropriation (hereinafter referred to as ‘Expropriation’) except where such 
Expropriation is: 
(a) For a purpose which is in the public interest; 
(b) Not discriminatory 
(c) Carried out under due process of law; and 
(d) Accompanied by the payment of prompt, adequate and effective    
               compensation.180 
 
There is a slight variation of the conditions of expropriation that can be seen in the 
investment treaties. Under NAFTA Article 1110 identifies key elements for expropriation 
or taking: 
 
a. Expropriation requires a taking (which may include destruction) by 
government-type authority of an investment by an investor covered by the 
NAFTA. 
b. The covered investment may include intangible as well as tangible property. 
c. The taking must be a substantially complete deprivation of the economic 
use and enjoyment of the rights to the property, or of identifiable distinct 
parts thereof (i.e., it approaches total impairment). 
d. The taking must be permanent, and not ephemeral or temporary. 
e. The taking usually involves a transfer of ownership to another person 
(frequently the government authority concerned), but that need not 
necessarily be so in certain cases (e.g., total destruction of an investment 
due to measures by a government authority without transfer of rights). 
f. The effects of the host state’s measures are dispositive, not the underlying 
intent, for determining whether there is expropriation. 
g. The taking may be de jure or de facto. 
h. The taking may be ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’. 
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i. The taking may have the form of a single measure or a series of related or 
unrelated measures over a period of time (the so-called ‘creeping’ 
expropriation).181 
 
The above criteria is applicable to the most of the investment treaties. States are in 
conflicting position while trying to attract the foreign investment they would also like to 
retain freedom to control their territory by means of legislation and regulation. These 
challenges create a great deal of tension, which is a part of the negotiation process and it 
depends mainly on the bargaining position of the host states on how successful they are 
in negotiating the investment treaties. In order to protect host state’s interests some 
investment treaties include exceptions. Such example can be seen in US – Kazakhstan 
BIT, which states: 
 
Each Party reserves the right to deny to any company the advantage of this 
Treaty if nationals of any third country control such company and, in the case 
of a company of the other Party, that company had no substantial business 
activities in the territory of the other Party or is controlled by nationals of a 
third country with which the denying Party does not maintain normal 
economic relations.182 
 
In most cases customary international law plays a crucial role as the Tribunal often refers 
to it in order to find an applicable standard when making decisions. One of such examples 
was the ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v Republic of 
Hungary183 where the tribunal was trying to find appropriate standard that would help 
define the value of compensation. The Cyprus – Hungary BIT stated that ‘the amount of 
compensation must correspond to the market value of the expropriated investment at the 
moment of the expropriation’184 to which Hungary claimed that the appropriate standard 
should be ‘market value’. However, the tribunal concluded that the provision in BIT only 
                                                          
181 Feldman’s Fund Insurance Company v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB/(AF)/02/1, award 
17 July 2006) NAFTA 176. 
182 Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (signed 19 May 1992, entered into force 12 
January 1994) Art I(2) <http:tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005571.asp> 
accessed 25 February 2016. 
183 See ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v Republic of Hungary Award, 
ICSID Case No ARB/03/16, award of the Tribunal of 2 October 2006 
<http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0006.pdf> accessed 20 March 2016. 
184 Cyprus – Hungary BIT (signed 24 May 1989, entered into force 25 May 1990) Art 4 
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/922> accessed 20 March 2016.  
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applies in the cases of legal expropriations and not in cases of the illegal expropriations. 
Consequently the Tribunal took the Chorzów Factory ruling into account and stated that 
‘Reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and 
re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not 
been committed’.185 The BIT also states that ‘neither Contracting Party shall take any 
measures depriving, directly or indirectly, investors of the other Contracting Party of their 
investment unless…the measures are accompanied by provision for the payment of just 
compensation’.186 Just compensation in this case would be the market value. The BIT does 
not make the distinction between the legal and illegal expropriation, which only the 
Tribunal has made. That clearly indicates that the compensation was not awarded based 
on the standards of treatment provided in the BIT, but based on the principle of customary 




4.4  Protection under BITs and Cases of taking of private foreign assets 
 
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) were commonly concluded to attract foreign 
investments and to protect property rights of foreign investors, however there is no 
evidence that BITs increase foreign investments.187 Mann and von Moltke maintained that 
there is ‘no recognizable relationship between IIAs and investment flows…’.188 The 
question is if the rules included in BITs have consequently also became rules of 
customary international law considering that BITs offer greater standard of protection 
than those of customary international law. Gunawardana stated that BITs affect the 
customary international law, which are governing the investments.189 Kishoiyian 
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maintained that ‘each BIT is nothing but lex specialis between parties’.190 Subedi 
maintained that an example of lex specialis can be seen in the ‘recent attempts by states 
such as Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador to re-negotiate concessions and other contracts 
with foreign companies’.191 Schwebel on the other hand maintained that ‘the very purpose 
of treaties is to constrain the freedom of States’.192 This research however maintains that 
it is not the investment treaties that constrain developing states but the lack of initiatives 
to include re-negotiations clause and oppose to the most-favour-nation treatment and full 
compensation payment, both of which are in favour of foreign investors. Concluding 
investment treaties should be accorded greater drafting attention to the provisions that 
should be better negotiated to adequately represent interests of both parties.  
Foreign investments are controlled by signed BITs, however notwithstanding the need 
for their protection.193 Host states are keen on enabling socio-economic development, 
technology transfer, and acquisition of skills without endangering their sovereignty, while 
the investors are interested in the return on their investment. The objective of foreign 
investors is to get the highest returns on their investment, while the objective of host 
developing states was to regain sovereignty, which namely applied to those newly formed 
independent states.  
In quest to accommodate the interests of both parties’ investment agreements were 
formed, which became dominant form of formal investment relationships. In the case of 
dispute reconciliation and protection, under the auspices of the World Bank (WB) the 
convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States (ICSID) 1965194 and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 
1985195 Conventions were formed. BITs enabled foreign investors to access the ICSID for 
resolving investment disputes with host states, which can be conducted in the absence of 
                                                          
190 Bernard Kishoiyian, ‘The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of Customary 
International Law’ (1994) 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 327, 329.  
191 Surya P. Subedi, International Investment Law (3rd edn, Hart Publishing 2016) 116. In 1997 UN 
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199 
 
the host states by appointed arbitrary. These conventions have formulated the scheme to 
insure foreign investments against risks. The main concern of foreign investors was the 
political instability of host developing states as well as their underdeveloped legal system 
and judiciary in which they had little trust and effectively taking. 
The question ‘whether, for an “investment” to qualify as a foreign investment, a transfer 
of capital is required’ has been raised, however ‘An investment is a foreign investment if 
it is owned or controlled by a foreign investor’196 is one view; the other view is that the 
origin of funds is not relevant. Investment could come from various sources, such as 
imported capital, profits made, payments received or loans raised locally, makes no 
difference to the degree of awarded protection. In Tokios Tokelės v Ukraine197 case for 
example ICSID ruled that due to the signed BIT, the parties have the right to determine 
what classifies the investment and the right to review the existing requirements set in the 
BIT. Terms and conditions in BITs should therefore be clearly defined and agreed. Lack 
of clarity was the case in Tradex v Albania,198 where the former claimed their financial 
source was irrelevant to which the tribunal agreed as there was no clear definition of 
investment. Schlemmer maintained that the ‘nature of an investment is determined 
exclusively by the nationality of the investor that exercises ownership and control’.199 
BITs left the definition of an investment open to interpretation and therefore ICSID 
reached different conclusions. Such argument can be noted in AMT v Zaire200 and Fedax 
v Venezuela.201 However in spite of referring to the latter case the tribunal in Joy Mining 
v Egypt202 came to a different conclusion regardless of the fact that the investment was 
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aimed at economic development, which the tribunal in LESI v Algeria203 found to be 
irrelevant but not in Patrick Mitchell v Democratic Republic of the Congo204 and 
Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v Malaysia.205 The lack of clarity is the reason 
that ICSID came to different conclusions in their arbitral ruling. 
Relationship between states are at the forefront of the investment agreements, namely 
between developed and developing states, which contain provision on the settlement of 
investment disputes by international tribunal. There is no such provision in the rare BIT 
between two developed states.206 Newly independent states expressed their aspirations in 
a number of UN resolutions207 as well as the right of developing states to fully regulate 
foreign investments on their territory in accordance with the domestic laws as 
recommended in the Calvo doctrine.208  
Private foreign investors wanted to protect their investments from the potential 
government intervention resulting in taking. Bernardini maintained that contractual 
guarantee is ‘a matter of negotiations with the State, based on the parties’ respective 
bargaining power, to agree in the investment contract on the most suitable provisions’.209 
As mentioned in the first chapter the importance of bargaining position plays a crucial 
role in negotiating terms and conditions of an investment agreement. 
In the definition of foreign investment, the provision on the protection of foreign 
investment is included. More recent developments have added to the concerns expressed 
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in the Aminoil210 and the Sedco211 cases. In addition to ‘Expropriation in the sense of an 
outright taking of private property by the state, usually involving a transfer of ownership 
rights to the state or to a third person’212 and compensation, physical property also the 
provisions in property right, copyright, intellectual property rights, share of the company 
that represent either ownership or management and contractual and regulatory rights213 
were expressed. 
‘The foreign corporation stood at a disadvantage in any agreement it made with the host 
state’ because ‘the host state had the legislative power to alter the impact on the contract’ 
in their territory, including contractual or property rights based on its sovereignty.214 
Foreign investors therefore wanted to protect themselves and for that reason the 
stabilisation clause was introduced.215 Notwithstanding that stabilisation clause has 
caused much controversy, examples of which can be seen in Texaco v Libya216, Aminoil v 
Kuwait217, Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project218, Consortium-Chad Convention for the 
Development of Oil Fields and the Host Government Agreement between Turkey and the 
Consortium of British Petroleum.219  
Re-negotiation clause has unfortunately not been utilised in the investment treaties in 
order to re-negotiate on the new terms of the contract, when circumstances change or a 
need for modification arises.220 The main question is over the governing law for which 
foreign investors are not keen to leave in the hands of the host developing states’ domestic 
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legal system and judiciary and would therefore prefer to be given to international 
tribunals.221 The problem of treaties is their vagueness of provisions and bias in favour of 
foreign investors. The biggest problem of investment treaties is however the lack of 
balance of interests between both contracting parties translated in the clear provisions. 
Umbrella clause is another provision of BITs, which is regarded as alternative but creates 
more problems because it is bias against developing states by protecting only foreign 
investors. Example can be seen in Switzerland-Pakistan BIT, however the ICSID in SGS 
v Pakistan maintained that the umbrella clause alone does not consequently make the 
breach of contract equal to breach of international treaty law.222 
 
ICSID Convention in Article 42(1) states that: 
 
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as 
may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal 
shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its 
rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be 
applicable.223 
 
BITs include similar provisions on protection such as fair and equitable treatment, full 
protection and security, MFN and national treatment, prohibited arbitrary or 
discriminatory measures, payment of appropriate compensation, 224 which should equally 
protect host states and investors against violating BITs provisions, but are significantly 
lacking the needed balance.  
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Foreign investment is promoted with BITs, which strive towards reciprocity and mutual 
benefits to the parties concerned towards socio-economic development.225 Bernardini 
maintained that ‘where the host country has enacted legislation governing private 
business activity and providing for some measures of protection of foreign investment’ 
because there is a risk that ‘the country may be subject to political instability’.226 Political 
stability unfortunately cannot be controlled with the provisions of BITs. 
Reisman and Sloane maintained that ‘failure to create or maintain the normative 
“favourable” conditions in the host state’227 requires to ‘establish and maintain an 
appropriate legal, administrative, and regulatory framework’.228 While political stability 
cannot be controlled with BIT provision the legal system and judiciary can develop to the 
required international standard, which can be specified in the BIT provision. 
Foreign investment has been controversial, especially in the host developing states. 
Despite the UN Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1962 
doubts have been expressed over the obligation of States to pay compensation due to 
taking.229 The most common cases of taking were the Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims230 
in which the US ‘took over the legal rights and duties of the shipowners toward the 
shipbuilders’231 and case concerning Certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia232 
where the Permanent Court of International Justice maintained that Poland expropriated 
contractual rights, patents and licenses by seizing a machinery and the factory and has 
therefore appropriated foreign-held property. On the ground of extensive damages that 
the investor suffered Starret Housing Corporation v Islamic Republic of Iran the Tribunal 
maintained that ‘measures taken by a state can interfere with property rights to such an 
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extent that these rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been 
expropriated’.233 However, compensation payments are no longer an issue for 
international law.234   
There were many other cases such as SD Myers Inc. v Canada which maintained that: 
 
An expropriation usually amounts to a lasting removal of the ability of an 
owner to make use of its economic rights although it may be that, in some 
contexts and circumstances, it would be appropriate to view a deprivation as 
amounting to an expropriation, even if it were partial or temporary.235  
 
SD Myers the tribunal maintained that expropriation includes “taking” of property by a 
government authority.236 Schwartz maintained that:  
 
Expropriations tend to deprive the owner and to enrich - by a corresponding 
amount - the public authority that the property, or the third party to whom the 
property is given. There is both unfair deprivation and unjust enrichment 
when an expropriation is carried out [without] compensation. By contrast, 
regulatory action tends to prevent an owner from using property in a way that 
unjustly enriches the owner.237  
 
Compañiá del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v The Republic of Costa Rica: ‘property 
has been expropriated when the effect of the measures taken by the state has been to 
deprive the owner of title, possession or access to the benefit and economic use of his 
property’.238   
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Expropriation includes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings 
of property, such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in 
favour of the host State, but also covert or incidental interference with the use 
of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in 
significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of 
property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State.239  
 
Technicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v Mexico:  
The issue is whether the investor was radically deprived of the economical 
use and enjoyment of its investments, as if the rights related thereto—such as 
the income or benefits related to the [property] or to its exploitation—had 
ceased to exist. In other words, if due to the actions of the Respondent, the 
assets involved have lost their value or economic use for their holder and the 
extent of the loss.240  
 
It further maintains that:  
 
This determination is important because it is one of the main elements to 
distinguish, from the point of view of an international tribunal, between a 
regulatory measure, which is an ordinary expression of the exercise of the 
state’s police power that entails a decrease in assets or rights, and a de facto 
expropriation that deprives those assets and rights of any real substance.241 
 
In case of GAMI Investment, Inc. v Mexico ‘the affected property must be impaired to 
such an extent that it must be seen as “taken”’.242  
First case under the Energy Charter Treaty 1994 in investor-state arbitration award was 
Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v Latvia243 where tribunal concluded that:  
 
The decisive factor for drawing the border line towards expropriation must 
primarily be the degree of possession taking or control over the enterprise the 
disputed measures entail. In the present case, there is no possession taking of 
Windau or its assets, no interference with the shareholder’s rights or with the 
                                                          
239 Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/97/1, award of 30 August 
2000 para. 103. 
240 Technicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mexico (2003) (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2) at 
para. 115. 
241 Technicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mexico (2003) (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2) at 
para. 115. 
242 GAMI Investment, Inc. v Mexico, NAFTA Award, 15 November 2004 at para. 126. 
243 Award dated 16 December 2003 <http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0570.pdf> accessed 20 December 2015. 
206 
 
management’s control over and running of the enterprise – apart from 
ordinary regulatory provisions laid down in the production licence, the off-
take agreement.244 
 
The risk of foreign investment is without a doubt the possibility of taking in addition to 
being subjected to the domestic legal system and judiciary, which can be challenged by 
sudden change in government, ideology, economic crisis, revolution, civil war and other 
scenarios that have direct impact on the foreign investments, if domestic courts are not 
independent and reliable. Therefor balance is called for between host developing states 
exercising its sovereign right to take actions in the interest of their socio-economic 
development and foreign investors profit maximisation. International institutions have 
been appointed to control host states behaviour under accordance with the international 
law, however there is no reciprocal system in place to control the activities of foreign 
investors in host developing states. 
It is challenging to formulate the right provision that would properly tackle the protection 
of foreign investments balanced with the interests of host developing states.245 There is a 
need to balance the investment protection against measures that should be imposed on 
foreign investors by the host developing states in terms of codes of conduct that should 
become a part of international customary law and as such legally binding. Codes of 
conduct should also be included in BITs and be contractually binding. However, the best 
way to offer protection is by means of state’s responsibility and international minimum 
standards.  
Wortley for example opposed to the payment of compensation even in cases of 
nationalisation.246 In any case the taking of private assets by public authorities is no longer 
an open issue of international law because host state has the right to taking as long as 
appropriate compensation is paid.  
                                                          
244 Award dated 16 December 2003 Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v Latvia section 4.3.1. 
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British Yearbook of International Law 307-316; B. Weston, ‘Constructive takings under international 
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Kuwait v Aminoil case247 is an example of fair compensation payment. The 60 – year oil 
concession granted by Kuwait to Aminoil in 1948 included stabilisation clause and was 
re-negotiated in 1961. Kuwait nationalised assets and agreed to pay fair compensation. 
The Tribunal concluded that stabilisation clause was not violated due to changing 
circumstances in which Kuwait became an independent state, but was due to pay 
“appropriate compensation” for which the replacement cost was used on a reasonable rate 
of return, including inflation.  
The question of legitimacy of taking arose and examples of when such activity is lawful 
remains to be reviewed. To date there is no universal agreement relating to the manner of 
assessment of due compensation payment. The UK-India BIT for example does not 
recognise Hull formula for expropriation or nationalisation.248 
On the topic of expropriation authors were divided in their views.249 International law 
however provides international minimum standards of protection against expropriation. 
The extent of expropriation in international law was studied in depth by a number of 
scholars.250 The biggest critic however still remains that none of the authors made clear 
distinction between regulation and expropriation or addressed newer types of 
expropriation on policy issues and factors that the tribunals should take into consideration 
while making decisions on compensation payment.251 García-Amador maintained that 
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Developments?’ (2003) 11 N.Y.U. Envtl. L. J. 64; Rudolf Dolzer and Felix Bloch, ‘Indirect 
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‘the very raison d’être of compensation for expropriation ordered in the public interest is 
the idea that the State, i.e. the community, must not benefit unduly at the expense of 
private individuals’.252 
Foreign investors operate in host developing states and therefore as such should be the 
subject to their domestic laws. Taking has hence been one of the biggest risks of foreign 
investment. Also due to the ever changing political situation in host developing states, 
where the circumstances at the entry can significantly change over time. The same applies 
to the legislation regarding foreign investments.253 At the same time the host developing 
states were questioning the rationale behind the compensation payment.254 
British Government issued a statement when Libya nationalised assets of British 
Petroleum stating that: 
 
An act of nationalisation is not legitimate in international law unless it 
satisfies the following requirements: 
(i) It must be for a public purpose related to the needs of the taking state, 
and  
(ii) It must be followed by the payment of prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation.  
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Nationalization measures which are arbitrary, discriminatory or which are 
motivated by considerations of a political nature unrelated to the internal 
well-being of the taking State are, by a reference to those principles, illegal 
and invalid.255 
 
Libyan Oil Ministry replied that: 
 
[N]o dispute has arisen over the application of the provisions of the 
concession agreement…. The revolution has merely exercised a sovereign 
right which is not open to challenge or debate in any form whatever. 
Nationalization is a legitimate course of action sanctioned by international 
law and society.256 
 
The restitutio in integram was ordered by Jean-René Dupuy as sole arbitrator in the 
Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v The Libyan 
Republic case. This order followed a declaration that the nationalisation of the foreign 
company's assets was invalid by reason of its non-compliance with public international 
law standards.257 
More common is the interference of governments in signed investment agreements that 
resulted in termination of the contract due to the breach, namely by the foreign investor.258 
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Therefore the arbitral tribunals were struggling to balance the rights of investors on one 
hand to the rights of sovereign states to control the investors and their investments on the 
territory of host states on the other. Under Canadian law for example in expropriation 
case259 the Court ruled that compensation payment was due in Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v 
R260 and British Columbia v Tener.261 
Expropriation is described as the act of a state taking private property, and consequently 
taking the ownership.262 Dolzer maintains that ‘the single most important development in 
state practice has become the issue of indirect expropriation’.263 The UNCTAD dealt with 
the issue of tangible and intangible property and definition of property and investment, to 
determine what expropriation might include.264 BITs include the provision on investment 
protection in cases of expropriation that will normally resolve in compensation payment 
and would also include definition of investment.265 
NAFTA in Articles 1110(1) and 1105(1) add the concept of ‘due process of law’, ‘fair 
and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’.266 Customary international law 
also protects foreign property from expropriation, which includes intangible rights. The 
most important distinction to be made is between the breach of contract that carries legal 
consequences and expropriation of contract rights, which carries consequences as per the 
international law. Indirect expropriation includes effective loss of management, use or 
control, or a significant depreciation of the value of the assets of a foreign investor’.267 
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Burton and Inoue maintained that “nationalisation” started with the socialist revolution 
in Russia and Mexico for which no compensation was paid.268 During the years 1960 and 
1977 the authors reported 1,857 cases of such takings. The issue was not in the 
nationalisation process, but in the fact that appropriate compensation was not paid. Hence 
numerous concerns were expressed, especially in the large-scale takings, where 
developing states might not be in the position to afford paying required compensation in 
money and in-kind. Taking was also common in the decolonisation period. McNair,269 
Domke270 and Sornarajah271 have discussed one of the most interesting cases of 
nationalisation, which occurred in Indonesia, when it took over Dutch property. 
Developing states are in favour of “appropriate” in oppose to the “prompt, adequate and 
effective” compensation payment. However, since there are no unified standards of 
compensation it all depends on the bargaining position and successful negotiation 
process. Model Agreements on Promotion and Protection of Investments of the Asian-
African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC) provides in its first alternative 
formulation of article 7(i) that: 
 
A Contracting Party may exercise its sovereign rights in the matter of 
nationalization or expropriation in respect of investments made... upon 
payment of appropriate compensation...272  
 
And in its first alternative part (ii) states that ‘compensation calculated on the basis of 
recognised principles of valuation’.273 Model of BIT of the United Kingdom in article 5 
(1) states that: 
 
The national or company affected shall have a right, under the law of the 
Contracting Party making the expropriation, to prompt review, by a judicial 
or other independent authority of that Party, of his or its case and of the 
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valuation of his or its investment in accordance with the principles set out in 
this paragraph.274  
 
While Chile in their BIT model in Article 6 (3) states that: 
 
The investor affected shall have a right to access, under the law of the 
Contracting Party making the expropriation, to the judicial authority of that 
Party, in order to review the amount of compensation and the legality of any 
such expropriation or comparable measure.275 
 
The issue of legality276 of taking277 and appropriate payment of compensation is no longer 
a challenge for international law. Compensation payment does not apply to the situation 





4.5  Compensation payments and The Issue of the breach of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs)  
 
The issue of taking of private assets of foreign investors by public authorities has been a 
challenge for international law for a few decades now. Some ‘governmental measures 
may not involve an actual physical taking of property, but may still result in the effective 
loss of management, use or control, or a significant depreciation of the value, of the assets 
of a foreign investor’.278  
Fear of taking still represents a big risk to the foreign investors, which could be resolved 
if ‘the takings clause could be drafted to reflect the formulation of a certain relationship 
                                                          
274 UNCTAD, 1996, vol. III, 188. 
275 UNCTAD, 1996, vol. III, 146. 
276 British Claim in the Spanish Zone of Morocco (1925) 2 RIAA ii. 617, 620; in Funnekotter v 
Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6, award of 22 April 2009. 
277 Siderman de Blake v Argentina, 965 F 2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992) court ruling was in favour of the illegal 
taking of the property, because it was based on ethnicity. 
278 UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements, Key Issues, Volume I (Ney York, Geneva 2004) 235. 
213 
 
that can accommodate both the concerns of foreign investors and national policy 
makers’.279 
Latin word “Tortus” provides the basis for the commonly used Tort, which refers to the 
civil wrongs in opposed to the criminal wrongs. As such the claims from tort origin arise 
from negligence, nuisance, trespass, defamation and others. Winfield and Jolowicz 
maintained that ‘Tortious liability arises from a breach of a duty primarily fixed by law; 
this duty is towards persons generally and its breach is redressible by an action for 
unliquidated damages’.280 According to Winfield ‘all injuries done to another person are 
torts, unless there is some justification recognised by law’.281 
Absolute liability applies in any case even when there is no fault by the responsible party. 
In absolute liability the party responsible is also not given any exceptions such are those 
given in rule of strict liability. Absolute liability is also more precise than strict liability 
and refers to “no fault liability”. The rule was laid by Rylands v Fletcher.282 Strict liability 
applies to the defendant even if it is not present nor being responsible for negligence. One 
may ask how it is possible to apply liability without negligence. There must be proof of 
accumulation on the defendant’s land, which has not been there before or is not of natural 
cause and has been brought on the land. In other case no liability will arise.283 Strict 
liability lies in between negligence and absolute liability. What strict liability does is hold 
defendant accountable but gives the possibility of defence limited to “abnormally 
dangerous activities”. The Chorzów Factory Case maintained that ‘it is a general 
conception of law that every violation of an engagement involves an obligation to make 
a reparation’.284 Therefore the general principle of law states that compensation must be 
paid in case of any taking. Strict liability should also apply in cases of environmental 
pollution.285  
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Foreign investors might, in the process of investment, commit acts such as environmental 
pollution, human rights, child labour violation or other kind of harmful activities. The 
issues of environmental protection have been addressed in a number of declarations, 
namely Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment 1972, World Charter for Nature 1982,286 Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development 1992 and Kyoto Declaration on Sustainable Development 1993. The 
legal principle that has emerged, namely from Article 16 of the Rio Declaration is ‘the 
polluter-pays principle’ and is based on the strict liability. Under customary international 
law states are obliged to take the necessary measures to protect the environment and 
corporate entities are equally obliged to abide by them. A proper conduct from TNCs is 
expected during the course of their investments in host developing states, which was also 
included in the UN Draft Code of Conduct on TNCs. Similar did the OECD 2011 
Guidelines include provision advising TNCs to abide by the environmental standards of 
host developing states in which they are conducting business activities. 
One of the concerns in the Barcelona Traction Case287 was the diplomatic protection of 
TNCs shareholders. The ELSI Case288 involved the compensation amount for taking and 
questioned the liquidation of a foreign corporation by a court and examined the states 
involvement in potential violation by denying justice. The Diallo v Congo case deals with 
the issue of corporate nationality by recognising the place of incorporation.289 Investment 
treaties also include the provision that the foreign investment are given “full protection 
and security”.290 
AMCO v Republic of Indonesia the Arbitration Tribunal stated that:  
 
[T]he full compensation of prejudice, by awarding to the injured party the 
damnum emergens and lucrum cessans is a principle common to the main 
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systems of municipal law, and therefore, a general principle of law which may 
be considered as a source of international law.291 
 
The Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) Corporation from Hong Kong invested in 
equity capital in Sri Lanka in Serendib Seafoods Ltd. Company that was in the business 
of shrimp culture. The investment suffered a total loss in disagreement between “Tigers” 
the Tamil rebels and Sri Lanka’s security forces (STF). AAPL claimed compensation 
from Sri Lanka based on Article 8(1) of the BIT agreement between the UK (extended to 
Hong Kong) and the government of Sri Lanka and ICSID Convention.292 The legal issue 
was regarding Sri Lanka’s responsibility for damages caused to AAPL and adequate 
compensation under customary international law. AAPL stated that the destruction of 
their property and assets were caused in cold-blooded killing and was not a consequence 
of a “combat action”.293 Sri Lanka was also accused of not performing “due diligence”. 
From a legal point of view, the international minimum standards do require a State to 
provide full protection of the foreign investment under customary international law. In 
addition to the investment treaty that includes provisions on other standards that the host 
states are due to fulfil and in case of violation “strict liability” may apply. Article 2(2) 
stated that foreign investor enjoys full protection and security in the territory of the host 
state. The question is whether the responsibility was in fact “force majeure”. The Tribunal 
concluded that “full protection and security” does not give rise to “strict liability” for the 
host State.294 Tribunal maintained that ‘The State into which an alien has entered…is not 
an insurer or a guarantor of his security….It does not, and could hardly be asked to, accept 
an absolute responsibility for all injuries to foreigner’…the nature of both the obligation 
and ensuring responsibility remain unchanged, since the added words “consent” or “full” 
are by themselves not sufficient to establish that the Parties intended to transform their 
mutual obligation into a “strict liability”.295 BIT Sri Lanka v UK the Tribunal stated that: 
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[N]one among the authors referred to by the Parties claimed in his 
commentary that the Sri Lanka/U.K. Treaty or similar Bilateral Investment 
Treaties had the effect of increasing the customary international law standards 
of protection to the extent of imposing “strict liability” on the host State in 
cases where the investment suffers losses due to property destruction.296 
 
However, the Tribunal stated that: 
 
[N]either Party was able to provide reliable evidence explaining with 
precision the conditions under which the destruction and other losses, mainly 
of the shrimps crop, took place. Under these circumstances it would be 
extremely difficult to determine whether the destructions and losses were 
caused as an inevitable result of the “necessity of the situation” or on the 
contrary, were avoidable if the governmental security forces would have been 
keen to act with due diligence.297 
 
Decisions of the Tribunals was made following the rule of strict liability. However, if the 
standards of treatments and proper of codes of conduct would have been practiced there 
would be no need for the law as the actor for settling the investor-state disputes. 
Foreign investment is covered by BITs298 that ‘focus mainly on the rights of the foreign 
investor and on the duties of the host state vis-à-vis the investor and their investment’.299 
Disputes are namely caused by government interferences with foreign investment. A 
state’s objective is to ensure capital flow, new technologies and management skills in 
order to contribute to the socio-economic development that is not on the expense of their 
sovereignty.300 In that quest states agreed to enter in contractual agreements with the 
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investors that became known as the investment agreements and have been widely spread 
in the form of bilateral investment treaties (BITs).301 
The rule of law should be the only element guiding contracts, and as such neutral. Bonell 
argued that:  
 
Even when drafted by sophisticated lawyers, investment contracts are 
inevitably incomplete as it is impossible to foresee all the events which might 
occur in the course of performance. Hence the necessity to have external 
sources to which to refer whenever a question arises that has not been 
expressly dealt with in the contract.302  
 
Obligations of TNCs to the host developing states have not been given much attention. 
Protecting the assets of TNCs via means of investment treaties or customary international 
law gained momentum, while the topic of obligations of TNCs to host developing states 
are in need of further development. Sornarajah maintained that ‘the notion of corporate 
liability for human rights violation have also been slow in evolving’.303 The pressure to 
hold TNCs accountable for human rights violation is gaining momentum. Therefore, 
human rights should be fundamental rights and as such be included as part of the 
constitutions, which would make them legally binding and compulsory.304 As discussed 
more in depth in chapter 3 many attempts were made towards forming codes of conduct 
for TNCs, however almost just as many have failed and the ones that did succeed were 
non-binding in nature.305  
OECD was keen on developing binding multilateral agreements on investments namely 
for the TNCs. Developing states were also in favour of such binding obligations for the 
TNCs. The United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) 
responded to their request by creating the draft Codes of Conduct for TNCs, however it 
                                                          
301 See Piero Bernardin, ‘State Contracts’ in New Trends in International Trade Law (G. Giappichelli 
2000) 47. 
302 Michael Joachim Bonell, ‘International Investment Contracts and General Contract Law: a Place for 
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts?’ (2012) 17 Unif. L. Rev. 141, 152. 
303 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (2nd edn, CUP 2004) 
146. 
304 A limited number of cases exist in which TNCs have been held accountable for human rights violation 
during the course of their business activities in the host developing states, such as The Amco Cadiz (1984) 
2 Loyds Rep 304; Connelly v RTZ Plc (1998) AC 854; Lubbe v Cape (2000) 1 WLR 1545.  
305 See M. Baker, ‘Promises and Platitudes: Towards a New 21st Century Paradigm for Corporate Codes 
of Conduct’ (2007) 23 Connecticut Journal of International Law 123. 
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was unfortunately not developed further from the draft version, covering areas of 
potential harmful activities of TNCs and its effect on the socio-economic development. 
The main objective was to formulate internationally accepted business practices that 
would be beneficial and acceptable to both parties without harmful consequences on the 
environment or human rights.  
Many attempts were made to agree on the international law of foreign investment between 
states, starting with the Havana Charter in 1948.306 The biggest critic was that it was not 
tailored for the developing states, but on protecting the foreign investment. Trade comes 
out of investment and yet no direct reference to investment was made in the Havana 
Charter. 
Settlement of investment disputes was entrusted with International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)307 by the World Bank. Arbitration however 
still remains the main system for settling foreign investment disputes. In addition to the 
ICSID there are also ad hoc arbitration and private arbitral institutions.308 The ICSID 
Convention in Article 42 (1) states that:  
 
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as 
may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal 
shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its 
rules on the conflict of laws) and such other rules of international law as may 
be applicable.309 
 
The above article has been subject to controversy because it touches on the choice of law 
and if such choice should be specified in the host state legislation or investment treaty, 
but it would be too lengthy to go into details at this stage.310 
                                                          
306 See J. E. S. Fawcett, ‘The Havana Charter’ (1949) 5 Yearbook of World Affairs 320.  
307 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes (Kluwer Law 
International 2000), 315–333. 
308 See Christoph Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2nd edn, CUP 2009). 
309 ICSID Convention Article 42(1) 
310 In the Klöckner case for example international law was given subsidiary role to the law of the host 
state which is contradictory to the ICSID convention. 
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Some attempts were made in the ICSID jurisprudence, which can be seen in award such 
as Benvenuti et Bonfant v Congo311 for example. Contract based arbitration312 was the most 
prominent until the AAPL v Sri Lanka313, when the treaty-based arbitration became more 
utilised.314  
The dispute has to clearly arise from an investment. There are however many international 
transactions and only foreign investment transactions qualify as an investment. The 
challenge is to identify criteria for an investment. Salini made an attempt to that end by a 
test that has been taken into consideration on a number of arbitral tribunals.315 In addition 
to contributions in money, in-kind or in industry, long duration, presence of risk, and 
promotion of economic development, Schreuer added generation of profits.316 Schreuer 
argued that economic development is ‘the only possible indication of an objective 
meaning of the term “investment”’.317 Economic development is also identified as an 
objective of investment treaties.  
While ICSID318 arbitrations are the most common route for settling investment dispute 
but it is not the only one. BITs also include provisions on the dispute settlements. 
However, the codes of conduct for investment and other guidelines for arbitration do not 
have any legally binding force. Therefore, the notion of creating formal sets of rules that 
would have legally binding force is still to be reviewed. 
The question is also if a breach of contract constitutes a violation of international law. In 
Consortium RFCC v Morocco ICSID panel maintained that a breach of contract would 
constitute a breach of treaty provisions ‘unless it be proved that the state or its emanation 
                                                          
311 Benvenuti & Bonfant v People's Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No ARB/77/2, 21 ILM 740 
(1982). 
312 See Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger, International Investment 
Arbitration (OUP 2007); Christopher Dugan, Don Wallace, Noah Rubins and Borzu Sabahi, Investor–
State Arbitration (OUP 2008). 
313 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Reports 254, final award of 
27 June 1990. 
314 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP 2008) 
315 See Salini Costruttori SpA v Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4 (Jurisdiction Award, 23 July 2001), 
(2001) 42 ILM577. 
316 Christoph Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2nd edn, CUP 2009) 130–134. 
317 Christoph Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2nd edn, CUP 2009). 
318 See also ICSID Secretariat Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration 
(Discussion Paper, 22 October 2004): ICSID Secretariat Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and 
Regulations (Working Paper, 12 May 2005). 
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has gone beyond its role as a mere party to the contract, and has exercised the specific 
functions of a sovereign’.319 
Hull standards are used by the Energy Charter Treaty 1994, APEC Non-Binding 
Investment Principles,320 MAI in Chapter IV (2) also refers to Hull standards while The 
World Bank specifically states “appropriate compensation” in Article IV (2): 
 
Compensation for a specific investment taken by the State will, according to 
the details provided below, be deemed “appropriate” if it is adequate, 
effective and prompt.321  
 
Hull standards have become widely used in arbitration ruling on compensation payment 
however they are not universally recognised and recent arbitration is leaning toward 
appropriate compensation payment.   
In 1984 the United States signed BIT with the Republic of Zaire.322 American 
Manufacturing & Trading Inc. (AMT), a US company from Delaware State, owned 94% 
of a Zairian company, Société Industrielle Zairoise (SINZA). AMT has invested in 
production of automotive, dry cell batteries, importation, re-sale of consumer goods 
through SINZA. Two incidents of looting occurred, first in 1991 and second in 1993, 
when soldiers from Zairian army destroyed, damaged property and stole belongings of 
SINZA. After the second incident in 1993 SINZA commercial complex remain closed. 
AMT claimed Republic of Zaire violated BIT and requested compensation in amount of 
$14.3 million without interests and costs and the dispute was brought before the ICSID 
Tribunal. Zaire did not argue against the damaged caused to SINZA, but it did not agree 
to the compensation claims on the ground of Article IX of the BIT: 
 
 
                                                          
319 Consortium RFCC v Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, Award, 22 December 2003 
<http://www.italaw.com/cases/325> accessed 13 December 2015. 
320 UNCTAD, Taking of Property (UNCTAD Series on issues in international investment agreements) 
(UN 2000). 
321 UNCTAD, International Investment Instruments: A Compendium (UN 1996) vol I, 252. 
322 BIT signed between The United States and the Republic of Zaire came into force on 28 July 1989. 
American Manufacturing & Trading Inc (AMT) v Zaire, ICSID Case No ARB/93/1, award of 21 
February 1997, (1997) 36 ILM 1531. <http://www.biicl.org/files/3933_1997_amt_v_zaire.pdf> accessed 
4 January 2016. 
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This Treaty shall not supersede, prejudice or otherwise derogate from: 
 
(a) Laws and regulations, administrative practices or procedures, or adjudicatory 
decisions of either Party; 
(b) International legal obligations; or 
(c) Obligations assumed by either Party, including those contained in an 
investment agreement or an investment authorization, 
Whether extant at the time of entry into force of this Treaty or thereafter, that 
entitled investments, or associated activities, of nationals or companies of the 
other Party to treatment more favourable than that accorded by this Treaty in 
like situations.323 
 
Zaire also claimed that the treaty deviates from the public policy matters and must as such 
be inadmissible. The case has several dimensions. In Article 25(2) of the ICSID 
Convention legal entity is considered to be a “national” of a country in which it is 
registered.324 Zaire claimed that while AMT is US national company SINZA is a Zairian 
company, in spite of the fact that AMT owns 94%, which does not grant AMT the right 
to act on SINZA’s behalf325 as it was a case of an “investment” as stated in Article 1 (c ) 
of BIT:  
 
[E]very kind of investment, owned or controlled directly or indirectly, 
including equity, debt and service and investment, contracts, and includes: 
 
(ii) a company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or 
interests in the assets thereof”.326 AMT claimed Zaire failed to respect 
AMT’s investment under “protection and security”.  
 
The Tribunal stated that: 
 
It is not called into question whether, as Zaire suggests, AMT can act in the 
name of SINZA. AMT acts in its own name and in its capacity as an American 
enterprise having invested in Zaire, that is to say, a national of a State party 
having a dispute with another State party which has welcomed his 
investments on its territory.327 
                                                          
323 BIT USA 0 Republic of Zaire, Article IX of the BIT: Preservation of Rights. 
324 See Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, ‘Jurisdiction rationae personae under the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States’ (1974) 47 The British 
Yearbook of International Law 227–267. 
325 AMT v Zaire, para 5.11 of the Award of the Tribunal, note 1. 
326 BIT US v. Republic of Zaire 1989 Article 1(c).  
327 Award of the Tribunal, Paragraph 5.15, note 1. 
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According to Article 25 of the ICSID Convention in order to qualify it must be 
“investment dispute” arising directly from an investment and one party has to be private 
entity, while the other is a host State. The Tribunal stated that ‘The bilateral Treaty does 
not suffice since it provides that the dispute of the type to be considered by the Tribunal 
must be justiciable before ICSID’.328 
The Republic of Zaire was under the impression according to their national legislation 
they are not required to make any kind of reparations for injuries caused on their territory. 
According to international law however, the host state is obliged to pay compensation to 
aliens when they suffer injuries. State responsibility is to provide protection to foreign 
investors and nationals. Due diligence is used to determine whether a state has ensured 
sufficient protection. Chatterjee maintained that ‘A failure by a host State to afford 
protection to foreign nationals and foreign investors amounts to a breach of the rule of 
State responsibility’.329 In any case under international law ‘exist duty to pay 
compensation to foreign investor for the injury caused to them’.330 Article II is clear on 
the violating the international responsibility. 
Republic of Zaire was in breach of BIT.331 In regards to the international minimum 
standards violation, due to their obligatory nature under the principle of international 
responsibility, regardless if there was a case of received treatment different from that 
given to the nationals as it is applicable only to the aliens. 
 
The Tribunal argued that: 
 
[T]he fact remains that Zaire has manifestly failed to respect the minimum 
standard required of it by international law. It should be added that Zaire has 
equally failed to perform a similar obligation with regard to a third State or 
all other third States. In effect, the agreement advanced by Zaire that it has 
not accorded to nationals and companies of these States any protection or 
reparation, is not pertinent for the Tribunal. Since the repetition of breaches 
and failures to perform similar obligations its owes to third States will not in 
any way exonerate the objective responsibility of the State of Zaire for the 
                                                          
328 Award of the Tribunal, Paragraph 5.17, note 1. 
329 Charles Chatterjee, ‘The arbitration between American manufacturing & trading Inc. and the Republic 
of Zaire’ (1999) 16(1) Kluwer Law International 43. 
330 Charles Chatterjee, ‘The arbitration between American manufacturing & trading Inc. and the Republic 
of Zaire’ (1999) 16(1) Kluwer Law International 44. 
331 BIT US - Republic of Zaire, Article II. 
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breach of its obligation of the treatment of protection and security it owes to 
AMT by virtue of Article II paragraph 4 of the BIT.332 
 
The above only reaffirms that there are no excuses that would justify any host state from 
its responsibility under the international law. However, it is interesting to note that the 
Republic of Zaire did not mention in front of the Tribunal that riots caused the damages 
in which case “force majeure”333 could be considered for the damages and would consider 
freeing Zaire of the liability and consequently fulfilling their treaty obligation under the 
signed contract.  
Another case was that of Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) and the Republic of 
Sri Lanka.334 Sri Lanka was accused of failure to give full protection to the foreign 
investor, failed to do due diligence for the catastrophe caused by the Tamil Tigers and of 
violation of the BIT as well as international responsibility. BITs include the provision on 
full protection and security that should be provided by the host state to the foreign 
investors. The ICSID Tribunal stated that “full protection and security” is not the cause 
for strict liability of the host State based on the Sambiaggio case.335 Sri Lanka did not 
oppose paying the compensation, but did oppose to admit to have failed in due diligence 





4.6    Conclusions 
 
States have substantial control over the foreign investment on their territory due to their 
sovereignty. States also have the right to decide on the treatment to be offered to their 
national investors as well as to their foreign investors. The division between capital-
importing and capital-exporting states are becoming wider and at the same time the 
                                                          
332 Award of the Tribunal, note 1, paragraph 6.10. 
333 “Force majeure” was used in Arbitration between National Oil Corporation (Libya) and the Libyan 
Sun Oil Company (USA) May 1985. 
334 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Reports 254, final award of 
27 June 1990. 
335 UN Report on International Arbitral Awards, Vol. X, 512. 
224 
 
distinction between developed and developing states is becoming more common and is 
gaining momentum. 
After newly born states became independent in the decolonisation process in the late 
1940s, they were competing to attract foreign capital and investments in order to help 
their socio-economic development and ultimately achieve socio-economic independence.  
The World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were the two primary 
international institutions that were also making funding available under certain 
restrictions for developing states in the form of financial aid. Bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) were significantly growing in numbers especially in 1990s. The biggest challenge 
was to find the balance between protecting foreign investments and state sovereignty as 
well as between domestic and international law applicable for settlement of investor-state 
disputes. 
There are a number or rules that can be applied to the international law, Articles 53 and 
30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties as well as Article 103 of the UN 
Charter and the fundamental human rights336 known as jus cogens rules. Human rights are 
normally dealt with via amicus curiae that were accepted by arbitral tribunals.337  
Taking of property by public authorities has put a big stain on international law, namely 
when involving private foreign investments. In case of government interference with the 
assets, which does not directly resolve in compensation payment. However, in order for 
the taking to be legal some kind of compensation has to be offered.  
The main challenge is to separate the breach of contract, which falls under the national 
law and contains legal consequences and expropriation of contract rights, which falls 
under international law.338 As ‘the breach by a State of a contract does not as such entail 
                                                          
336 See Thomas Donaldson, The Ethics of International Business (OUP 1992); Tom Campbell and 
Seumas Miller (eds), Human Rights and Moral Responsibilities of Corporate and Public Sector 
Organisations (Kluwer Law International 2004). 
337 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua 
S.A. v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17 (formerly Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe 
S.A, Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A., and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua, 
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‘Investment Agreements and Human Rights: The Effects of Stabilization Clauses’ Corporate Social 
Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 42 (Harvard University, March 2008). 
338 See Stephen M. Schwebel, ‘On Whether the Breach by a State of a Contract with an Alien is a Breach 
of International Law’ in Stephen M. Schwebel, Justice in International Law (CUP 1994) 425. 
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a breach of international law. Something further is required before international law 
becomes relevant, such as a denial of justice by the courts of the State in proceedings 
brought by the other contracting party’.339 Some major issues of the role of law have been 
highlighted through the cases of settlement of international investment disputes between 
states, which is the objective of international law. 
One of the challenges for the evolving international investment laws is finding the right 
balance between states’ sovereignty and protection of foreign investments. The balance 
is also needed between national domestic law of host developing states and international 
law. Several different cases of arbitration and awards have shown that there are many 
provisions open to interpretation.  
International treatment standards and namely expropriation are still major issues of public 
international law. With the increase of foreign investment, the foreign investors wanted 
higher protection for their investments in the host developing states.  
Aspirations of developing states were expressed in the Permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources 1962 and New International Economic Order 1974 in which they 
expressed their aspiration to maintain full control over foreign investments in their 
territory. Many different attempts were made to form multilateral treaty framework, 
without desired success. However, the objective of the international investment law was 
to find the balance between host developing states and foreign investors. BITs were 
formed with the purpose to protect and promote foreign investments. Number of signed 
BITs proliferated and also revealed the shortcomings of the investor-state dispute 
settlement mechanism. As indicated in a number of cases further vulnerability was 
revealed.    
The benefits of private foreign investment for the host developing states, namely their 
contribution to the capacity building and socio-economic development remain to be seen. 
However, BITs did encourage further development of international investment law. With 
the number of signed BITs, a number of investor-state disputes also increased. The 
dispute between the use of domestic and international law in such investor-state disputes 
                                                          
339 Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility os States for internationally wrongful acts, 
adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third, session (2001), Official Records of the 
General Assembly, Fifty-Sixth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10) ch IV.E.2, 78. 
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has not yet been resolved. Finding the balance between state sovereignty and aspirations 
of private foreign investors will have to be achieved in the near future as the aspirational 
gaps will have to be closed. However, there is also the disagreement between developed 
and developing states regarding international minimum standards of treatment that will 
require further attention.  
Foreign investors are concerned with their investments in host developing states, based 
on the fact that state sovereignty allows them to expropriate, which is not illegal as long 
as compensation is offered. Sovereigns have the inherent right to nationalise and the law 
cannot take or stop this right. As long as compensation is paid, this right cannot be taken 
from a sovereign state. States are taking necessary actions to protect their citizens. At the 
same time, they are trying to attract foreign investments and control them by means of 
regulations and legislation. These issues are namely discussed during the negotiation 
process, when the terms and conditions of the investment treaties are made.  
While domestic law is important the Tribunal tends to lean on the customary international 
law, when making decisions on investor-state dispute settlement. BITs are the most 
common form of foreign investment relationships between developed and developing 
states with the objective to promote and protect foreign investments. However 
shortcoming of BITs is that it cannot protect foreign investments from the political risks. 
Foreign investment in principle should contribute to the socio-economic development of 
host developing states, but many authors’ questions this correlation. 
The importance of bargaining position comes to light again as the states have the 
opportunity to negotiate their contractual obligations as well as the contractual obligations 
of foreign investors. In order to protect foreign investors “stabilisation clause” can be 
included.340 In order to protect the host state re-negotiation clause should be included as 
well as the requirements for capacity building, local management participation and profit 
distribution.  
The main question remains open, and that is who should take the lead in investor-state 
dispute settlement, be it domestic or international courts. Foreign investment remains 
                                                          
340 See Aminoil arbitration. 
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controversial from the question of its contribution to the socio-economic development to 
the law that should be managing such cases in the first instance. 
In cases of contract breach absolute or strict liability can apply. The difference is that 
absolute liability occurs even when there is no fault but intent to harm, while strict liability 
sits between negligence and absolute liability and does not depend on the intent to harm.  
The best way of giving protection is through state responsibility and international 
minimum standards that should also include codes of conduct for TNCs. At present 
investment treaties are giving more attention to the MFN treatment, which is not 
compulsory as it is not a part of customary international law. Protection for foreign 
investment activities in different treaties is used in different ways. NAFTA 1998 for 
example offers protection for the ‘establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments’,341 while Energy Charter 
Treaty 1994 covers all investment-related activities ‘including management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment, or disposal’.342 Therefore agreeing on clear definitions of 
investment treaty provisions would be a good start moving forward, towards establishing 
universally acceptable system of protecting the interests of TNCs and host developing 
states in a balanced way. 
                                                          
341 NAFTA, Article 1103. 
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Chapter 5: Role of Law: Jurisdiction and governing law 
issues 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
Investor-state dispute settlement has always provoked controversy, especially in deciding 
which law should be the governing law. By virtue of choosing and supported by the 
Article 42 of the ICSID Convention, the foreign investors’ preference of governing law 
was international law and not the legal system and judiciary of the host developing states. 
Developing states ‘agreed to offer additional protection to foreign investors by agreeing 
to international arbitration in legal disputes with investors’.1 The ICSID convention does 
not require the exhaustion of local remedies, unless BIT includes the provision that 
requires foreign investors to exhaust local remedies prior to resorting to international 
arbitration.2 Developing state that signed BITs can refuse to participate in arbitration, 
however as two-party consent is not required under BIT arbitrators are appointed ‘on 
behalf of the host state to enable the arbitration to proceed even without the co-operation 
of the host state’.3 As mentioned earlier, while it is possible to delocalise the dispute, 
contract on the other hand cannot be delocalised. Therefore, jurisdiction needs to be local 
and foreign investors should accept the law of the host developing state in which they are 
investing and operating.   
Place of performance should give the jurisdiction the governing law. However, just 
because this should be the case, it does not mean that it is, which is the case in current 
foreign investors and host developing states’ relationship. TNCs should equally be govern 
by the domestic law of the host state in which they are operating. The reason this is not 
the case is due to the lack of confidence in the national law that is legal system and 
judiciary of the host developing state by foreign investors. 
                                                          
1 Surya P. Subedi, International Investment Law (3rd edn, Hart Publishing 2016) 105. 
2 Such example can be seen in Spain – Argentina BIT, which requires (1) the foreign investor to exhaust 
all local remedies and (2) an 18-month period to expire without issuance of a court decision on the merits. 
However in Maffezini case these requirements were not respected. 
3 Surya P. Subedi, International Investment Law (3rd edn, Hart Publishing 2016) 121. 
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Therefore, the recommendation is delocalisation of disputes, as there is no need to 
centralise the dispute. Host developing states should provide for neutral procedural law 
and neutral governing law. Hence the governing law and contract law should be neutral. 
Local procedures law has not been applied in the arbitral investor-state disputes 
settlement. Hence local courts should have appointed judges that understand international 




5.2  Artificiality in choosing the governing law of investment treaties 
 
When the European businessmen were trading with foreign states, namely Africa, Asia 
and Latin America ‘it was held that the local law did not apply to them since they were 
already subject to the law of their home country’.5 The foreign businessmen were subject 
of their own state national laws6 mainly because ‘the local law was inferior, it could not 
apply to the foreigners, who were subject to the superior body of law of their home 
country’.7 This notion changed with newly born independent states, under the law of 
protection of aliens and alien property8 based on the principle of sovereignty and doctrine 
of state responsibility, which gave sovereign states the right to expropriate, and 
nationalise against due compensation payment. Developing states ‘wished to have an 
international instrument regulating foreign investment’ however ‘now these very same 
states appear reluctant to implement such an instrument because of the fear that they may 
come under pressure to agree to a higher level of protection for foreign investors’.9 The 
issue of discrimination based on the ownership nationality was already addressed in 
                                                          
4 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (CUP 2008). 
5 Surya P. Subedi, International Investment Law (3rd edn, Hart Publishing 2016) 22. 
6 See C.H. Alexandrowicz, ‘The Afro-Asian Nations and the Law of Nations’ (1968) 123 Hague Recueil 
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7 Surya P. Subedi, International Investment Law (3rd edn, Hart Publishing 2016) 22. 
8 Several scolars were in favour of the doctrine of state responsibility, such as Edwin M. Borchard, ‘The 
Minimum Standard in the Protection of Aliens’ (1939) 33 ASIL Proceedings 51; Arghyrios A. Fatouros, 
‘Transnational Enterprises and in the Law of State Responsibility’ in Richard B. Lillich (ed), 
International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (University Press of Virginia 1983) 361.  
9 Surya P. Subedi, International Investment Law (3rd edn, Hart Publishing 2016) 77. 
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national treatment, which accorded foreign investors the treatment accorded to domestic 
investors in like circumstances.10 However, it did allow for the international minimum 
standards to be applied in cases where local law was underdeveloped or failed to meet the 
required international minimum standards.11  
Root maintained that: 
 
If any country’s system of law does not conform to that standard, although 
the people of the country may be content or compelled to live under it, no 
other country can be compelled to accept it as furnishing a satisfactory 
measure of treatment to its citizens.12 
 
Schwarzenberger argued that: 
 
[T]he national standard cannot be used as a means of evading international 
obligations under the minimum standard of international law. Even if the 
standard of national treatment is laid down in a treaty, the presumption is that 
it has been the intention of the parties to secure to their nationals in this 
manner additional advantages, but not to deprive them of such rights as, in 
any case, they would be entitled to enjoy under international customary law 
or the general principle of law recognised by civilised nations.13 
 
As recognised in the Article 9 of the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933, 
which was one of the first international instruments to support the principle of national 
treatment. The idea was based on the state responsibility to protect aliens against injuries 
and to offer protection for aliens in a host state that would be equal as the protection 
offered to their own nationals. Whether the national standard or external standard of 
treatment they both share the idea to facilitate free movement of trade and investment 
across national borders.14   
                                                          
10 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (CUP 2005). 
11 See Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations (Liberty Fund 2008). 
12 Elihu Root, ‘The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad’ (1910) 4 American Journal of 
International Law 16, 21-22. 
13 Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (Stevens 
1957) 248; see also Georg Schwarzenberger, ‘The Standards of Civilization in International Law’ (1955) 
VII Current Legal Problems 220. 
14 See Hugo Grotius, The Free Sea (Richard Hakluyt tr, Evergreen Review Inc. 2009). 
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Based on the principle of sovereign immunity15 states were exempt from lawsuits brought 
by private foreign entities until the states started entering in BITs, which ‘enable foreign 
investors to sue host governments but not vice versa’.16 Breach of BITs gave foreign 
investors the right to sue the host governments for the first time.17 While states should 
have the right to regulate their investment regime and not be subjected to the interests of 
foreign investors when the regulation is exercised in good faith and on behalf of the public 
welfare.18 It seems that the justification for changing the current law relating to private 
foreign investments is much needed and the future of existing BITs, IIAs, FTAs as well 
as the ICSID is questionable at best. The former practice has already changed in some 
states, such as Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, the UK (Protection of 
Trading Interest Act 1980) and the US (Federal Sovereign Immunities Act 1976). New 
system for resolving investor-state arbitration is required together with reformed 
Investment Court System that would be public and will not favour foreign investors over 
host developing states, but will represent the interests of both parties in a balanced way. 
The questions regarding the law that should be applicable in such cases still remains to 
be answered and clarified.19 The negotiated agreement should be that the law of the host 
state should apply. 
The Annulment Committee decision 39 stated that: 
 
Some of these views have in common the fact that they are aimed at restricting 
the role of international law and highlighting that of the law of the host State. 
Conversely, the view that calls for a broad application of international law 
                                                          
15 Hazel Fox and Philippa Webb, The Law of State Immunity (3rd edn, OUP 2013). When the dispute 
between governments is of commericial nature state immunity does not apply. Following the decision of 
Trendtex Trading corporations v Central Bank of Nigeria case 1977, the Protection of Trading Interest 
Act 1980 was adopted and therefore government department and agencies cannot claim state immunity if 
the dispute is commercial in nature. 
16 Surya P. Subedi, International Investment Law (3rd edn, Hart Publishing 2016) 235.   
17 Carlo de Stefano, ‘Arbitration Agreements as Waivers to Sovereign Immunity’ (2014) 30 Arbitration 
International 59. 
18 See further Thomas Kendra, ‘State Counterclaims in Investment Arbitration – A New Lease of Life?’ 
(2013) 29 Arbitration Internation 575; Public Statement on the International Investment Regime – 31 
August 2010 < http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement-international-investment-regime-31-
august-2010/> accessed 20 August 2016.  
19 Wena Hotels Ltd v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/98/4, Decision on Annulment, 28 
February, 2002, 41 I.L.M. 933 <http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0903.pdf> 
accessed 15 March 2016.  
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aims at restricting the role of the law of the host State. There seems not to be 
a single answer as to which of these approaches is the correct one.20  
 
Applicability of the appropriate law will therefore depend on the circumstances, which 
will justify the taken decisions followed by courses of actions. In ICSID Article 42(1) 
second sentence uses the word ‘may’, which suggests that there is no definitive line to 
divide the scope of international and domestic law and consequently the grants the 
tribunal the power of interpretation.21 
The important thing to note is that:   
 
The law of the host State can indeed be applied in conjunction with 
international law if this is justified. So too international law can be applied by 
itself if the appropriate rule is found in this other ambit.22 
 
In the first instance domestic law should be considered. However, it seems that powerful 
states ‘attempt to impose standards of investment protection preferred’ by them.23 Schultz 
and Dupont argued that ‘investment arbitration appears to have been used as a 
replacement for dysfunctional domestic courts in countries with a weak rule of law 
tradition until the mid-to-late 1990s’24 and added that ’the overall picture of investment 
arbitration seems to have changed…when the system shifted from…a neo-colonial 
instrument to an instrument that...promote the international rule of law’.25 
 
ICJ stated in the Belgium v Spain case that: 
 
                                                          
20 Wena Hotels Ltd v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/98/4, Decision on Annulment, 28 
February, 2002, 41 I.L.M. 933 para 39 <http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0903.pdf> accessed 15 March 2016. 
21 Article 42(1) ICSID, second sentence. 
22 Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ad hoc committee decision of Feb. 5, 2002, 6 ICSID Rep. 
129, 138 (2004). 
23 Muthucumaraswamy Sarnarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (3rd edn, CUP 2004) 
19.  
24 Thomas Schultz and Cédric Dupont, ‘Investment Arbitration: Promoting the Rule of Law or Over-
Empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study (2014) 25 European Journal of International Law 
1147, 1149. 
25 Thomas Schultz and Cédric Dupont, ‘Investment Arbitration: Promoting the Rule of Law or Over-




When a State admits into its territory foreign investment of foreign nationals, 
whether natural or juristic person, it is bound to extend to them the protection 
of the law and assumes obligations concerning the treatment to be afforded to 
them.26 
 
Therefore, negotiations of the investment treaties with agreed terms and conditions are 
important as they can determine the protection foreign investment and responsibility of 
foreign investor as well as decide on the governing law. Bargaining position plays an 
important role and was therefore given the needed attention in the first chapter. The terms 
and conditions should be negotiated in a way to benefit both parties involved in the 
foreign investments. Since the existing international investment law was predominantly 
made by the foreign investors it is time that the host developing state contribute their part 
and re-negotiate the existing practice of foreign investments by re-negotiating the existing 
investment agreements and making newer investment agreements based on reciprocity 
accordingly. 
A balance must be struck between the investors’ aspirations and those of host developing 
states in the light of international investment law that should be based on the agreed 
investment treaties between the two parties and backed by the rule of law be it domestic 
or international. Domestic in terms of governing law by supporting the international 




5.3 The lack of enforcement procedures 
 
States started losing hope in the ICSID as they realise the trade-offs they have made by 
entering in BITs. The ICSID has also resulted in various interpretations of BITs 
provisions. Notion of collective property was replaced with the notion of private 
individual property.27 
                                                          
26 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Case (Belgium v Spain), ICJ Reports 1970, 3 para 33. 




During the colonial period there was no such issues regarding the applicable law that 
should be the governing law and its enforcement as the law of imperial powers suffice 
for protection of the private foreign investments in the colonies at the time. Protection 
was secured by means of imperial parliament and their imperial courts under the colonial 
rule. System of extraterritoriality was imposed by power as the ultimate arbiter for 
investment disputes. There have been some cases of coercive dispute resolution to help 
foreign investors even by means of force.28 
The situation has since evolved drastically. While the gap between capital-exporting and 
capital-importing states became wider and the dynamics has changed. The biggest critics 
of the Calvo doctrine, mainly the developed states are now embracing the ideas supported 
in the Calvo doctrine. BRICS countries are gaining momentum and many developing 
states are homes to successful TNCs that are starting to invest in developed states. Their 
views on international minimum treatment standards, investor-state dispute resolution 
regarding foreign investments and rights, still vary. The role of law however is becoming 
more and more instrumental in these cases, notwithstanding that it still significantly lacks 
clarity on the question which is the governing law. 
PCIJ in Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case for example stated that: 
 
It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to 
protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law 
committed by another State, from when they have been unable to obtain 
satisfaction through the ordinary channels. By taking up the case of one of its 
subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial 
proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights – the 
right to ensure, in the person of its subject, respect for the rules of 
international law.29 
 
Above is an example of the right of a state to resort to diplomatic protection, which has 
been extended to BITs that enabled foreign investors to sue the host state. The ruling has 
been adopted by the ICJ as seen in Belgium v Spain case. Under BITs the investors got 
the right to sue the host states’ governments before international tribunal. It can also be 
                                                          
28 Such cases are the intervention of overthrowing the government of Mossadegh in Iran and Allende in 
Chile; Iraq intervention. 
29 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case (Greece v UK), PCIJ Rep (1924) Series A, No 2. 
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considered to be a form of extended diplomatic protection as stated in The Republic of 
Ecuador v Occidental Exploration & Production Co. that: 
 
States owe duties to other States to protect their citizens. This is known as the 
“doctrine of diplomatic protection”. Effectively, BITs are treaties that 
acknowledge this principle of public international law, apply it to particular 
circumstances between two States and develop the protection of investors by 
giving them “standing” to pursue a State directly in “investment disputes” 
between an investor and a State Party in ways that are set out in BIT.30 
  
Notion of diplomatic protection is a part of treatment of aliens. In recent years, investment 
agreements, mainly BITs are offering the protection of foreign investment. Foreign 
investors have the option to bring investor-state disputes before international tribunals. 
For example, investor – state disputes can be resolved before ICJ or ICSID or before other 
international tribunals or courts. However, states can exercise their sovereign rights, 
which means that the only obligatory standard is the minimum standard of treatment 
under international investment law, which can be potentially extended to BITs in addition 
to state responsibility. 
Law is fundamental for development of a state as well as for the development of civil 
society, which functions through three central organs, the law-making (legislative), law 
determination (courts and tribunals), and law enforcement (administration, police, army). 
‘The United Nations General Assembly is not a world legislature, the International Court 
of Justice in The Hague can operate only on the basis of the consent of states to its 
jurisdiction, and the law enforcement capacity of the United Nations Security Council is 
both legally and politically limited’.31 Under the UN Charter the General Assembly 
‘powers are limited to making recommendations’.32  
While the investment agreements clearly define the responsibility of the state to protect 
foreign investors, there is no such written responsibility for the foreign investors to protect 
the host developing states or its citizens from wrongful or harmful activities. Concerns 
have been expressed for the current investor-state dispute mechanism facilitated by the 
                                                          
30 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Republic of Ecuador, High Court of Justice, QBD 
(Commercial Court), Case No 04/656, 2 March 2006, para 8. 
31 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th edn, Routledge 1997) 3. 
32 Surya P Subedi, Internationl Investment Law (3rd edn, Hart Publishing 2016) 42. 
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ICSID and therefore a recommendation was made to look for an alternative option. An 
alternative that would facilitate complaints of individuals, public society and 
governments against foreign investors’ wrongful acts. Unlike current investor-state 
dispute mechanism only enables the foreign investors to sue host developing states. In 
the events the government would file a claim against foreign investor ‘they do not have 
to pay compensation to the host government or to the victims of violation of 
environmental or human rights standards’.33 The challenge is that in spite of state 
sovereignty ‘the complex nature of the operation of MNEs, their institutional structure, 
and the immense power and influence’ national institutions are struggling ‘to hold 
multinationals to account for the violations or non-compliance with their obligations’34 
be it under international or national law. Democratic society should be able to facilitate 
individuals to be able to sue foreign investors for wrongful acts without them enjoying 
any favourable treatments or privileges that do not apply to their own nationals. 
Furthermore, there should be an international institution created that would have the 
authority and independence in facilitating such investor-state arbitration. In any case the 




5.4  Conclusions 
 
The notion of regulating private foreign investment and activities of TNCs has been on 
the international agenda for a long time. There were also a number of treaties concluded 
to that end, however this far no universal agreement has yet been reached.  
While BITs are perceived to protect economic rights, predominantly those of foreign 
investors the BITs are overdue in revisiting and re-negotiating the terms and conditions 
of such relationship, that should be equally beneficial to both parties. This is the reason 
that it should not have been down to the power but to the law to be the supreme authority. 
                                                          
33 Surya P Subedi, Internationl Investment Law (3rd edn, Hart Publishing 2016) 270.  




For the law to be able to function properly it requires the three fundamental organs that 
have to be present within the state and can only be achieved by means of capacity building 
through well informed electorate with high public awareness. 
Law is fundamental for development of the stable democratic states. States have clear 
responsibilities, among which is also the protection of private foreign investors. Private 
foreign investors invest in host developing states and during the course of their investment 
host states are responsible to provide protection. Since the emergence of BITs, the states 
have opened themselves for investor-state lawsuits by means of signing such bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs). Current investor-state dispute mechanism is under review and 
recommendations were made for an alternative dispute settlement mechanism to be 
formed. In democratic societies, no wrongful act should be left without proper review to 
assign compensation for caused damages. Such a mechanism should work both ways on 
the principle of reciprocity. Institutions, be it national or international should be able to 
hold TNCs accountable for any harmful activities, violation of obligations or non-
compliance with national laws and regulations. Stable democratic societies should be able 
to sue private foreign investors for wrongful acts through independent institutions 
executing arbitration. In any case the decisions rendered by courts or tribunals have to be 
made in a way that they protect the integrity of the rule of law at all times, without 
allowing that their decisions are open for interpretation.   
Debates over the definition of the rule of law have been ongoing. The lack of its definition 
does however not limit its use. As such, the rule of law remains an idea awaiting 
clarification. The role of law is to assist in finding an acceptable definition of the rule of 
law, which can only exist in democratic societies. There is a disagreement regarding the 
rule of law and its conflicting role with state sovereignty and the parliament. The question 
that state sovereignty might be limited due to the obligations to foreign investors’ 
committed by signing the investment agreements is yet to be reviewed. State limitation 
to the sovereign immunity ‘was voluntarily accepted by states when the concluded BITs 
or IIAs with an ISDS mechanism’.35 Democracy and the rule of law go hand in hand in 
building stable democratic societies. A state cannot exist without its government and at 
                                                          
35 Surya P Subedi, International Investment Law (Hart Publishing 2016) 9.  
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the same time a change of government does not affect obligations of a state made before 
the change of government took place.  
Newly born independent states were developing their judiciaries and therefore foreign 
investors were not keen to subject their investments under national courts. However, a 
new initiatives has called for expanding the Calvo doctrine, which would mean that the 
investor-state disputes have to first be submitted to the national courts before they can be 
taken in front of the international courts or international arbitration. Verwey and Schrijev 
maintained that Calvo doctrine implies the principle of territorial sovereignty of the 
state.36 
New development in international investment law allowed foreign private entities to bring 
suits against host states that entered in BITs with them. Breach of BITs gave foreign 
investors the right to sue the governments or host developing states. For a long time, 
international arbitration arising from private foreign investments was considered to be of 
commercial nature and it was not until BITs came about that the investor-state disputes 
thrived. BITs were originally meant to help developing states in their development by 
attracting private foreign investments. Cases brought before ICSID are mainly due to 
expropriation and breach of due compensation payments. However, the decision held by 
the tribunals have been heavily criticised for their creative interpretation of the rules of 
international investment law, international minimum standards and provisions of BITs. 
Foreign investors enjoy the right to bring dispute resolutions before ICSID, while host 
developing states cannot, creates tensions in investor-state dispute resolution mechanism. 
Developing states have started raising louder concerns over this issue as well as favouring 
the protection of foreign investors over host developing states. Developed states seem to 
be imposing standards on the developing states that were preferred by themselves.  
Recent sequence of events, starting with developing states reviewing and rejecting signed 
bilateral investment treaties and withdrawing from ICSID, showed that reforms of BITs, 
IIAs, FTAs as well as ICSID are much needed. ICSID also does not provide an option for 
appeal against their decisions. Developing states have lost its trust in ICSID and investor-
state dispute resolution mechanism, especially considering the trade-offs made by 
                                                          
36 WD Verwey and NJ Schrijev, ‘The Taking of Foreign Property under International Law: A New Legal 
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developing states when signing BITs, which ICSID interpreted in its own way. The main 
role of law is to offer protection, which should be given equally to both parties and not 
favouring one party over the other. Law is playing a crucial role and it is also fundamental 
in development of a democratic state that would cater for a balanced investor-state dispute 
resolution mechanism.  
This is also an existing constitutional principle of the rule of law. However, there is no 
definite definition of the rule of law. It is however recognised as a principle. Bingham 
maintained that ‘All individuals and organisation within a state whether public or private 
are bound by and entitled to the benefit to laws prospectively permutated and publicly 
administrated in the courts’. More precisely Bingham suggested that the rule of law can 
be explored based on eight principles.37 While governments are producing administrative 
legal documents it is making it even more difficult to crystallise the definition of the rule 
of law instead of making it clearer and more applicable in practice. The basic assumption 
is that there should be an existing “rule of law” to oppose to the rule of power. While the 
expression “the rule of law” was coined by Dicey38 the idea originates from Aristotle by 
maintaining that ‘It is better for the law to rule than one of the citizens’, because this way 
‘even the guardians of the law are obeying the laws’.39 Dicey presented three explanations 
for the rule of law. Firstly, ‘no man is punishable or can lawfully be made to suffer in 
body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner 
before the ordinary courts of the land’. Secondly, the rule of law ‘as a characteristic of 
our country, not only that with us no man is above the law, but (which is a different thing) 
that here, every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of 
the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals’. Thirdly, ‘the 
constitution is pervaded by the rule of law on the ground that the general principle of the 
constitution (as for example the right to personal liberty, or the right of public meeting) 
are with us the result of judicial decisions’ which are ‘determining the rights of private 
persons in particular cases brought before the courts’ that fell ‘under many foreign 
constitutions the security (such as it is) given to the rights of individuals results, or appears 
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to result, from the general principles of the constitution.40 Regardless of the lack of its 
definition, the rule of law has been consistently referred to in judgments and in court 
rulings. Even the European Convention of Human Rights 1950 provides inter alia that 
the governments of European states ‘have a common heritage of political traditions, 
ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to take the first steps for the collective enforcement 
of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration.41 The Consolidated Version of 
the Treaty on European Union stated that ‘The Union is founded on the principles of 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of 
law, principles which are common to the Member States’.42 The rule of law is also present 
in the British Constitutional Reform Act 2005.43 The Constitutions of the Unites States 
represent an important point in the evolution of the rule of law, whereas the first ten 
amendments are known as the American Bill of Rights.44  
In the UK, parliamentary sovereignty is what distinguishes it from the other states in 
which ‘the constitution, interpreted by the courts, has been the supreme law of the land, 
with the result that legislation inconsistent with the constitution, even if duly enacted, 
may be held to be unconstitutional and so invalid’.45 Bingham concluded that parliament 
sovereignty and the rule of law are “potential antagonists”46 because ‘there was and could 
be no fundamental or constitutional law which Parliament could not change by the 
ordinary process of legislation’47 but that does not make the Parliament omnipotent.  
Council of the International Bar Association stated in resolution inter alia that ‘The Rule 
of Law is the foundation of a civilised society.48 The Rule of Law remains to be an idea 
without precise definition. However, it does make a difference in terms of the 
government, which takes the rule of law in consideration and attempts to abide by it at all 
times. The notion of the rule of law makes a distinction between the bad and the good 
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Macmillan 1945) 195. 
41 European Convention of Human Rights 1950, 5, 
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47 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin books 2011) 162. 
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governments especially in the developing states, which are not yet fully developed liberal 
democracies and therefore the rule of law is not based on the law but on the merit of the 
leading authority in power. The role of law should therefore be to become the supreme 
authority in regulating the conduct of human beings and corporate entities. Developing 
states should therefore strive towards developing stable democratic societies and their 
own stable judiciaries that will give them the ability to enforce the law on the citizens as 
well as on the corporate entities, which will extend to TNCs. The role of law is therefore 
primarily inter alia to offer protection for its citizens and their property, and for corporate 
entities and their assets, especially in the light of recent trends of state practices and 
jurisprudence. Schultz and Dupont maintained that ‘the functional effects of investment 
arbitration is that it serves to make up for deficient rule of law in the host developing 
states’ and ‘to replace “dysfunctional” courts in “unreliable” countries’.49 Schultz and 
Dupont added that investor-state arbitration is losing momentum because it is ‘accused 
of harming developing states facing economic hardship for the benefit of a wealthy few’.50 
Investment arbitration was used as ‘a means to impose the rule of law in non-democratic 
states with a weak law and order tradition’.51 Therefore Jacobs maintained that the rule of 
law ‘cannot coexist with traditional conceptions of sovereignty’52 while Bogdanor added 
that ‘there is a conflict between these two constitutional principles, the sovereignty of 
Parliament and the rule of law’.53 States in general are not affected by the legitimacy of 
the rule of law.54 However, the question arises about the period needed in order to either 
accept or change the rule.55 States are sovereign and as such Lotus maintained that ‘The 
rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will…’.56 Henkin 
added that ‘state is not subject to any external authority unless it has voluntarily consented 
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to such authority’.57 State responsibility in this case is to give consent to abide by the 
international law, which is the condition for customary international law. Subedi 
maintained that ‘Most developed countries are stable democracies where the right to 
property is protected by law, the judiciary is by and large independent, and there is little 
non-commercial or political risk involved in investments made’.58 However, to review the 
role of law in democratic societies, law has to be seen as a tool not as a driving force to 
which the civil society has to abide. In a stable democratic society people should be able 
to voice their concerns to the government and not be penalised for taking such actions. 
At the same time people have to be properly trained by means of educational institutions 
available to them in which they can receive proper training and acquire the needed skill 
set. In democracy ‘law must be employed to foster and safeguard that equality of 
opportunity, which is the essence of the democratic way of life’.59 
The United Nations addressed the rule of law in relation to the democracy and stated that 
‘a fundamental distinction has to be drawn between “rule by law”, whereby law is an 
instrument of government and government is considered above the law’ and the rule of 
law ‘which implies that everyone in society is bound by the law, including the 
government. Essentially, constitutional limits on power, a key features of democracy, 
requires adherence to the rule of law.60 In this distinction it is worth noting that democracy 
and the rule of law go hand in hand when building stable democratic societies. State 
cannot exist without a government, notwithstanding that a state is not its government, 
which is why international rights and obligations of a state are not affected by the change 
of its government. In other words, a state is responsible to pay due compensation for the 
government wrongdoing. TNCs should be equally responsible and bound by the law to 
pay such compensations for similar wrongful activities in the host developing states. The 
principle of accountability should be applicable to both by means of the rule of law.61 
Since ‘Democracy is a universal value based on the freely expressed will of people to 
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determine their political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation 
in all aspects of their lives’.62 Stable democratic societies require high public awareness 
as well as peoples’ participation in the governance of a state, where ‘the will of the people 
shall be the basis of the authority of government’.63 Public society has to be properly 
informed as they represent the electorate that has the power to elect members of the 
parliament whom they entrust decision-making on their behalf for the benefit of the state 
and wellbeing of its citizens. Equally the public has the power to remove the members of 
the parliament. Public society can achieve such action in addition to the democratic voting 
mechanism of general elections or referendum and also by means such as protests, 
demonstrations and by signing petitions. These actions of civil society can also be 
targeted at certain decision-making process or decisions made by the government that the 
civil society opposes. In some cases, it can also be because of the poor working 
conditions, low wages, insufficient benefits or other dissatisfaction of the public society, 
all of which then trigger government to take appropriate actions. In some democratic 
states workers have strong unions that are representing their interest and fighting for 
worker’s rights and wellbeing. In most stable democratic states, the board level employee 
participation is highly practiced, which allows the workers to be involved in the decision-
making process and give recommendations for improving working conditions, which 
consequently increase workers’ productivity and bring visible benefits for both the 
workers and the company. However, since not all the developed states have the board 
level employee participation yet fully developed and because government can make 
decisions that are not in the best interests of its citizens, hence disagreements and 
dissatisfactions occur, which can result in protests and demonstrations. The bottom line 
is that this kind of protests and demonstrations can only emerge in stable democratic 
societies. Therefore, the people of a state have to be able to access the fundamental state 
institutions that provide citizens with education and healthcare, and most importantly 
legal institutions and mechanisms, where public society can seek justice for wrongful acts 
or mistreatment. The main role in this process is without a doubt in educational system 
that has the role to educate and train the public society, which can then take the roles and 
responsibilities in providing and improving state services for its citizens. There is no 
doubt that democracy was one of the more successful political ideas, unfortunately it has 
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not reached and evolved in all the states equally to facilitate a viable stable democratic 
regimes and as it seems, it is going through turmoil even in some of the more established 
democratic states. It is felt that if the rule of law is observed the aspirational differences 
could be narrowed. However, the rule of law is an important and a complex topic that 










A large number of TNCs and their activities, namely through private foreign investment 
in host developing states have caused heated debates on the impact that private foreign 
investment has in terms of contributing to the socio-economic development by means of 
capital, technology transfer, market access, increasing competitive advantage, capacity 
building, employment generation and effects on the environment. Some of the major 
issues were caused over the question of foreign ownership and control. With the 
increasing importance of TNCs during the period of their expansion they have been 
identified by some as agents of development due to the significant role that they played 
in the world political economy, however not consensually. 
The perception of foreign investment has changed significantly over the years. Starting 
with acknowledgment of foreign investment as a key to socio-economic development and 
the suggestion to remove the obstacles that were standing in its way. This was a complete 
opposite to what Havana Charter 1948 had proposed in its investment provisions. The 
UNCTAD addressed Governments of capital exporting states to take ‘all appropriate 
steps to provide favourable conditions for foreign investment’ and against ‘preventing or 
limiting the flow of capital from such countries to developing countries’ and ‘to 
encourage the flow of private investments to developing countries’.1 
TNCs have been seen as enormous economic powers and as such were considered to be 
endangering sovereignty of host developing states, including their environment and 
engaging in massive exploration of host developing states’ natural resources for the 
profit-maximisation purposes.  
The UNCTAD Assembly resolution 3202 (S-VI) section V stated that: 
 
all efforts should be made to formulate, adopt and implement an international 
code of conduct for transnational corporations: 
(a) To prevent interference in the internal affairs of the countries where they 
operate and their collaboration with racists regimes and colonial 
administrations; 
(b) To regulate their activities in host countries, to eliminate restrictive business 
practices and to conform to the national development plans, and in this 
                                                          
1 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1948. 
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context facilitate, as necessary, the review and revision of previously 
concluded agreements; 
(c) To bring about assistance, transfer of technology and management skills to 
developing countries on equitable and favorable terms; 
(d) To regulate the repatriation of the profits accruing from their operations, 
taking into account the legitimate interests of all parties concurred; 
(e) To promote reinvestment of their profits in developing countries.2 
 
The Codes of conduct for TNCs unfortunately were not implemented due to a number of 
factors, such as general restructure of the UNCTC, which came under the UNCTAD and 
reduced interest in general because there were simply too much disagreements resulting 
from the differences of the parties at the negotiating table that could not have been 
overcome. The focus was shifted to bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and the role of 
foreign investment on the socio-economic development in the lack of public finances and 
aids available for the developing states and their socio-economic development. TNCs 
with their investment became the only source of capital injecting assistance. In spite of 
the new climate the TNCs still could not wash the stain of their bad reputation. 
Nevertheless, developing states are now launching campaigns to promote foreign 
investments as was proposed by the UNCTAD to stimulate sustainable development. The 
challenge was how to measure the impacts of foreign investment without the activities of 
TNCs on the host developing states.  
The World Investment Report (WIR) 19923 focused on Transnational Corporations as 
Engines of Growth in which it analysed the relationship between foreign investment and 
development. The World Investment Report 1999 reviewed the FDI and the challenges 
of development.4 
Importance of the UN role cannot be denied as it formed the first platform for the 
development concept in the modern form and allowed developing states to take part in 
decision making process. Its contribution, namely in terms of development aid was 
instrumental in times after the Second World War, when development became 
international public concern, especially for the newly born independent states, that used 
to be colonies.  
                                                          
2 The UNCTAD Assembly resolution 3202 (S-VI) section V. 
3 World Investment Report 1992. 
4 World Investment Report 1999. 
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Over the decades the scholars and researchers have been striving to understand the 
dynamics of foreign investment and its effects on socio-economic development. It 
became obvious that balanced approach is needed since strict policies on one side nor 
“laissez-faire” on the other were not efficient. 
The final conclusion is that TNCs ‘can do well, by doing good’5 and therefore the UN 
will have to continue to lead the discussions and negotiations towards achieving 
international corporate governance and take notes from previously failed attempts for 
balancing the interests between the parties.  
As Sagafi-Nejad recommended that:  
 
[T]he United Nations should rededicate itself to creating a special focal point 
on TNCs within the United Nations (like the UNCTC in New York) to 
interface with TNCs about their relations with home and host countries on 
matters of good corporate citizenship and their impact on the developmental 
process.6 
 
The UN made significant efforts in trying to understand the impact of TNCs and its role 
in the world economy by exploring concepts, information on their size, locations, 
distribution channels, ownership structure, and organisation. Notwithstanding the 
recognition of accountability of TNCs to the wider international community and 
suggested courses of actions, the report inter alia also noted that: 
 
While the conditions in the real world hardly permit an ideal system of 
international exchange and cooperation, a practical economic solution is 
required in which the political entities…can co-operate to reconcile the 
conflicting interests, harmonize their policies for their mutual benefit, and 
achieve a greater measure of international distributive justice.7  
 
The controversy of TNCs activities was on the national sovereignty in the host developing 
states where they had their operations. There were many different and contradicting views 
                                                          
5 Howard V. Permutter in Tagi Sagafi-Nejad and John Dunning, The UN and Transnational 
Corporations, From Code of Conduct to Global Compact (Indiana University Press 2008), 195. 
6 Howard V. Permutter in Tagi Sagafi-Nejad and John Dunning, The UN and Transnational 
Corporations, From Code of Conduct to Global Compact (Indiana University Press 2008), 215. 
7 United Nations, Multinational Corporations in World Development (New York; United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1973) 3. 
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on the subject of TNCs from ‘engines of growth’ to fear that ‘conflict between rich and 
poor nations will be converted into a struggle between developing countries and MNCs’8 
to the ‘agents of capitalism’. One of critics of TNCs Hymer was sceptical of the UN 
efforts by maintaining that the reports the UN produced were “inadequate” as they failed 
to address many fundamental issues and asked if ‘a world system based on private 
multinational capitalism [could] ever achieve the development goals we all desire’.9 
Hymer was in favour of strict control and regulation over TNCs and their activities. The 
concerns over ‘undesirable effects that foreign investment by multinational corporations’ 
and ‘Host countries are concerned about the ownership and control of key economic 
sectors by foreign enterprises’ due to ‘the extent to which they may encroach upon 
political sovereignty’.10 One of the objectives of Economic and Social Council was to 
strengthen the negotiating skills of host developing states, which will effectively 
contribute to the capacity-building. Also, because ‘the perception by many developing 
countries that they lacked bargaining power vis-à-vis TNCs’.11 Objectives of creating the 
commission and the centre on TNCs was intended:  
 
[T]o serve the cause of economic development and the role of TNCs and FDI 
in that development and to do so in the context of ideas, philosophies, and 
economic policies prevalent among developing countries.12 
 
Over the years, the relationship between TNCs and host developing states changed. A 
common agreement is that developing states could do more to help attract needed foreign 
investment for capacity building and socio-economic development. Improved 
relationships with TNCs could also be based on better negotiation process and bargaining 
position.  
                                                          
8 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Summary of the Hearings before the Group of 
Eminent Persons, 445. 
9 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Summary of the Hearings before the Group of 
Eminent Persons. 
10 Taji Sagafi-Nejad, The UN and Transnational Corporations: From Code of Conduct to Global Compact 
(Indiana University Press 2008) 79. 
11 Tagi Sagafi-Nejad and John H. Dunning, The UN and Transnational Corporations, From Code of 
Conduct to Global Compact (Indiana University Press, Bloomington 2008) 94. 
12 Tagi Sagafi-Nejad and John H. Dunning, The UN and Transnational Corporations, From Code of 
Conduct to Global Compact (Indiana University Press, Bloomington 2008) 95. 
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Socio-economic development cannot be achieved without significant financial 
contribution also because ‘inequality and privilege act as major obstacles to 
development.13 ‘[R]esources locally available in underdeveloped countries were 
insufficient to stimulate and sustain economic development’.14 It was clear that 
developing states were in need of foreign investment.  
 
As the World Bank’s World Development Report 1990 stated inter alia that: 
 
[M]any countries experienced macroeconomic difficulties in the 1980s as the 
debt crisis and international recession brought structural weakness into the 
open. But when structural adjustment issues came to the fore, little attention 
was paid to the effect on the poor. Macroeconomic issues seemed more 
pressing, and many expected that there would be a rapid transition to new 
growth paths. As the decade continued, it became clear that the 
macroeconomic recovery and structural change were slow in coming. 
Evidence of declines in incomes and cutbacks in social services began to 
mount.15  
 
Developing states ‘to put themselves on a path of convergence with the advanced 
economies, developing countries must align their policies with the forces of 
globalization’.16 The International Labour Organisation (ILO) added that ‘rather than 
eliminating or attenuating differences and inequalities, the integration of national 
economies into a global system has on the contrary made those differences and 
inequalities more apparent and, in many ways, more unacceptable’.17 
Objectives of profit maximisation were put in confrontation to the national social-
economic development and capacity building objectives. 
TNCs were not only a concern for developing states, they were also a concern for the 
developed states. The international business community also reacted to the activities of 
                                                          
13 Peter Bauer, The United Nations Report on the Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries 
(Economic Journal 63, March 1953) 213. 
14 Louis Emmerji, Richard Jolly, Thomas G. Weiss, Ahead of the curve? UN Ideas and Global Challenges 
(Indiana University Press 2001) 40 – 41. 
15 World Bank, World Development Report 1990: Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press 1990) 
103.  
16 IMF, Forces of Globalization Must Be Embraced (IMF Survey 26, no.10 1997) 154. 
17 ILO, Defending Values, Promoting Change: Social Justice in a Global Economy, an ILO Agenda 
(Geneva: ILO, 1994) 18. 
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TNCs by adopting guidelines.18 Salacuse and Sullivan maintained that ‘foreign investors 
who sought the protection of international investment law encountered an ephemeral 
structure consisting largely of scattered treaty provisions, a few questionable customs, 
and contested general principles of law’.19 TNCs have ‘been portrayed both as engine of 
growth capable of eliminating international economic inequality and as a major obstacle 
to development’.20  
Foreign direct investment ‘reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a 
resident entity in one economy (“direct investor”) in an entity resident in an economy 
other than that of the investor (“direct investment enterprise”)’.21  
However, the states, whether developed or developing have started taking actions over 
concerns that disproportionate protection is given to the foreign investors also by means 
of jurisprudence by looking for alternative investor-state arbitration mechanism, 
reviewing existing BITs and in some cases even terminating existing BITs and 
withdrawing from ICSID. Ever evolving international investment law has faced a new 
challenge to accommodate for different aspirations between the parties involved, for 
which there still exist a big gap that will have to be overcome. A new mechanism for 
settlement of investor-state investment disputes will have to be introduced and the 
existing BITs will have to be reviewed to accommodate for changing circumstances. 
Therefore, the recommendation is that new investment agreements should include 
succession clause, re-negotiation clause, performance clause and transfer of profits. This 
goals can only be achieved in stable democratic societies where civil society public 
                                                          
18 These guidelines were voluntary. See for example International Chamber of Commerce, Guidelines for 
International Investment (ICC 1972) (updating its ‘International Code of Fair Treatment for Foreign 
Investments’, which had been drawn up by the ICC’s Committees on Foreign Investments and Foreign 
Establishments and approved by the ICC’s Quebec Congress in June 1949; contained in UNCTAD, 
International Investment Instruments: A Compendium (UNCTAD 1996) vol III 273–278). It was updated 
in May 2012, available online <http://www.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-and-Rules/Document-
centre/2012/2012-ICC-Guidelines-for-International-Investment/> accessed 10 January 2016. See also 
United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on  
Multinational Corporations, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, The International Telephone and  
Telegraph Company and Chile 1970–1971 (Government Printing Office 1973) (the extensive hearings in 
the United States on outward FDI and especially the activities of ITT in Chile). In Europe, Jean-Jacques 
Schreiber’s Le defi américain (Éditions Denoël 1968)  
received wide attention.  
19 Jeswald W Salacuse and Nicholas P Sullivan, ‘Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain’ (2005) 46 Harvard Intl L J 68. 
20 Rhys Jenkins, Transnational corporations and uneven development, the internationalization of capital 
and the Third World (First published 1987, Routledge 1991) 1. 
21 OECD definition of FDI. 
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awareness is high and the rule of law is heavily imbedded in the existing legal order. Such 
stable democracies should also have well developed judiciaries and state institutions to 
offer protection for their citizens and continue to govern the state in the spirit of the 
wellbeing of its citizens as well as aliens. 
Based on the ideas researched and developed in this research the hypotheses that were 
laid at the beginning can now be confirmed. 
1. How may it be possible to develop a technique whereby interests of both parties 
may be balanced?  
The only possible way moving forward is through balanced negotiations, where 
bargaining position would be equal on both sides and benefits would have to be agreed 
for both of the parties. It has to be a two-way process and the UN should be the platform 
to facilitate such negotiations with the support of the principle of the rule of law. Any 
disputes that might arise between the parties in the investor-state dispute settlement 
should be facilitated by autonomous entity that would not favour any of the parties and 
would work in a balanced way and would help developing states in their quest of 
developing reliable judiciaries by offering know-how and training the staff. Therefore, 
the gap between the aspirational differences between the parties has to be closed by means 
of negotiations and taking reciprocity into consideration as well as equal distribution of 
benefits and profits. Hence roles and responsibilities should be equally and clearly 
distributed during the negotiation process. Domestic courts should take the lead and 
become the first port of call for any investor-state disagreement which could be solved 
by re-negotiating the terms and conditions if there is a change of circumstances. However, 
domestic courts have to engage in capacity building and develop to the point that they are 
able to provide reliable due process for solving investor-state disagreements. 
 
2. A false notion of bargaining power has hindered the process of implementing the 
concept of balancing the interests. 
Due to the misconception and the use of the word ‘power’ it has been recommended that 
bargaining position would be more appropriate word to use in future negotiations of 
international investment agreements. That is due to the fact that power suggest superior 
position of one party over the other and as such does not facilitate balanced representation 
of interests. Aspirations have to be met and both parties should work towards mending 
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fences. Starting by taking the responsibility and assigning clear roles during the 
negotiation process in which interest of both parties will be equally represented. While 
TNCs are profit-masimisers and HDS are benefit-maximsers. TNCs are interested in 
achieving highest return on their investment and HDS are interested in achieving socio-
economic independence. The interests of both parties have to find a balance in order for 
both parties to benefit from signed agreements towards achieving the interests of both the 
parties in a balanced way. 
 
3. The aspirational differences between the parties are currently unreachable and 
some progress on this issue can be made if only true bargaining position concept 
is developed and applied.  
As seen from the previous two notions it is of significant importance that aspirational 
differences of the parties are met. High profits of TNCs are no longer sustainable without 
the capacity building, re-negotiation clause, distribution of profits, succession and 
progress review. At the same time host developing states have to do their part in 
developing stable democratic societies, where civil society is involved in governance of 
the state and reliable judiciaries are at the forefront of ensuring stability. Such stable 
democratic states can only operate on developed and reliable judiciaries that can 
eventually take over investor-state dispute resolutions in cases they arise and offer 
protection and security for its citizens as well as aliens. The recommended way forward 
is to apply the concept of bargaining position in the negotiations process and re-negotiate 
existing investment agreement that would represent aspirations of both the parties in a 
balanced way and facilitate reciprocity moving forward. In the case when investment 
disputes between the foreign investor and a host state do arise, domestic courts should be 
able to facilitate independent dispute arbitration. There are three litigation options. First 
option is based on the signed BIT and recognition of the domestic court of the developing 
state that has the capacity to facilitate litigation also by the recognition of the court order, 
in which the developed state sends their skilled and trained arbitrators to the host 
developing state in order to conduct litigation. Second option is that the court of the 
developed state carries litigation for the claims brought by the host developing states. The 
third option is the revival and implementation of the Calvo doctrine. In the UK for 
example the English courts have jurisdiction over any company that is domiciled within 
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their territory.22 In the US on the other hand the courts do not automatically accept 
jurisdiction over TNCs sued for actions that took place abroad. 
 
This research achieved its purpose to establish the lack of balance of interests between 
TNCs and host developing states. While this research found inconclusive arguments on 
the contribution of TNCs it equally found opposing arguments on the benefits of private 
foreign investors in host developing states on socio-economic development and 
effectively capacity building. This research concludes that the reasons for this is in history 
and the lack of capacity in respect of reciprocity between developing and developed 
states. This research therefore establishes the need for the attitudes of both the parties to 
be changed. The way towards achieving mutually beneficial cooperation is in closing the 
gap between aspirational differences. Aspirations between profit-making institutions and 
maximising benefits for capacity building from the participation of TNCs. There have 
been many attempts to control the activities of TNCs. One of them was the UN draft 
codes of conduct on TNCs, OECD codes of conduct and the recommendations on transfer 
of technology among other codes of conduct developed by intergovernmental or non-
governmental institutions, however all attempts have failed and have unfortunately not 
been successfully implemented so far. 
While the host developing states were obliged to follow and to offer the international 
minimum standards to the foreign investors, the principle of states responsibility included 
protection of TNCs and their assets. Whenever there was a clash between the two parties, 
based on their aspirational differences, there have been cases of nationalisation and 
expropriation of TNCs assets in newly born independent states. This research confirmed 
the lack of a negotiation system in place that would facilitate mutually beneficial 
investment agreements, for which both the parties are equally responsible. Therefore, 
both legislative and normative protective measures, trough codes of conduct particularly 
of good governance, should be adopted by host developing states as well as by TNCs and 
implemented with the help of the UN, which should become the platform to facilitate 
balanced negotiation process. Close examination of a number of existing BITs showed 
                                                          
22 See for example the most recent case of Zambian villagers claims that their water supplies have been 
heavily polluted by the London based Mining firm Vedanta Resources. The High court has ruled in 
favour of the Zambian to have their case heard in the British courts. The trial is likely to begin in 2017. 
Represented by Martyn Day <https://www.leighday.co.uk/Our-experts/partners-at-ld/Martyn-Day> 
accessed 13 December2016. 
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that these investment treaties are imbalanced as they tend to protect the interest of TNCs, 
rather than providing for a climate of mutual participations of both the parties based on 
reciprocity. It is however believed that challenges associated with this research topic can 
be resolved by diplomatic negotiations as not everything can be resolved by law due to 
the limits explored in this research. 
This research placed great emphasis upon the need for capacity building of developing 
host states as it also maintains that state contracts should include certain specific clauses 
for balancing these interests, namely succession clause, re-negotiation clause, 
performance clause, transfer of profits clause as agreed and protection of investor’s 
clause. Host developing states should also work on developing stable democratic societies 
and reliable judiciaries. This is the foundation for the important legislation in regard to 
private foreign investments, namely legislation on intellectual property rights, equality 
among investors, human rights legislation and finally they should also promote the rule 
of law. In the event of disputes arising between investor-state these could be settled by 
the local courts and the local legislation if the reliable judiciaries and confidence is 
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